THE HUMANITARIAN DISCOURSE OF FORCE:

EXPLAINING U.S. PRESIDENTS' JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION

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Conventional wisdom assumes that national security justifications are the most effective way to bolster support for military action and uniformly persuade the domestic audience. Using an original dataset of justifications for all potential U.S. interventions, 1990-2013, I show that contrary to these expectations U.S. presidents employed humanitarian justifications in every military intervention of the past 25 years. Why are humanitarian justifications prevalent, even in popular, security-driven interventions? To what extent do these justifications facilitate the use of military force?

Combining content analysis, survey experiments, and archival research, I focus on the domestic audience to argue that humanitarian justifications are necessary to build a coalition of support from a public with diverse foreign policy beliefs. In particular, humanitarian claims resonate with individuals who are unconvinced by security justifications and are otherwise active opponents of intervention. As a result of their broad appeal, presidents have an incentive to emphasize humanitarian claims as often as possible; however, the same constituents that make humanitarian justifications necessary also constrain their use. Specifically, individuals with cooperative internationalist values are uniquely influenced by humanitarian claims, but punish leaders who misuse humanitarian explanations. The findings have implications for whose support matters most in the build-up to military interventions and the conditions under which presidents can use moral appeals to obtain this support.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Sarah Maxey holds a Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University, with a focus on International Relations. She received her B.A. *summa cum laude* in Government and Sociology with a social justice concentration from Georgetown University in 2009 and her M.A. in Government from Cornell University in 2015. Sarah has also worked as the program director for a service provision non-profit in North Carolina. During 2017-2018 she will be a post-doctoral fellow with the Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In September 2013, President Barack Obama addressed the nation to make the case for military action against Syria. Intervention was necessary, Obama argued, because "Assad's government gassed to death over a thousand people, including hundreds of children. The images from this massacre are sickening: Men, women, children lying in rows, killed by poison gas" (Obama 2013). Despite the clear evidence of attacks on civilians, Obama's humanitarian appeals—defined as references to the protection or promotion of the welfare of foreign civilians—failed to mobilize support for military action. Only 28 percent of the public favored air strikes in response to the use of chemical weapons and only 37 percent favored air strikes even if Syria refused to give up its chemical weapons (Pew 2013). The President eventually pursued diplomatic alternatives instead (Koh 2016, 999).

One year later, in September 2014, Obama again made the case for military action in Syria, this time to combat the growing threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This address focused on "what the United States will do with our friends and allies to degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group" (Obama 2014). In contrast to the 2013 response, the prospect of a terrorist threat successfully mobilized public support. Polls conducted immediately after Obama's speech reported that 53 percent of respondents approved of his planned military campaign and a growing number were concerned that U.S. action would not go far enough (Pew 2014a). However, in addition to the national security concerns, Obama also continued to justify U.S. military action against ISIL in humanitarian terms. His 2014 address first outlined the threat ISIL posed to the people of Iraq and Syria before describing threats to U.S. citizens, asserting, "In a region that has known so much bloodshed, these terrorists are

unique in their brutality. They execute captured prisoners. They kill children. They enslave, rape, and force women into marriage. They threatened a religious minority with genocide" (Obama 2014). Given the ineffectiveness of humanitarian justifications in 2013 and the public's confusion about the objectives of intervention in 2014—62 percent did not believe the U.S. operation had a clearly defined goal (Pew 2014)—Obama's continued use of humanitarian appeals raises questions about the incentives behind presidents' justifications for military action.

Obama's rhetoric in the Syrian case is not unique, but suggests there is much left to be understood about the strategies presidents use to justify interventions and when different justifications effectively bolster public support. Analysis of national addresses reveals that U.S. presidents have used humanitarian justifications in almost every potential military intervention of the past 25 years. However, presidents also appear to exercise discretion when using humanitarian claims in security-driven interventions, taking care to present national security as the dominant explanation for action. Combined, presidents' widespread use of but muted emphasis on humanitarian claims presents a puzzle for the relationship between official rhetoric and public attitudes. This pattern runs counter to three alternative explanations for presidents' justification strategies: 1) that presidents have an incentive to use humanitarian claims as often as possible to persuade an emotional and inattentive public (Almond 1950; Lippmann 1922; Mearsheimer 2011); 2) the expectation that national security threats are a sufficient and effective means of rallying public support (Brody 1991; Drezner 2008a); and 3) the implicit assumption that the effects of humanitarian claims are best studied in cases of potential humanitarian interventions (Finnemore 2003).

Contrary to these existing accounts, justifications that reference the protection or promotion of the welfare of foreign civilians are a common part of how U.S. presidents

communicate with their publics about military action. Additionally, the influence of these claims is not limited to cases of humanitarian intervention. Why do presidents consistently use humanitarian justifications for interventions best explained in national security terms? Who is the target audience for these claims? To what extent do these moral appeals allow presidents to manage public perceptions of military action?

This project attempts to explain the role of moral appeals in contemporary interventions by focusing on characteristics of the domestic audience that shape presidents' opportunities to build stable coalitions of support. In particular, the public's foreign policy preferences vary along two dimensions based on answers to the questions: Should the U.S. play an active role in international affairs? What form should this active role take? Combined, these two dimensions generate three categories of foreign policy beliefs: 1) militant internationalists who favor engagement in global affairs and support the use of military force to achieve foreign policy goals, 2) cooperative internationalists who also support an active U.S. foreign policy, but are skeptical of military force, and 3) isolationists who do not support U.S. involvement in solving international problems (Kertzer et al. 2014; Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; Wittkopf 1994; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983). Building on these known divisions, I identify cooperative internationalists as the target audience for communication strategies and as the segment of the public most likely to impose the political costs that hold the president accountable for military action. I then demonstrate that cooperative internationalists are also uniquely responsive to humanitarian claims. The important position these individuals occupy in the domestic coalition creates the incentives that drive both the widespread use and limited emphasis of humanitarian claims. Clarifying the composition of domestic coalitions both explains the pattern of

humanitarian justifications and sheds new light on whose support matters most for initiating and sustaining military interventions.

Humanitarian Justifications in Contemporary Interventions

Explaining the Justifications of U.S. Presidents

Justifications are the overt and public rationale that presidents use to convince the public that military action is legitimate and worth the potential costs and risks. In the U.S. context, presidents have considerable power over how military interventions are framed and perceived by the public. This power stems from their information and first-mover advantages on matters of foreign policy (Howell, Jackman, and Rogowski 2013; Kernell 1997; Neustadt 1980; Western 2005). In the context of potential military interventions, the complexity of collecting and interpreting details about foreign crises and military options gives the president a "near-monopoly control" over information relative to both the public and Congress (Kernell 1997, 183). Additionally, the role of Commander in Chief gives the president the final authority to decide when and how the U.S. conducts military interventions. The president is thus the first to know that the U.S. intends to take military action and can present information about the intervention to the public before and in greater detail than media coverage or political elites. These advantages enable the president to use official statements to shape the terms of the debate about military action and block sources of dissent (Krebs and Lobasz 2007). While public attitudes towards military action are influenced by information from a variety of sources, including media coverage and elite cues, the president's justifications provide the initial frame to which all other sources respond. Examining the justifications offered by the president in national addresses thus provides leverage for understanding how the White House attempts to manage

public opinion and the conditions under which it will be able to mobilize the domestic audience in support of military action.

In this project, I examine the pattern of and domestic incentives behind two broad categories of justifications: humanitarian and security. Humanitarian justifications assert that military action is necessary to protect or promote the welfare of foreign civilians. These justifications include statements such as Obama's claims that U.S. airstrikes in Syria had "helped save the lives of thousands of innocent men, women and children" (Obama 2014). Alternatively, security justifications contend that the U.S. must take military action to protect or promote U.S. national security and strategic interests. In the Syrian case, Obama employed security justifications when he explained that, "If left unchecked, these terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States" (Obama 2014).

I developed these categories of justifications inductively from manual coding of post-Cold War national addresses—outlined in detail in Chapter 3—but they also reflect the two purposes of military action legitimated by international law. The United Nations Charter establishes a general prohibition on the use of force with exceptions for states' rights to self-defense if an armed attack occurs and threats to international peace and security recognized by the Security Council (United Nations 1945). Security justifications are in line with the use of force to defend against threats to U.S. and international security. Humanitarian justifications reflect the Chapter VII provision for addressing threats to international peace and security, as well as related agreements such as the 1948 Genocide Convention and 2005 World Summit resolutions that legitimate the use of military force to protect foreign civilians (Bellamy 2006; Finnemore 2003, 79).

While almost all leaders benefit from publicly presenting their rationale for taking military action, this project focuses on the justifications offered by U.S. presidents because the U.S. is unique in its ability to project military power around the world and is the state most often involved in interventions (Pickering and Kisangani 2009). The analysis is also limited to justifications for interventions in the post-Cold War period and begins in 1990. Considering only the post-Cold War period precludes conclusions about the historical pattern of justifications, but holds constant the feasibility of humanitarian justifications as a primary rationale for action. Before the end of the Cold War, humanitarian crises were viewed as the internal affairs of states whose sovereignty could not be violated without also violating the UN Charter (Finnemore 1996a). As a result, states often avoided humanitarian rationales for action even in the face of grave humanitarian crises because these appeals alone could not legitimate intervention (Wheeler 2000). Therefore, prior to the post-Cold War period it is not possible to determine whether presidents' emphasis of humanitarian justifications in security interventions was limited by the composition of the domestic coalition or because primarily humanitarian interventions were not considered internationally legitimate uses of force.

Humanitarian Justifications in Post-Cold War Military Interventions

Understanding when and how humanitarian justifications influence support for military intervention sheds light on what it takes for a justification to effectively bolster public support and whose support matters the most. Humanitarian claims are conventionally assumed to be suboptimal justifications for military action—because they do not present an immediate threat to U.S. security, leaders will have to work hard to make the case that protecting foreign civilians is worth the financial expense and risk of American casualties. For this reason, the effects of humanitarian justification have almost exclusively been studied in the context of potential

humanitarian interventions, where humanitarian claims are the only feasible explanation for taking immediate military action and the "discussions are, again, not about interest and advantage. They are about responsibility and duty" (Finnemore 1996b, 87). However, this approach to humanitarian justifications overlooks the prevalence of humanitarian claims in interventions driven primarily by security concerns.

In fact, U.S. presidents from both political parties have used humanitarian appeals as part of their justification strategy for every military intervention of the post-Cold War period. I define military interventions as deployment of combat troops across international borders with the purpose of engaging in coercive action that lasts at least one week.[1] In the context of this study, interventions must last at least one week because single-strikes carry a lower burden of justification. Presidents are less likely to be held accountable for non-sustained uses of military force and thus may justify these types of military action differently, if at all. Focusing on military interventions also excludes cases in which the U.S. responded to a foreign crisis by sending aid or support for UN peace operations that were conducted with the consent of the target state. Like single-strike operations, non-coercive actions carry fewer costs and risks and, as a result, the bar for public justifications is significantly lower.

By this definition, the U.S. has participated in nine military interventions since 1990, five of which pursued primarily security objectives and four of which were humanitarian interventions.[2] As Table 1.1 shows, the president employed humanitarian justifications to evoke concern about foreign civilians in each case, regardless of whether the intervention's goals were

[1] The requirement that intervention last at least one week is added to standardize the threshold for justifications, but this definition is consistent with existing studies (Finnemore 2003, 9–10; Kreps 2011, 15; Saunders 2011, 21).
[2] All interventions contain multiple objectives, but I follow Jentleson (1992) and Jentleson and Britton (1998) in classifying interventions by their primary, or principle, policy objective. This decision and the related coding are outlined in detail in Chapter 3.

primarily humanitarian or security-driven. The prevalence of humanitarian claims across interventions also indicates that these justifications are not specific to the rhetorical style of any particular president or to especially challenging or long-term military actions.

Table 1.1 Examples of Humanitarian Justifications in All Post-Cold War Interventions

Case	Primary Policy Objective	Example of Humanitarian Justification
Gulf War (1991)	Security	"Iraq's brutality against innocent civilians will not be permitted to stand. And Saddam Hussein's violations of international law will not stand. His aggression against Kuwait will not stand" (G. H. W. Bush 1990g).
Somalia (1992-93)	Humanitarian	"I have to remind my fellow Americans and all of the people in the world who have an aversion to the events of the last two weeks not to forget that over 300,000 people lost their lives there, were starved, were murdered, were subject to incredibly inhumane conditions because of the chaotic and lawless behavior of the people who had authority" (Clinton 1993c).
Haiti (1994)	Security	"Our reasons are clear: to stop the horrific atrocities that threaten thousands of men, women, and children in Haiti" (Clinton 1994f).
Bosnia (1994-95)	Humanitarian	"Two weeks ago, in a murderous attack, a single shell killed 68 people in the city's market. And last week with our NATO allies, we said that those who would continue terrorizing Sarajevo must pay a price" (Clinton 1994b).
Kosovo (1999)	Humanitarian	"I think the most important thing now is for us to save lives, return people to their homes, get them the humanitarian aid they need, and to remove completely and irrevocably the threat of aggression by the Serb military and other forces in Kosovo" (Clinton 1998).
Afghanistan (2001-14)	Security	"Not only is our military destroying those who would harbor evil…but we're liberators. We're freeing women and children from incredible oppression" (G. W. Bush 2002).
Iraq (2003-10)	Security	"We care about those who suffer under the hands of dictator in Iraq. We care deeply about those who dissent and then are tortured, about those who express an opinion other than what the dictator thinks and are raped and mutilated. The condition of the Iraqi citizen is on our mind and in our heart" (G. W. Bush 2003c).
Libya (2011)	Humanitarian	"The United States of America is different. And as president, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action" (Obama 2011).
Syria/ISIL (2014)	Security	"When we helped prevent the massacre of civilians trapped on a distant mountain, here's what one of them said: 'We owe our American friends our lives. Our children will always remember that there was someone who felt our struggle and made a long journey to protect innocent people.' That is the difference we make in the world" (Obama 2014).

The examples of humanitarian claims outlined in Table 1.1 suggest that by focusing almost exclusively on cases of humanitarian intervention, normative accounts have overlooked a major category of military action in which humanitarian claims play a prominent role. Additionally, focusing on humanitarian interventions assumes that the prevalence of humanitarian justifications is a result of developing humanitarian norms, disregarding U.S. presidents' long history of combining humanitarian and security explanations for war (Bass 2008; Bogen 1966). As a result, little is known about the influence or incentives behind humanitarian justifications in a context in which they are frequently used, can significantly bolster public support, and have the potential to create a false pretense for otherwise unpopular interventions. By focusing on how the composition of the domestic audience drives presidents' justification strategies in both security and humanitarian interventions, this project provides a comprehensive account of humanitarian justifications that is consistent with both their long history and current patterns of use.

Argument in Brief: Building a Domestic Coalition from a Diverse Audience

I argue that the pattern of humanitarian justifications in U.S. interventions is explained by the composition of the domestic coalition that presidents must build to mobilize support for military action and avoid politically costly opposition. Humanitarian claims are useful—even in popular security-driven interventions—because they are uniquely capable of strengthening support among cooperative internationalists who are the target audience for communication strategies and the individuals most likely to form a politically costly opposition. By appealing to this key group, humanitarian appeals allow presidents to minimize the risk of domestic dissent; however, they do not give leaders free rein to pursue military action. When humanitarian claims are stretched beyond their role as supplementary explanations for security-driven interventions,

they can generate backlash from the same individuals they are intended to persuade. The importance of maintaining a stable domestic coalition of support thus explains why presidents use humanitarian claims widely but limit their emphasis in security interventions.

This domestic coalition argument stands in contrast to existing accounts of the relationship between justifications and attitudes towards military action, which can be divided into two competing camps. The first presents humanitarian justifications as a convenient cover for interventions that promote the U.S. strategic interests or the president's political objectives but do not otherwise resonate with emotional, impulsive publics (Carr 1939; Holsti 1992, 440; Morgenthau 1951). Alternatively, the second portrays a prudent public that sorts through justifications to evaluate the risks and benefits of intervention and responds to humanitarian claims only to the extent that these justifications communicate new information about the expected costs or success of military action (Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998). However, both of these accounts are based on the implicit assumption that there is a uniform U.S. public that responds to justifications for military action in homogeneous ways.

This assumption is challenged by evidence that the U.S. public is composed of individuals with diverse foreign policy preferences that can be systematically evaluated along two dimensions: 1) whether they believe the U.S. should play an active role in the world, and 2) what form this active role should take (Kertzer et al. 2014; Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; Wittkopf 1994; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983). From these two dimensions, individuals can be divided into three categories of foreign policy beliefs. Isolationists believe that the U.S. should not play an active role in solving international problems, regardless of the objectives. Militant internationalists believe that the U.S. should play an active role in the world and that this role

should focus on using and maintaining U.S. military strength. Cooperative internationalists also support active U.S. engagement in global affairs, but believe this engagement should take the form of cooperative efforts to reach humanitarian goals. Figure 1.1 summarizes these dimensions and the related foreign policy beliefs. [3]

Figure 1.1 Foreign Policy Beliefs

		Preferred Form of U.S. Engagement	
		Military	**Cooperative**
Should the U.S. play an active role in world affairs?	**Yes**	Militant Internationalists	Cooperative Internationalists
	No	Isolationists	

Building on these categories, I contend that these same dimensions also determine how individuals respond to alternative justifications for military action and can be used to identify the target audience for humanitarian claims. Because they do not support active engagement in international affairs, isolationists are unlikely to offer sustainable support in response to either security or humanitarian justifications, making them an inefficient target for presidential appeals. By contrast, because they approve of engaged foreign policy and are focused on solving problems by demonstrating military strength, militant internationalists are the most consistent

[3] The defining and unifying characteristic of isolationists is their lack of support for engagement in international affairs and, because they are not easily convinced to support action for either militant or cooperative goals, I analyze this category in the aggregate. However, in her study of attitudes toward foreign aid, Prather (2016) demonstrates that isolationists can be disaggregated into liberals and conservatives based on their attitudes towards redistribution. Liberal isolationists support domestic redistribution, but not foreign aid. Because there is no comparable domestic dimension for military intervention, this distinction is less relevant for understanding how individuals respond to justifications for the use of force.

source of support for both security and humanitarian interventions. Presidents can thus never count on the support of isolationists and almost always count on the support of militant internationalists. This characterization leaves individuals with cooperative internationalist values as the group that is skeptical of military action but can be persuaded to offer sustainable support if the president uses effective justifications. Cooperative internationalists are thus a critical component of a stable domestic coalition and a key target for presidents' justification strategies. The importance of gaining and maintaining support from these individuals is compounded by their political engagement—cooperative internationalists are expected to be particularly attentive to foreign policy and willing to take political action to express their discontent, making them a source of potentially costly opposition.

Given the importance of persuading cooperative internationalists, the question becomes: When do these individuals respond to justifications for intervention? Because they prefer cooperative approaches to foreign policy, cooperative internationalists are inherently skeptical that military action is the best way to solve international problems and will be unconvinced by security justifications. Instead, humanitarian justifications are uniquely capable of bolstering support among these individuals because they circumvent skepticism by shifting the focus to humanitarian objectives and the necessity of military action to protect foreign civilians. The same attention to humanitarian objectives that makes humanitarian justifications resonate with cooperative internationalists also makes these individuals sensitive to their misuse. If presidents are perceived as overstating humanitarian claims in security interventions, they will provoke backlash from this key group. The central position of cooperative internationalists in the domestic coalition thus creates an incentive for and constrains the use of humanitarian

justifications. Presidents' efforts to appeal to these individuals and maintain stable coalitions of support account for the pattern of humanitarian claims in contemporary interventions.

The domestic coalition argument creates observable implications at three different levels. First, in terms of the pattern of presidents' justifications, it expects humanitarian claims to be widely present but carefully balanced in security interventions. Second, at the individual level, it contends that people with cooperative internationalist values respond most strongly to humanitarian justifications, are skeptical of security justifications, and impose political costs on presidents who misuse humanitarian appeals. Finally, in terms of White House decision making, it expects concern about building a domestic coalition from a public with diverse foreign policy preferences to guide the communication strategy for military interventions. The multi-method design presented in the following section evaluates the implications at each of these levels.

Methods and Case Selection

This project employs a multi-method design to address three empirical questions generated by the domestic coalition argument: 1) What is the pattern of humanitarian justifications for potential interventions in the post-Cold War period? 2) How do individuals' underlying foreign policy beliefs influence their response to alternative justifications and sensitivity to seemingly deceptive claims? 3) Does the White House recognize the importance of building a stable domestic coalition from a public with diverse foreign policy preferences and does this recognition inform official communication strategies? Together, these questions explain the role that humanitarian justifications play in contemporary interventions and clarify whose support is necessary to mobilize the domestic audience. In this case, a multi-method design that combines quantitative, experimental, and qualitative methods is necessary to address each question at the appropriate level of analysis. This approach also allows me to "test

assumptions that are generally untested in single-method research, thereby transforming key issues of descriptive and causal inference from matters of speculative assertion into points of empirical debate" (Seawright 2016, 1).

The first step to understanding the influence of humanitarian justifications is to identify when and how these justifications are used and how this pattern compares to the use of security explanations. This analysis extends the study of humanitarian justifications beyond the context of humanitarian interventions by demonstrating that these claims are common across all types of potential interventions in the post-Cold War period. To illustrate and analyze the pattern of humanitarian justifications over time, I construct an original dataset of justifications for all potential U.S. military interventions from 1990 to 2013. Potential interventions include crises from the UCDP and MID datasets that received public attention, in immediate and specific detail, with the threat of coercive action. To investigate how justifications are distributed across different types of interventions, I code each crisis as a potential humanitarian or security intervention. I then use content analysis of national addresses that reference a potential intervention to capture the pattern of justifications for each crisis. From the content analysis, I create indicators for whether humanitarian claims were present in a given speech and the relative emphasis placed on these claims.

The second question investigates individual-level behavior in response to humanitarian claims to determine whether the pattern of justifications is likely to resonate with the domestic audience. To separate the effect of humanitarian justifications from attitudes about the president and exposure to different coverage of events, I design survey experiments that vary both the type of justification used and the perceived sincerity of the president's explanation for action. The survey instrument measures individuals' underlying foreign policy beliefs, their support for

military action, trust in the president, expectations about the intervention's outcome, and willingness to support additional humanitarian efforts in the future.

Together, the dataset of justifications and survey experiments show that both the pattern of humanitarian justifications and individuals' responses are consistent with the argument that concern about the domestic coalition drives justification strategies. Humanitarian justifications help build and sustain a coalition of support for military action; however, the quantitative analysis cannot determine whether this outcome was the intent of White House strategy or a beneficial side effect of a communication plan developed to reach other objectives. Qualitative analysis of administrations' communication strategies is used to consider: 1) whether presidents recognize the importance of building a domestic coalition that includes individuals with diverse foreign policy preferences, and 2) the extent to which this recognition drives their choice of justifications for military action. To understand how administrations view the domestic audience and take this audience into account when developing communication strategies, I conduct case studies of one security intervention and one humanitarian intervention—the 1991 Gulf War in Iraq and U.S. policy towards Bosnia from 1993-1995, respectively. These analyses draw on archival materials including speech drafts, internal memos, meeting notes, official correspondence, and press guidance collected from the George H.W. Bush and William J. Clinton Presidential Libraries.

Case Selection

I use the Gulf War case to examine how presidents develop communication strategies for security interventions because it represents one of the three largest, security-driven U.S. military actions of the post-Cold War period.[4] This intervention is security-driven because it responded

[4] The intervention involved both the deployment of thousands of U.S. ground troops for more than a week and incurred billions of dollars of financial costs. The Gulf War, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and

primarily to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, which both constituted an act of aggression condemned by the international community and posed a threat to U.S. regional and economic interests. While Saddam Hussein was accused of human rights violations prior to military action and the U.S. pursued the humanitarian Operation Provide Comfort following the end of the Gulf War, these abuses did not increase significantly in the buildup to military action. As Evans noted during Operation Iraqi Freedom more than a decade later, the humanitarian argument "was a very strong one a decade and more ago, when Saddam was massacring Kurds in the late 1980s and the southern Shi'ites in the early 1990s—as the world in both cases looked steadfastly the other way—but it had much less application in recent years, when no such catastrophe was occurring or imminent and, awful as it was, the Iraqi regime's behaviour was not much worse than a score or two of others" (Evans 2004, 71). Instead, the impetus for the Gulf War was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and threat to both U.S. allies and access to oil.

Given these conditions, examining communication strategies in the Gulf War highlights the role of humanitarian claims in one of the largest security interventions of the post-Cold War period. As the first major military operation following the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War also helps establish scope conditions of the domestic coalition argument by investigating whether the utility of humanitarian claims was an established fact or something the Bush administration discovered as it navigated the new world order (Haass 1999, 6). Additionally, the central role played by a multilateral coalition in Operation Desert Storm (Kreps 2011, 49) and narrow votes in favor of military action in both the House and Senate (Clymer 1991) suggest the President had reason to persuade the public, the international community, and political elites. Both the domestic coalition and alternative explanations—that the president was focused on the

Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq are unique in this respect for the post-Cold War period (Belasco 2009; Daggett 2010; Salazar Torreon 2016).

international audience or elite debates—are therefore feasible and the Gulf War case provides a helpful context for clarifying the relative emphasis the Bush administration placed on appealing to each audience.

To determine whether concern about the domestic coalition also drives justification strategies in response to humanitarian crises and during periods of non-intervention, the second case study considers U.S. policy towards Bosnia from 1993 to 1995 for two reasons. First, the conflict led to one of the worst humanitarian disasters of the post-Cold War period. In addition to blocking humanitarian aid from reaching Bosnian Muslims and laying siege to Sarajevo, the Serbs engaged in a campaign of ethnic cleansing and genocide. In one of the conflict's most egregious and publicized tragedies, Serbian forces attacked the U.N. safe area in Srebrenica, systematically killing 7,000 boys and men (Power 2002, 393). The genocide received international attention, influenced the international community's approach to UN peace operations, and contributed to the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. Understanding how humanitarian justifications were used in this case thus evaluates the domestic coalition argument in one of most substantively important humanitarian interventions of the last twenty-five years.

Second, U.S. policy towards the Bosnian conflict shifted from Clinton's threats of military action on the campaign trail and early attempts to lift the arms embargo to a commitment to pursing a negotiated solution in 1993 and 1994 to increased participation in airstrikes and the commitment of U.S. troops to implement the Dayton Accords in 1995. Investigating changes in the Clinton administration's communications at different stages of the Bosnian conflict thus allows me to evaluate how humanitarian claims are used to manage domestic pressure during periods of non-intervention and mobilize domestic support for military

escalation. Examining periods of intervention and non-intervention within a single case highlights how the Clinton administration changed their communication strategy over time to justify both inaction and the commitment of U.S. troops while also holding constant any conflict or country-specific confounders.

Overview of the Dissertation

The dissertation aims to explain why presidents consistently use humanitarian claims in interventions best justified in terms of U.S. national security as a means of clarifying the limits and mechanisms of democratic accountability for the use of force. To this end, the project's structure reflects the same three motivating questions that drive its methodology: How do presidents employ humanitarian justifications in contemporary interventions? Which individuals respond to these claims and to what extent do these individuals punish leaders for deceptive justifications? Does the pattern of humanitarian claims reflect the White House's efforts to build a stable coalition of support from a public with diverse foreign policy preferences?

After providing a detailed account of the domestic coalition argument in Chapter 2, which contends that the importance of persuading cooperative internationalists both drives and constrains the use of humanitarian justifications, the dissertation proceeds in three parts that address each of these questions in turn. First, Chapter 3 uses an original dataset to examine the pattern of humanitarian justifications in presidents' national addresses from 1990 to 2013. The domestic coalition argument generates theoretical expectations for how presidents use and emphasize humanitarian justifications across different types of interventions. It expects presidents to use humanitarian claims in both humanitarian and security interventions to persuade cooperative internationalists. However, because cooperative internationalists are sensitive to the perceived overuse of humanitarian appeals, it also expects presidents to exercise

discretion in their emphasis of humanitarian claims in potential security interventions. The chapter analyzes the trends of justifications by intervention type to evaluate the domestic coalition argument against two alternatives: a "kitchen sink" hypothesis that expects presidents to use all possible justifications all the time to please an emotional and impulsive public, and a "situational determinants" hypothesis that expects presidents to use humanitarian claims only when they reflect an ongoing humanitarian crisis. The findings show that humanitarian claims have played an important role in explanations for military action across the post-Cold War period, are not confined to cases of humanitarian intervention, and, consistent with concern about maintaining the support of cooperative internationalists, are emphasized with discretion.

Chapter 4 builds on this analysis to examine whether the pattern of humanitarian justifications effectively bolsters support among cooperative internationalists. To this end, I employ a survey experiment that classifies respondents by their underlying foreign policy beliefs and varies both the type and sincerity of the president's justifications for military intervention. I find that cooperative internationalists are skeptical of security justifications but respond strongly to humanitarian claims. By contrast, militant internationalists support intervention and isolationists oppose intervention regardless of the justifications used. The support of cooperative internationalists is thus the benefit that presidents gain by adding humanitarian claims to their justifications for security interventions. This support is particularly important because the results also indicate that cooperative internationalists are politically engaged and willing to take action to impose political costs on presidents who pursue military intervention without their approval. Additionally, evidence from the survey experiments indicates that humanitarian justifications bolster the support of cooperative internationalists by increasing their concern with the welfare of foreign civilians rather than by changing their perceptions of the president's motives.

To this point, humanitarian justifications appear well suited to increasing support for intervention among cooperative internationalists, able to maintain the support of militant internationalists, and effective without requiring respondents to change their perceptions of the president's motives. Presidents should thus have an incentive to use humanitarian justifications as often as possible. Why then do presidents limit their emphasis of humanitarian justifications in security interventions? Chapter 5 leverages the survey experiment's variation in the sincerity of justifications to show that cooperative internationalists also impose limits on the utility of humanitarian claims. When respondents received information that the president was using humanitarian claims insincerely as a cover for security or political interests, the support of cooperative internationalists dropped dramatically. In addition to withdrawing their support for the intervention, backlash from these individuals also imposes political costs on the president in terms of approval ratings and a willingness to support his reelection. Unlike cooperative internationalists, the support of militant internationalists and isolationists is not significantly affected by evidence that the president used humanitarian claims to cover up security motives. Combined, the findings from Chapters 4 and 5 highlight the important role cooperative internationalists play in facilitating the domestic mobilization of support necessary to pursue military action and in holding presidents accountable for their foreign policy decisions.

Having shown that humanitarian justifications are a common explanation for military action—in both security and humanitarian interventions—and bolster support among cooperative internationalists, the remainder of the dissertation demonstrates that this pattern of justifications reflects an intentional White House communication strategy. Case studies of the 1991 Gulf War and U.S. policy towards Bosnia, 1993-95, show that administrations are aware of heterogeneity in public opinion and design communication strategies to build domestic coalitions of support

among a diverse audience. Chapter 6 details the George H.W. Bush administration's communication strategy for the Gulf War to reveal that the administration acknowledged sources of heterogeneity in public opinion, was concerned about public support and the potential for backlash, and used humanitarian justifications to target key groups. While the administration also conducted a public diplomacy campaign geared towards the international audience and worked to manage congressional dissent, creating and maintaining the support of the domestic audience was the primary goal of the communication plan in general and presidential speeches in particular.

Building on evidence that the White House acknowledges and responds to the need for a diverse domestic coalition, the Bosnian case study presented in Chapter 7 serves two purposes. First, it demonstrates that presidents use humanitarian justifications to strategically target key groups in the domestic coalition in both humanitarian and security interventions. Second, analyzing the administration's communication strategy over the course of this conflict illustrates that cooperative internationalists remain the key constituency and humanitarian claims are used to manage domestic pressure during periods of non-intervention and escalating military involvement.

The dissertation concludes by considering the stability of foreign policy beliefs in a changing political context. I demonstrate that the results are generally consistent over time but were affected by the 2016 presidential election. To evaluate the extent to which foreign policy beliefs are likely to remain relevant in an increasingly polarized environment, the conclusion draws on additional survey evidence to demonstrate that the partisanship of the president does not significantly moderate the effect of foreign policy beliefs on support for alternative

justifications. The conclusion also considers the implications of the domestic coalition argument for the White House, humanitarian and anti-war organizations, and U.S. foreign policy.

CHAPTER TWO

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A DIVERSE DOMESTIC COALITION

Conventional wisdom assumes that national security is the foremost concern for a state and its citizens (Drezner 2008). Worried about its own safety, the United States' (U.S.) public will rally to support military action that responds to or prevents attacks on American soil and national interests (Brody 1991). By extension, justifications that evoke U.S. national security and connect intervention to U.S. interests are expected to be the most effective means of bolstering public support for military action. As international norms governing the use of force shifted following the end of the Cold War, some scholars argued that leaders could also effectively use humanitarian justifications to bolster public support for action in response to humanitarian crises. Focused on demonstrating that humanitarian claims can now provide a solely sufficient and internationally accepted explanation for action, these studies examined the influence of humanitarian justifications almost exclusively in the context of potential humanitarian interventions (Finnemore 1996a, 2003; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Welsh 2004; Wheeler 2000).

Both of these approaches to understanding justifications for military intervention are rooted in the assumption that for an intervention to be popular the president must make a compelling case that the use of force serves U.S. interests. In security interventions, evidence of imminent aggression and threats to national security demonstrate the importance of action. In humanitarian interventions, leaders can make the case that inaction in the face of humanitarian crises threatens U.S. values and international peace and stability. However, recent cases of intervention, as outlined in the introduction, challenge both sides of this conventional wisdom by revealing that the influence of humanitarian justifications is not resigned to humanitarian

interventions. Instead, humanitarian appeals are prevalent in security-driven interventions, including those that receive high levels of public support. This pattern raises questions about the expectation that, all else equal, security justifications are the most effective means of mobilizing support for the use of force and about norms scholars' implicit assumption that the effects of humanitarian justifications are best studied within the context of humanitarian interventions.

The widespread use of humanitarian claims in contemporary security interventions is particularly puzzling because additional justifications create political risks. First, presidents have a limited amount of time to publicly make the case for intervention and set the terms of the debate that follows. Time spent outlining humanitarian objectives risks diluting the strength of the president's overall message by taking away the time available to make the best possible case in terms of U.S. national security. Second, presidential speeches provide soundbites that are repeated in media coverage of the intervention and presented to a public that generally pays little attention to foreign policy (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989). Speeches that promote multiple themes and justifications risk creating soundbites that divert attention from security explanations to less compelling rationales. Finally, leaders who promote humanitarian goals may be punished by the public if those goals are not met. Highlighting humanitarian objectives in security interventions thus unnecessarily creates expectations for humanitarian outcomes and raises the bar for success, which may undermine public support in the long-run (Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009).

This project aims to provide a better understanding of the pattern and influence of humanitarian justifications in contemporary interventions by addressing three questions: Why do leaders consistently use humanitarian justifications for interventions best explained in national

security terms? Who, if anyone, responds to these moral appeals? Under what conditions do humanitarian justifications effectively increase support for military action?

In response to these questions, I argue that the explanation for presidents' justification strategies lies in the composition of the domestic coalition of support. The U.S. public is a heterogeneous audience with diverse foreign policy beliefs that influence which justifications individuals find most persuasive. Within this audience, the support of individuals with cooperative internationalist values is particularly important for reducing the political costs of intervention. These individuals possess a unique combination of traits—an inherent skepticism of military action, a willingness to actively oppose intervention, and high levels of political engagement—that make them a critical target audience for presidential justifications. Humanitarian justifications maximize the support of cooperative internationalists while the effectiveness of security explanations is limited. The importance of persuading these individuals explains the prevalence of humanitarian appeals in contemporary interventions. As a result of their broad appeal, presidents should have an incentive to emphasize humanitarian claims as often as possible; however, the same individuals that make humanitarian justifications necessary also constrain their use. When humanitarian justifications appear insincere they no longer bolster the support of cooperative internationalists and the domestic coalition falls apart.

This account sheds new light on justifications as an under-examined mediator of the relationship between the president and public support for military action. By examining how heterogeneous foreign policy preferences shape attitudes toward the use of force and illuminating the power of humanitarian appeals, the project addresses the broader questions: What is required to effectively justify military action to the U.S. public? How much public support is necessary to facilitate intervention? This approach contends that the composition of domestic support matters

more than the magnitude and identifies a critical target audience for presidential appeals. Additionally, contrary to conventional wisdom, it implies that national security claims are not always the most effective justifications for military action. Individuals also respond to moral appeals for military action and the influence of these appeals is not limited to cases of humanitarian intervention. The argument also has implications for the threat that presidents will misuse humanitarian claims to provide a false pretense for action, demonstrating both that successful domestic coalitions give presidents leeway to pursue intervention and that the diversity of foreign policy beliefs plays an important role in maintaining democratic accountability for the use of force.

In this chapter I present the theory of justifications for a diverse domestic coalition in detail. I first highlight the importance of official justifications and the nature of presidents' concerns with public opinion. I then outline two competing accounts of the relationship between public opinion and presidents' justification strategies and demonstrate that neither of these alternatives can comprehensively explain the pattern of humanitarian claims in contemporary interventions. The following section describes the origins of foreign policy beliefs before outlining the domestic coalition argument, linking evidence that the U.S. public is made up of individuals with diverse foreign policy preferences with presidents' political incentives and information advantages. I then rule out additional explanations focused on partisanship, the international audience, and changes in international norms governing the treatment of civilians in conflict. The chapter concludes by outlining the observable implications of the domestic coalition argument, which are systematically evaluated in each of the subsequent chapters.

What are justifications and why do they matter?

Why Justifications Are Necessary

U.S. presidents' efforts to justify military action stem from their democratic accountability to citizens who bear the burden of war (Kant 1795).[5] Presidents who undertake military action without the support of the public risk political punishment, either at the polls or through tightened institutional constraints that make it more difficult for leaders to pursue their political agendas (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver 2007; Larson and Savych 2005; Tomz and Weeks 2013). These constraints help democracies avoid risky conflicts and hold leaders accountable for foreign policy decisions (Reiter and Stam 2002; Russett 1993; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2010). Leaders thus pay careful attention to public opinion (Berinsky 2009; Holsti 1992, 2004). They develop frames for intervention to bring public opinion in line with their policy choices and attempt to control the flow of information to shape public perceptions of military action (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Kernell 1997; Western 2005, 17).

While media coverage (Brody 1991; Brody and Shapiro 1989; Groeling and Baum 2008) and partisan discourse (Berinsky 2007) also influence public perceptions, presidents' information advantages on matters of foreign policy make their justifications particularly important in military interventions (M. Baum and Groeling 2010). In his capacity as Commander in Chief, the president introduces the prospect of military action to the public and offers the initial explanation for intervention, setting the terms of the debate that follows. Examining presidents' justification strategies thus sheds light on a central part of the process through which public support is mobilized to facilitate military action (Krebs 2015, 15).

[5] Recent work demonstrates that autocratic leaders in civilian regimes with powerful elites can also be constrained by their publics (Weeks 2008, 2012). While the dissertation focuses on constraints imposed by democratic institutions in the United States, I would also expect leaders in autocratic regimes to face pressure to justify military action when their publics can enforce audience costs.

Justifications versus Motivations

Justifications for military action are a key link between presidents' foreign policy choices and public support for intervention. In the context of this project, I define justifications as the public and overt rationale leaders use to convince their publics that military action is legitimate, necessary, and worthy of support. Notably, the justifications for an intervention are distinct from the motivations for military action. While presidents can pursue military action for any number of reasons, their motivations cannot be directly observed by either scholars or the public. Instead, Krebs and Jackson (2007, 42) argue that to understand the consequences of political rhetoric, public justifications are not only observable, but are also the most relevant unit of analysis for understanding how the public perceives military action:

> We cannot observe directly what people think, but we can observe what they say and how they respond to claims and counter-claims. In our view, it does not matter whether actors believe what they say, whether they are motivated by crass material interests or sincere commitment. What is important is that they can be rhetorically maneuvered into a corner, trapped into publicly endorsing positions they may, or may not, find anathema. Rhetoric affects political outcomes even when all actors are cynical operators with little interest in genuine deliberation. The resolution of political issues through public debate need not imply any significant level of intersubjective consensus.

Following this logic, the project focuses on presidents' strategic choice of justifications to sell intervention to the U.S. public. It begins with the assumption that presidents choose justifications carefully and intentionally based on what they expect to resonate with the broadest possible domestic audience. In this way, studying the content of justifications speaks to both the conditions under which intervention frames are effective and how presidents think about managing public opinion.

Public Attitudes Towards Foreign Policy

Investigating the prevalence of humanitarian justifications in security-driven interventions is grounded in the long-running debate about the role of morality in foreign policy. Existing accounts divide into two camps that present the public as emotional and impulsive or self-interested and rational. Examining the combination of humanitarian and security claims reveals shortcomings in existing theories' abilities to explain how leaders justify interventions and sheds light on when and how other-regarding, moral appeals bolster public support.

The Emotional Public

Morality plays a central role in many realists' conceptions of public opinion (Carr 1939; Drezner 2008a; Goddard and Krebs 2015, 11; Holsti 1992, 440; Kertzer and McGraw 2012, 247; Lipset 1988; Mearsheimer 2011; Morgenthau 1951; Rathbun 2008). In his early account of realism in international politics, Carr (1939, 146) claimed that "The place of morality in international politics is the most obscure and difficult problem in the whole range of international studies." The perceived role of morality also distinguished realists from utopians, where realists "hold that relations between states are governed solely by power and that morality has no part in them. The opposite theory, propounded by most utopian writers, is that the same code of morality is applicable to individuals and to states" (Carr 1939, 153). Unlike leaders who understand the complexities of foreign policy, these foundational theories portrayed the public as emotional and easily persuaded by moral appeals. This view of the public's relationship with foreign policy was consistent with early studies that presented public opinion as impulsive, unstructured, and lacking in content (Almond 1950; P. E. Converse 1964; Holsti 1992, 442; Lippmann 1922). From this perspective, presidents use humanitarian justifications to "bamboozle" the public "into supporting strategic aims at odds with their own interests rightly

understood" (Goddard and Krebs 2015, 11). Because the national interest is "best served by the very Realpolitik that ordinary citizens find abhorrent, policymakers need to either brace themselves for political backlash, or camouflage their policies in anti-realist rhetoric" (Kertzer and McGraw 2012, 245). From this perspective, humanitarian justifications thus provide a cover for interventions that promote strategic national security goals but would otherwise be unpalatable to the public. However, these justifications become problematic when the public uses them to pressure leaders into taking risky action for humanitarian purposes that do not serve the national interest (Snyder 1991).

The common ground among these "emotional public" perspectives is the expectation that the public responds positively and consistently to humanitarian claims and that presidents can use these justifications to manage public opinion. The role of justifications is thus to evoke an emotional response from the public by framing military action in terms that it can support and feel good about. Recent scholarship casts doubt on this perspective by demonstrating that the public holds realpolitik views usually attributed only to far-sighted leaders (Drezner 2008; Kertzer and McGraw 2012; Rathbun 2008). Moreover, leaders do not limit their deployment of humanitarian justifications to cases in which intervention is otherwise unjustifiable or the public is unconvinced by appeals to national security concerns.

The Prudent Public

In line with evidence that the public holds realpolitik foreign policy preferences, a second camp draws on public opinion data to suggest that the public acts as a prudent constraint on the use of force (Reiter and Stam 2002; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2010). When faced with a potential intervention, the public weighs the costs of action relative to the likelihood of success and the importance of the principal policy objective (Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi, Feaver, and

Reifler 2009; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998). The prudent public supports intervention to restrain the aggression of foreign powers and to address humanitarian crises, but is skeptical of using force to accomplish internal political change (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998). Eichenberg (2005) argues that public concern with the operation's policy objectives is driven by its overarching interest in success—the public supports interventions it thinks will end well. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009) show that when the public believes an intervention will ultimately be successful, it is not only more likely to support military action, but is also willing to pay relatively high costs to achieve victory. Costs may include military casualties (Gartner 2008; Gartner and Segura 1998; Kriner and Shen 2014; Larson and Savych 2005; Larson 1996; Mueller 1973) and finances (Flores-Macías and Kreps forthcoming; Geys 2010), which can be offset by the prospect of multilateral approval (Grieco et al. 2011) and burden-sharing (Kull and Destler 1999).

These accounts are united by their presentation of a discriminating public that can sort through presidential rhetoric to decide whether the benefits of the intervention are worth the risks. The role of justifications is thus to communicate information to the public to convince it that success is possible and that action is worthwhile. The prudent public will see through false claims and will only be influenced by humanitarian justifications when the intervention's principle policy objective is humanitarian. From this perspective, presidents have no incentive to use humanitarian appeals in security-driven cases because they will not further bolster support. The prevalence of humanitarian justifications in contemporary interventions is thus expected to reflect the post-Cold War acceptance of humanitarian interventions as a legitimate and potentially prudent form of military action (Finnemore 1996a, 2003; Welsh 2004; Wheeler 2000).

However, this approach cannot explain why presidents feature humanitarian justifications in interventions that the public expects to be successful and that already have high levels of approval. In other words, if the public is primarily interested in calculating the costs and benefits of action, presidents should have no incentive to offer additional humanitarian explanations for interventions for which the national security benefits are obvious and widely supported. Nor can this perspective account for the widespread use of humanitarian claims in security interventions where these justifications do not provide additional information about the intervention's objectives or the likelihood of success.

Despite the inability of the emotional and prudent public explanations to account for the pattern of humanitarian justifications, there are two conditions under which they could feasibly still drive presidents' justification strategies. First, presidents could use humanitarian claims because they incorrectly believe these appeals matter, in which case it would not be possible to infer anything about public opinion from the content of presidents' justifications. Given the amount of time and resources administrations devote to understanding and attempting to influence public opinion, it is unlikely that presidents would continue to use humanitarian justifications across conflicts and administrations if they did not generate any benefits. Second, presidents could use humanitarian justifications because these claims provide a costless rhetorical filler. In other words, humanitarian appeals could make for exciting oratory without raising costs or expectations about the intervention's outcome. This explanation is inconsistent with the number of speeches given in the context of security-driven interventions, such as Afghanistan 2001, that focus primarily or exclusively on humanitarian objectives.

However, to more directly test and rule out these alternative accounts, the following chapters directly evaluate their hypotheses for justification patterns and public opinion alongside

the implications of the domestic coalition argument. Chapter 3 examines the emotional and prudent public explanations' ability to account for the pattern of humanitarian justifications in contemporary interventions, Chapter 4 considers whether they are consistent with how individuals respond to humanitarian justifications, and Chapter 5 investigates the extent to which the public holds the president accountable for his rhetorical choices.

Building Public Coalitions

Both the emotional and prudent public explanations are built on the implicit assumption that there is a single U.S. public that responds to information about military interventions in a uniform way. However, studies of partisanship and foreign policy beliefs demonstrate that rather than an "undifferentiated whole" (Berinsky 2007, 977), the U.S. public is a diverse audience with foreign policy preferences that vary systematically based on individuals' views of when and how the U.S. should engage in international affairs (Chanley 1999; Holsti and Rosenau 1988; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Kertzer et al. 2014; Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; Wittkopf 1986; Wittkopf 1990; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983). Connecting presidents' justification strategies to a disaggregated domestic audience, I argue that support for intervention requires a broad coalition of approval from a public with diverse foreign policy beliefs and that security justifications alone are often insufficient for this coalition building process. Presidents have incentives to build public approval for military action to avoid short-term costs of dissent and maintain leeway to pursue their political agenda and to bolster election prospects in the long-term.

The logic of coalition building is commonplace in discussions of election campaigns. In the development of campaign messages and allocation of resources, "campaigns will generally ignore or take for granted each candidate's most committed supporters and concentrate their

persuasive efforts on the undecided or weakly committed swing voters" (Mayer 2007, 361). Failure to build an electoral coalition that includes moderate and independent swing voters alongside the core constituency can cost the candidate the election (Abramowitz 1999, 61). Additionally, the importance of building coalitions does not end with the president's election. Instead, Edwards (2000, 47) argues that coalitions are "at the core of governing in America. The necessity of forming coalitions is inevitable in a large, diverse nation in which political power is fragmented both vertically and horizontally." As a result, "presidents are involved in a permanent campaign to build supportive coalitions" in order to maintain the political capital necessary to carry out their domestic agenda (Edwards III 2000, 48).

Public opinion polls play an important role in these coalition building efforts. The White House uses internal public opinion polls to identify the issues around which a coalition can be built, the segments of the public that can be brought into a coalition on the given issue, and the messages most likely to persuade these key individuals (Druckman and Jacobs 2015, 40). Recognizing that the segments of the public tracked by internal polls reflect these groups' strategic importance to the White House, Druckman and Jacobs (2011, 167) contend that the "analysis of representation needs to address not only possible disparities in influence but also the distinct strategies of elites to cultivate and to mobilize based on policy domains."

In the context of election campaigns, while the composition of coalitions may change over time and across candidates, the necessary magnitude of support is relatively straightforward. The candidate needs enough support in enough states to cross the 270 vote threshold in the electoral college—a feat which is often but not always equivalent to winning a majority of the popular vote. To cross the threshold of electoral success, the candidate must build a coalition that combines co-partisans with a sufficient number of independents and moderate voters from the

opposing party. The broader the electoral coalition, the more confident the candidate can be in his or her prospects for electoral success. For example, Druckman and Jacobs (2011, 182) explain Reagan's election and contributions to the future of the Republican party in terms of successful coalition building:

> Reagan's careful calibration of his public positions to reflect his subgroup polling contributed to the formation of a new and broader conservative coalition—one that widened its appeal from the affluent and philosophical conservatives to political independents and, most strikingly, religious conservatives. The result was a broader and more enduring coalition for future Republican presidential and congressional politicians.

Electoral coalitions and coalitions of support for military action both require the president to maintain the approval of a base constituency while appealing to a broader audience; however, there are a number of important differences between these two types of coalition building. During election campaigns, opposition and attacks from committed members of the opposing party are both expected and business as usual. Additionally, the time point at which the success or failure of coalition building matters is clearly identified ahead of time—the strength of the coalition on election day is decisive and sufficient to elect the president even if support begins to decline in the immediate aftermath.

While the logic is the same, coalition building in the context of support for military action differs on each of these dimensions. In the build-up to military action, rather than winning individual votes, the president needs the support of the public as leverage to navigate institutional constraints on the use of force and minimize the political risks of action. Explaining the importance of public support for policy decisions, Edwards (2000, 48) notes that "Leading the public—changing opinions and mobilizing citizens into action—is perhaps the ultimate resource of the democratic political leader. It is difficult for others who hold power to deny the legitimate demands of a president with popular support." With the public on his side, the

president undercuts the incentives of Congress and other elites to oppose the intervention, increasing his leeway to take action (Kernell 1997; Schultz 2003).

However, in contrast to the votes needed to win an election, the threshold at which the president has enough support for military action to reap these benefits is both undefined and likely to vary by crisis. Under these uncertain conditions, the president has an incentive to shore up as much support as possible, both to maximize his leeway to navigate institutional constraints and to account for the inevitable erosion of support over time (M. Baum and Groeling 2010; Berinsky 2009; Gartner 2008; Gartner and Segura 1998; Kam and Ramos 2008; Kriner and Shen 2014). In this context, a vocal opposition is less tolerable than during election campaigns. Rather than an expected sign that the other party thinks their candidate is better, the appearance of a mobilized opposition to military action raises questions about the legitimacy and prudence of the president's foreign policy. These doubts exacerbate the erosion of support and decline of the president' information advantage. They also create political incentives for elites who disagree with the president to voice their dissent and take action to block the intervention. As a result, while the White House will always aim to maximize support, it will also be concerned with limiting opportunities for opposition. In this context, the goals of presidents' justifications for military action are two-fold: 1) to bolster support for intervention as much as possible, and 2) to limit the intensity of dissent so that even individuals who oppose intervention are not compelled to take to the streets or otherwise take action to punish the president.

Finally, because the political salience of military action does not have a clear endpoint, the White House must consider how an intervention's popularity affects its short- and long-term political goals. In the short-term, support for military action means the president can move forward with his desired foreign policy without threatening his approval rating or other items on

the domestic agenda. In the long-term, support ensures that if the intervention becomes a salient issue in the next campaign it will reflect positively on the candidate.[6]

Taken as a whole, these differences suggest that the domestic coalition for military action must be both more encompassing and more concerned with mitigating vocal opposition than electoral coalitions. Coalitions built along the partisan lines that shape election campaigns are unlikely to meet these criteria for two reasons. First, because the prospect of military intervention primes national identity over partisan identity (Kam and Ramos 2008; Levendusky Forthcoming; Levendusky and Horowitz 2012; Malhotra and Popp 2012) targeting only co-partisans and independents underestimates the size of the potential coalition. Second, linking military action to party politics polarizes the intervention and encourages both public and elite dissent from the opposing side, facilitating rather than preventing the growth of a vocal opposition.

Druckman and Jacobs (2011, 182) also recognize that "the president treats domestic and foreign policy differently" and argue that the president relies on "discrete policy preferences to shape his domestic policy statements and on aggregate public mood in crafting his foreign policy positions." However, their analysis relies on a broad category of foreign policy decisions that includes defense spending and trade agreements alongside military action. Instead, I contend that military interventions are not foreign policy as usual and demand a unique form of coalition building. Rather than appealing to the aggregate public mood or to independents and co-partisans, the relevant coalition for military action is built by persuading individuals with different types of internationalist foreign policy beliefs, outlined in detail in the following

[6] Because the president is also the leader of his party, the role of the intervention in the next election is expected to be a concern regardless of whether the president is running for reelection. However, Croco (2011) provides evidence that in some circumstances the public does not hold new candidates culpable for the mistakes of their predecessors.

section. By appealing to these groups, the president's message targets the full range of individuals who could feasibly be persuaded to sustain support for military action.

In sum, while the logic of coalition building—recruiting moderates to join a base of supporters—applies to both electoral coalitions and coalitions of support for military action, there are important differences between the composition and process of building these coalitions. In particular, coalitions of support for military action—what the remainder of this project refers to as the "domestic coalition"—are not built along strictly partisan lines, are more sensitive to dissent, and must be sustained for undefined periods of time. As the following section outlines, I contend that all presidents, regardless of party or popularity, need to construct a domestic coalition that includes militant and cooperative internationalists in order to maintain support for military action. However, the composition of the president's electoral coalition may influence the ease with which he or she is able to build stable coalitions of support for intervention. Presidents elected with broad support from Democrats and other groups that contain a disproportionate number of cooperative internationalists will already have credibility with these key constituencies, making their justifications for military action more salient. Alternatively, presidents with electoral coalitions that contain a disproportionate number of militant internationalists or isolationists will need to build domestic coalitions of support for military action that extend far beyond their core constituencies and are more likely to face an uphill battle. The interaction between these two processes of coalition building is beyond the scope of this project but is an important area for future research.

How Coalitions Shape Communications Strategies

The White House recognizes the importance of building domestic coalitions from a diverse audience and makes use of internal polls to craft messages that resonate with target

groups without alienating the relevant base (Druckman and Jacobs 2015). For example, Druckman and Jacobs (2015, 21) examine internal polling and speeches under the Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan administrations to demonstrate that:

> Modern White House communications stands out for its use of scientific polling to anticipate public reactions before presidents speak. Presidents have developed the administrative capacity of a public opinion apparatus to track and use their private polling to calibrate strategy to widen their discretion on government policy while building and retaining public support. They use this institutionalized capacity to precisely fashion their public communications in order to narrow their policy responsiveness to particularly salient issues, cater to politically powerful supporters on issues that are less salient, and broaden public support through personal appeals.

Polls designed to inform the communications strategy reveal that the White House both recognizes and is concerned about tailoring its message to different subgroups within the domestic audience. In their case studies of presidential polls and communications, Druckman and Jacobs (2015, 29) find that "general vital signs, however, rarely satisfied presidents and their senior staff" and instead "Starting in earnest with Johnson, the White House's political needs drove its collection of data on five categories of public opinion: policy preferences, issue approval, most important problem, personality traits, and subgroup demographics (e.g., social and religious orientations)." This understanding of how individuals differ in their perceptions of the most important problems facing the country and how these differences vary across personal and social demographics provides the White House with the necessary tools to identify and build a domestic coalition of support for military action.

The domestic coalition argument put forth below contends that in the development of communication strategies for military action, the White House acknowledges that the public holds heterogeneous foreign policy beliefs and crafts justifications that resonate across these beliefs. While polls consider the same concerns about the role of the U.S. in the world and the most effective tools of foreign policy that make up the categories of beliefs outlined in the

following section, it is unlikely that the White House talks about these divisions using academic terminology. Instead, I expect the White House to identify the underlying groups as the key target audience for justifications based on an inherent understanding that there are sizeable segments of the public who are skeptical of military action because they are concerned with the morality and human costs of war. Appealing to moral and humanitarian considerations is thus necessary to bring these individuals on board or, at a minimum, to limit their dissent. White House discussions are expected to reference these beliefs in terms of broad internationalist or isolationist sentiment or by focusing on interest or demographic groups that consistently correlate with different underlying foreign policy preferences. For example, religious groups are likely to raise moral concerns about war that are rooted in the just war tradition and also reflect cooperative internationalist sentiments. Similarly, at the individual level skepticism towards military action and concern with humanitarian outcomes is more likely to appear among individuals who are relatively young, well-educated, women, or non-southerners (Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 43).

Disaggregating by Foreign Policy Beliefs

The Development of Foreign Policy Beliefs

Having established the importance of building a coalition of support for military intervention, I then pose the question: what are the relevant divisions for understanding which groups can be persuaded to join this coalition? The domestic coalition argument I develop in this chapter begins with the assumption that different aspects of interventions resonate with different segments of the public based on individuals' underlying foreign policy beliefs. Attention to systematic differences in the foreign policy preferences of the U.S. public first gained traction with Mandelbaum and Schneider's (1979) analysis of the 1976 presidential election. Noting the

erosion of a Cold War consensus about the U.S. role in the world, the authors attribute the challenges facing Jimmy Carter's campaign to the absence of "a resource held by its predecessors in conducting the nation's affairs, namely, a domestic consensus for foreign policy" (Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 34). In the 1976 campaign, this challenge was linked to debates over détente and antimilitarism which played an important role in the primaries of both parties (Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 35). Abstracting from the campaign, the authors then conduct factor analysis of survey data from the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations to demonstrate that these debates are symptomatic of a growing split in the internationalist public. The findings show that "Most Americans continue to agree that the United States should take an active role in world affairs, but there is no longer agreement on what role it should be" (Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 41). Rather than a unified source of support or opposition, "It is more appropriate to think of foreign policy attitudes as arrayed along two dimensions, an internationalist-isolationist dimension (whether the United States should play an active role in world affairs) and a cross-cutting liberal-conservative dimension (what kind of role it should play)" (Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 41).

Under Mandelbaum and Schneider's typology, liberal and conservative internationalists are defined by their support for alternative goals and tools of U.S. foreign policy. Liberal internationalists' goals commit the U.S. to a world role of cooperative internationalism that uses non-aggressive means to reach economic, humanitarian, and peace-oriented ends (Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 42). By contrast, conservative internationalists favor a competitive internationalism that employs aggressive American leadership and interventionist strategies to defend U.S. interests and uphold military commitments (Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 42). Despite the liberal/conservative terminology, the authors find no significant differences in the

partisanship of the groups and note that, rather than standing in direct opposition, the two categories share a common internationalist foundation that makes coalition building possible (Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 43). Whether the White House can successfully build a coalition between the two groups depends on the specific policy; however, no domestic consensus is possible without broad support from internationalists. When either liberal or conservative internationalists oppose a policy, "they can usually find allies from among the 43 percent of the public who are noninternationalists and do not want to interfere in other countries' affairs" to create a problematic majority (Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 48).

Building on this evidence of distinct foreign policy preferences, a subsequent wave of studies focused on refining the relevant dimensions and evaluating opinion data from different sources (Holsti 1979; Holsti and Rosenau 1986, 1988, 1990; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Wittkopf 1986, 1987; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983). These efforts coincided with a proliferation of alternative terminologies; however, by the late 1980s a general consensus had developed around Wittkopf and Maggiotto's (1983) "cooperative" and "militant" internationalist nomenclature. In this project, I continue to rely on the cooperative/militant terminology for two reasons: 1) it most directly reflects the form of engagement supported by each subgroup, and 2) it avoids confusion with political ideology and partisanship, which correlates with but does not directly reflect foreign policy preferences (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Wittkopf 1990).

Following the end of the Cold War, scholars confirmed that the same two dimensions continued to structure the U.S. public's foreign policy beliefs in the face of changing security threats (Chanley 1999; Holsti and Rosenau 1996; Wittkopf 1994). Wittkopf (1994, 377) outlined the potential for changes in post-Cold War attitudes, noting "the perceived threat of communism and how to deal with the Soviet Union occupied central roles in giving definition to Americans'

foreign policy beliefs. They were crucial in differentiating between cooperative and militant internationalism." However, his analysis proceeded to provide evidence that these orientations remained relevant for understanding the public's attitudes towards foreign policy, leading to the conclusion that "The visions predate the Cold War and will surely transcend it, thus incorporating the new issues that will compete for attention in the post-Cold War era" (Wittkopf 1994, 378). Similarly, using time series data Chanley (1999, 23) demonstrates that different dimensions of internationalism have structured foreign policy attitudes since at least 1964 and shows that "aggregate changes in public support for internationalism are consistent and predictable."

Having determined which categories best characterize the public's foreign policy beliefs, scholars then turned to the question of how foreign policy preferences are formed (Kertzer et al. 2014; Nincic and Ramos 2010; Rathbun et al. 2016). Drawing on work from political psychology, Ninic and Ramos (2010) contend that individuals' foreign and domestic policy beliefs are driven by the extent to which they are self-regarding or other-regarding. Employing an alternative value framework of conservation and self-transcendence, Rathbun et al. (2016) argue that because foreign policy preferences are rooted in the same personal values that shape the public's general social preferences, even low-information individuals can hold coherent foreign policy attitudes.

Kertzer et al. (2014) go a step further, employing insights from moral foundations theory to highlight the different moral values that drive militant and cooperative internationalist and isolationist foreign policy beliefs. From this perspective, cooperative internationalism "captures the distinction between the self and other in international affairs" and is associated with individuals who "typically believe that the United States should work with other countries and

international organizations to solve global problems" (Kertzer et al. 2014, 829). By contrast, militant internationalism is primarily concerned with the national interest and "marks the familiar division between hawks and doves over the importance, effectiveness, and/or desirability of using force to reach foreign policy objectives" (Kertzer et al. 2014, 830). Notably, this distinction highlights the difference between the cooperative/militant internationalist dimension and the more general hawk/dove framework—hawks align closely with militant internationalists, but the category of doves cannot distinguish between individuals who are skeptical of force but support action under some circumstances (cooperative internationalists) and those who are committed to non-engagement (isolationists).

Defining the Dimensions of Foreign Policy Beliefs

In line with this scholarship, I conceptualize foreign policy beliefs along the same two dimensions defined by when and how individuals believe the U.S. should be involved in international affairs. First, individuals are positioned along an isolationist-internationalist dimension based on how active of a role they believe the U.S. should play in the world (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Kertzer 2013; Kertzer et al. 2014; Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; Wittkopf 1990; Wittkopf 1994). Isolationists oppose active engagement, while internationalists believe the U.S. should remain engaged in addressing international problems.

Although internationalists are united by the belief that the U.S. should play an active role in the world, they are divided along a second cooperative-militant dimension based on what form U.S. engagement should take. Individuals with militant internationalist values view military power as a critical tool for pursuing U.S. foreign policy and give the highest priority to national security goals (Schneider 1983, 40). As a result, militant internationalists are inclined to support interventions as an effective way to solve international problems. Alternatively, individuals with

cooperative values do not believe military force is a particularly effective tool of foreign policy (Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 38). They favor humanitarian and multilateral foreign policy goals (Kertzer et al. 2014, 826) and would prefer that leaders focus on global problems such as the scarcity of natural resources, pollution, and international economic inequality rather than maximizing U.S. military security (Schneider 1983, 40).

Public and Elite Internationalism

These three overarching categories of foreign policy beliefs—militant internationalists, cooperative internationalists, and isolationists—are drawn from public opinion surveys and theoretically grounded in the moral values that drive individuals' social preferences in everyday life. Similarly, the White House drafts national addresses to communicate the president's justifications for military action to the general public.[7] The theory put forth below thus aims to explain how diversity in foreign policy preferences among the U.S. mass public influences justification strategies and the conditions under which the domestic audience can be mobilized to support military action. In this respect, it is decidedly public rather than elite focused.

However, early studies of heterogeneity in foreign policy beliefs provide evidence that divisions in internationalist sentiment also exist at the elite level (Holsti 1979; Holsti and Rosenau 1986, 1988, 1990, 1996; Wittkopf 1987). In his comparison of elite and mass attitudes towards the U.S. role in the world, Wittkopf (1987, 140) demonstrates that although cooperative and militant distinctions remain dominant, elite attitudes are more complex than the two dimensions outlined above. The foreign policy divisions found in leader surveys do not map neatly onto the mass survey data, in part because, unlike the public, "elites apparently differ over the *means* of American foreign policy, not necessarily its ends" (Wittkopf 1987, 142). Based on

[7] Chapters 6 and 7 examine the development of White House communication strategies to provide evidence for this claim.

these findings, Wittkopf (1987, 143) concludes that "Perhaps the best we can say, then, is that American leaders continue to be appropriately described as 'selective internationalists,' but they defy easy characterization beyond that."

Evidence that foreign policy beliefs take different forms at the public and elite levels is comparable to findings that realism has a simpler, "folk" variant that appears in public opinion (Drezner 2008; Kertzer and McGraw 2012). At the individual level, foreign policy beliefs are impulses about when and how it is appropriate for the U.S. to engage in the world that guide individuals' instinctive responses to different foreign policy decisions. At the elite level, foreign policy preferences are part of a political strategy based on a more complex understanding of the world and the long-term opportunities and consequences for engaging with other states. The extent to which the divisions in the public's foreign policy beliefs also account for heterogeneity in the decision-making of political elites thus remains an open question that, while beyond the scope of this project, is worthy of future attention.

The Limitations of Two-Dimensional Foreign Policy Beliefs

The two dimensions of foreign policy beliefs outlined above—whether the U.S. should play an active role in international affairs and what form engagement should take—provide the foundation for the analysis that follows because they identify the broadest possible category of individuals that can feasibly be convinced to provide sustainable support for military action. Individuals with internationalist beliefs approve of U.S. engagement with the world and, under certain circumstances, can be convinced that engagement should take the form of military action. Dividing internationalists by their concern with military strength sheds further light on the conditions under which different types of internationalists can be persuaded to support military intervention. Focusing on these broad categories thus represents the minimum level of

disaggregation necessary to understand how underlying foreign policy beliefs shape the U.S. domestic audience and its willingness to support the use of force.

However, because individuals exist along a spectrum of beliefs, foreign policy attitudes are more complex than any single categorical measure can capture. This classification is further complicated by the fact that the existing definitions of militant and cooperative internationalists vary in their operationalization and conflate preferences for the goals and means of U.S. foreign policy—militant internationalists' preference for military means is paired with national security goals and cooperative internationalists' preference for diplomatic or multilateral means is paired with humanitarian objectives. As a result, militant internationalism captures individuals who favor taking consistently aggressive postures and those who believe force is necessary to address threats to U.S. national security but should be used sparingly. Cooperative internationalism may include individuals who are committed to multilateralism for all foreign policy goals and those who believe U.S. engagement should focus primarily on promoting the common good. Similarly, the isolationist category may include pacifists or anti-imperialists who believe force is never warranted and individuals with the belief that force is acceptable in response to a direct attack on the U.S.

To capture this additional variation, some scholars further divide the cooperative and militant categories. For example, Wittkopf (1994, 379) identifies four foreign policy belief systems, including: "*internationalists* (those who support both forms of internationalism), *isolationists* (those who oppose any form of involvement abroad), *accommodationists* (those who support cooperative internationalism but oppose militant internationalism), and *hard-liners* (those who support militant internationalism but oppose cooperative internationalism)."[8] While it

[8] Emphasis in original.

offers a more fine-grained description of the public's foreign policy beliefs, further disaggregating the cooperative and militant internationalist categories does not provide additional leverage for understanding who can be convinced to support military action—individuals with any combination of internationalist values offer potential and sustainable support for military action, making them an efficient target for presidential appeals, while isolationists are unlikely to support intervention. Therefore, as a first step towards understanding how sources of heterogeneity in the domestic audience influence mobilization for the use of force, here I focus on how justifications resonate with the broad categories of foreign policy beliefs.[9]

In sum, this section presents existing evidence that the public holds diverse foreign policy preferences divided along two dimensions: whether the U.S. should play an active role in the world and what form that role should take. While existing studies highlight the persistence and foundations of foreign policy beliefs, they do not evaluate the extent to which these beliefs influence politics or decisions to use military force. In the following section I outline a theory of domestic coalitions and argue that applying these foreign policy beliefs to the study of presidents' justifications for and public attitudes towards military action clarifies: 1) whose support is needed to mobilize the domestic audience for military action, and 2) the conditions under which this mobilization is possible.

Argument: Humanitarian Justifications and the Domestic Coalition

Disaggregating the public by foreign policy beliefs allows me to clarify both the target audience for presidents' justifications and the types of justifications that resonate with this

[9] Additionally, the experimental results presented in Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that within these three general categories individuals respond similarly to justifications for military action. This level of aggregation thus appears to capture the relevant differences in how individuals react to the president's explanation for intervention.

audience. In addition to favoring disengagement with international affairs, isolationists are themselves relatively disengaged from the political process (Wittkopf 1986, 435). Schneider (1983, 41–42) refers to such individuals as the "inattentive public" and demonstrates that they "tend to be poorer and less well educated and to know and care little about foreign affairs, which they see as remote from their daily concerns." These individuals are "not so much opposed as they are nonsupportive" (Schneider 1983, 43)[10] of U.S. involvement in international affairs, will only approve of military action when there is a direct and immediate threat to U.S. interests, and demand "swift, decisive action but not long-term involvement" (Schneider 1983, 42). Because they offer only short-term support for immediate threats to U.S. security and because their lack of engagement makes them an improbable source of active dissent, I expect isolationists to be an inefficient target for presidents' justifications. Instead, isolationists will be unlikely to sustain support for military action, regardless of the justifications used.

Alternatively, internationalists endorse U.S. engagement in international affairs and can be persuaded to offer long-term support for interventions. They are also more likely to be educated and knowledgeable individuals (Kertzer 2013, 237) who are engaged in politics and are represented in greater proportions among political elites than among the general population (Wittkopf 1987, 134).[11] I expect that this level of political engagement makes internationalists a credible source of active domestic dissent. Presidents thus need to develop justification strategies that target and persuade a majority of internationalists to build a sustainable domestic coalition of

[10] Because these individuals are characterized by disinterest and disengagement rather than an ideological commitment to staying out of global affairs, Schneider refers to them as non-internationalists rather than isolationists. In line with the broader literature on foreign policy beliefs, I use the term isolationist to refer to any individual who does not believe the U.S. should play an active role in the world.

[11] I focus on the foreign policy beliefs and coalitions of support among the U.S. public; however, these foreign policy beliefs are also held by political elites (Holsti and Rosenau 1988; Wittkopf 1987). Appealing to elites with diverse foreign policy beliefs may also be key to building and sustaining elite coalitions (Saunders 2015).

support. With the right justifications, the support of internationalists is both possible and sustainable, making them the primary target audience for presidents' justifications.

Among this target audience, I expect security and humanitarian justifications to resonate differently with militant and cooperative internationalists. Individuals with militant internationalist values are the most likely supporters of military interventions because, as outlined above, they believe both that the U.S. should be engaged in the world and that military force is a central part of this active engagement. I expect these individuals to be persuaded by security justifications, which introduce a threat to U.S. national security that can only be addressed through military action. However, their baseline belief that military force effectively solves international problems, including humanitarian crises, means that militant internationalists can also be convinced by humanitarian justifications.

By contrast, individuals with cooperative internationalist values are the equivalent of swing voters in potential domestic coalitions of support. They believe the U.S. should be engaged in solving international problems and thus can be convinced that intervention is necessary. However, individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs are hesitant to use military force and are focused on the multilateral pursuit of humanitarian goals, making them less likely to be persuaded by security justifications. Instead, I expect that cooperative internationalists can be swayed primarily by humanitarian justifications which shift the focus of intervention from the matters of realpolitik associated with security claims to what Drezner (2008, 54) refers to as "internationalist policy priorities," including "the protection of human rights, democracy promotion, or the strengthening of multilateral institutions." Humanitarian justifications are thus unique in their ability to maximize support among a coalition of militant and cooperative internationalists.

In short, I argue that internationalists, especially those with cooperative preferences, are the target for presidents' justifications and that combining humanitarian and security justifications is ideally suited to resonate with this audience. In addition to creating a stable coalition of support, the approval of cooperative internationalists is particularly important because, unlike isolationists—the other skeptics of military intervention—these individuals are attuned to political developments and are likely to turn their discontent into a vocal opposition that raises the political costs of intervention. Figure 2.1 summarizes the categories of foreign policy beliefs based on their willingness to support military action and the expected persuasiveness of alternative rationales for action to demonstrate that cooperate internationalists are the key target audience for justifications.

Figure 2.1 Identifying the Target Audience for Justifications



Mobilizing and Managing Domestic Pressure in Humanitarian Crises

In the context of security-driven interventions, presidents thus have an incentive to include humanitarian justifications to persuade the broadest possible coalition of internationalists. However, the importance of maintaining support from a coalition of internationalists remains even when the intervention instead responds to a primarily humanitarian crisis or when the White House intends to pursue a policy short of intervention. In the face of a humanitarian crisis, the justification strategy necessary to build a coalition of support for action is straightforward and unlikely to carry political costs. Cooperative internationalists will be inclined to support the use of force if it is presented as the only way to achieve humanitarian objectives and end human suffering. At the same time, militant internationalists will respond to the necessity of using military force to solve the humanitarian problem. In this case, the White House communications strategy is expected to employ humanitarian justifications as the primary rationale for action because they are capable of bolstering support from the full range of internationalists and do not run the risk of appearing insincere.

However, the White House often responds to humanitarian crises with action short of military intervention, as cases such as the early stages of the Bosnian conflict (1992-1994), 1994 Rwanda, and 2003 Sudan highlight. If the crisis is short-lived and does not receive media attention or present a direct threat to U.S. interests, the domestic audience is unlikely to pressure the president to take increased military action. Alternatively, if the crisis escalates over time, media and elite discourse will make the humanitarian case, regardless of the White House's communication plan. The prevalence of arguments that the humanitarian toll of the crisis is building and only U.S. military action can end the suffering creates domestic pressure for action.

Faced with evidence of overwhelming harm to foreign civilians, cooperative internationalists' desire to end the crisis can outweigh their skepticism towards the use of force. Combined with militant internationalists' belief that only military action can effectively solve the problem, cooperative internationalists' response to evidence of egregious humanitarian abuses creates pressure for action from the key players in the domestic coalition. To mitigate dissent and avoid paying political costs for inaction, the objective of the White House communication strategy in this context is to manage the domestic pressure for escalation. In particular, the president will need to offset pressure from cooperative internationalists by justifying non-intervention in humanitarian terms and reassuring them that humanitarian objectives can be met through means other than force. Therefore, while the content and objective of justifications is expected to change in cases of humanitarian intervention and non-intervention, presidents remain concerned with the domestic coalition and target cooperative internationalists with their communication strategies.

The Distribution of Foreign Policy Beliefs

Given the skepticism of cooperative internationalists, presidents could attempt to drown out their potential dissent by maximizing the support of militant internationalists. However, examining the distribution of foreign policy beliefs in the general public reveals that this approach to coalition building is not a viable option. Instead, gaining support from individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs is critical to achieving and maintaining a majority of support.

In their account of U.S. foreign policy beliefs during the Cold War, Mandelbaum and Schneider (1979) used data from the Chicago Council Survey to create indicators of the different varieties of internationalism based on what foreign policy goals individuals thought were "very

important." Their results indicated that without the support of both cooperative and militant internationalists, a domestic consensus in favor of intervention was not possible.

In the more than 30 years after the initial study, the distribution and content of U.S. foreign policy beliefs have changed, but the need for a coalition of cooperative and militant internationalists remains. Drawing on data from 13 waves of the Chicago Council surveys, 1974-2015, Figure 2.2 illustrates changes in the average percentage of respondents who listed militant or cooperative internationalist goals as "very important."[12] Average support for militant internationalists policies ranges from a maximum of 46 percent in 1982 to a minimum of only 14 percent in 2012. Cooperative internationalist policies received a consistently higher average level of support that ranges from a high of 61 percent when the survey was first conducted in 1974 to a low of 43 percent in 2001.

Figure 2.2 Changes in the Distribution of Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974-2015



[12] Response options associated with cooperative and militant internationalism are taken from Mandelbaum and Schneider (1979). A complete list of the policies associated with cooperative and militant internationalism, as well as responses to individual items, is included in the appendix. Not all policy options were included on the survey every year. Figure 2.2 reports the average percentage of respondents who thought cooperative or militant policies were "very important" for all relevant policies listed in the given year.

While these averages do not capture the relative strength of individuals' militant or cooperative internationalism, over time variation highlights two key points about the distribution of foreign policy beliefs and potential domestic coalitions of support. First, there is covariance in the level of support for cooperative and militant policies because both draw on a common commitment to an active role in international affairs.[13] Second, while support for policies waxes and wanes over time, at no point could a consensus be reached without the approval of individuals who support cooperative internationalist policies. The combined support of individuals with cooperative and militant internationalist beliefs is therefore critical to building a stable domestic coalition that both includes a majority of the public and is capable of sustaining intervention in the long-term. Because they are skeptical of military action, the need for support from cooperative internationalists is expected to present an obstacle to the formation of domestic coalitions.

Leading and Misleading the Public with Humanitarian Justifications

If humanitarian justifications resonate with the segments of the public most likely to actively oppose intervention, can presidents use these claims to convince the public to support any intervention? The extent to which humanitarian justifications allow leaders to circumvent domestic constraints draws on recent developments in the study of deception in international relations. Understanding the potential for deception and public backlash is particularly important in the case of humanitarian justifications because their misuse can prevent the U.S. from responding to genocide and mass atrocities in the future.

[13] Each foreign policy goal was presented separately and individuals' support for militant and cooperative internationalist goals was thus not mutually exclusive.

Deception and Democratic Constraints

Leaders have significant incentives to lie to their publics about military action (Alterman 2004; Mearsheimer 2011). Deception allows leaders to avoid dissent, hide mistakes, and convince the public to support action that is difficult but necessary to protect the national interest. In his account of dishonesty in international politics, Mearsheimer (2011, 58) argues that "It is reasonably easy for policymakers to lie to their publics" because they control the intelligence apparatus and can manipulate the flow of information, taking advantage of the fact that "most people will be inclined to trust what their leaders tell them unless there is hard evidence that they are being deceived." Similarly, Schuessler (2015, 117) suggests that deception is not only possible, but is "a natural outgrowth of the democratic process." However, democratic leaders risk blowback and domestic political costs if caught in a lie, which "even if it makes good strategic sense—might spill into the national arena and cause significant trouble by legitimizing and encouraging dishonesty in daily life" (Mearsheimer 2011, 84).

Reiter (2012) argues that the risks of blowback and public backlash are not only costly, they are prohibitive. Elected leaders realize that "if an attempt at deception is exposed, then they will suffer heavy domestic political costs" (Reiter 2012, 595). Democratic political institutions, including government bureaucracy, political competition, and the marketplace of ideas, ensure that deception will eventually be exposed and therefore "elected leaders are unable to elude public constraints by manipulating public estimates of the benefits and costs of war" (Reiter 2012, 595). The expected costs of deception are in line with Cobb et al.'s (2013) examination of belief perseverance, which finds that when positive misinformation—such as the humanitarian benefits of a conflict—is exposed, the backlash against leaders exceeds the initial positive benefit. Similarly, Alterman (2004, 19) asserts that Americans are so accustomed to leaders' lies

that "most have adapted to official falsehood as a way of life," but argues that despite the prevalence of deceit, "presidents cannot lie about major political events that have potentially serious ramifications—particularly those relating to war and peace—with impunity. These lies inevitably turn into monsters that strangle their creators" (Alterman 2004, 314).

These existing accounts converge around the expectation that lying about matters of foreign policy is commonplace but politically costly. However, they remain vague regarding the amount of deception required to generate these prohibitive costs, in part because they focus primarily on acts of provocation and covert operations.[14] While provocation and covert operations are particularly dramatic and costly examples of deception, the opportunities to use misleading justifications as a pretext for military action are both more common and less easily exposed. Humanitarian justifications are particularly susceptible to misuse because they are feasible in a wide range of cases—all military interventions inevitably involve some form of harm to civilians. Additionally, because no state has a perfect human rights record, stories of human rights abuses are both widely available and difficult to discredit. Justifications are thus a most likely case for deception and the extent to which they activate the same domestic constraints that prevent false provocation remains an open question.

Lessons from the 2003 Iraq War

The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq raised additional questions about the extent to which the U.S. public holds presidents accountable for telling the truth about military action. When inspectors did not find weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—the Bush administration's primary justification for action—following the initial invasion, scholars examined how democratic institutions failed to constrain the use of force, focusing on shortcomings of the marketplace of

[14] See Schuessler's (2015) discussion of overselling and the 2003 Iraq War for a notable exception.

ideas and Bush's successful management of the media (M. Baum and Groeling 2010; Kaufmann 2004), as well as the salience of different types of justifications and opportunities for dissent in the post-9/11 security environment (Bellamy 2004, 2005; Krebs and Lobasz 2007). Contrary to Reiter's (2012) expectation that democratic institutions prevent deception, the Bush administration's ability to persuade the public at the beginning of the Iraq War seemed to indicate that neither the public nor the media could hold leaders accountable for misleading justifications. Instead, the extent to which misperceptions about the Iraq case remained uncorrected led Kaufmann (2004, 7) to conclude that:

> …democratic political systems may be inherently vulnerable to issue manipulation. The logic of the marketplace of ideas in foreign policy is based on the proposition that median voters have strong incentives to scrutinize expansionist arguments and reject those that seem to serve only narrow interests or risk weakening, rather than strengthening, national security. There is reason to believe, however, that median voter logic can often be bypassed by elite manipulation of how issues are framed in debate.

Beyond Iraq's implications for democratic accountability, Bush's perceived abuse of humanitarian justifications also raised concerns about two long-term consequences for humanitarian norms. First, based on the perception that humanitarian appeals helped sustain support for the intervention when the WMD rationale became untenable (Bellamy 2004; Evangelista 2008, 21; Fisher 2003), humanitarian justifications could provide a pretext for action and allow the U.S. to become involved in otherwise unpopular interventions. Second, examples of failed or costly interventions associated with humanitarian appeals could affect the U.S. approach to future conflicts (Stapleton 2015) and the over-use of humanitarian claims could undermine the credibility of future U.S. appeals (Bellamy 2005). Declining public acceptance of humanitarian claims is especially problematic to the extent that it prevents action to address mass

atrocities and undermines efforts to expand and institutionalize humanitarian norms, such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Bellamy 2006; Evans 2004; ICISS 2001).

The Consequences of Deception

Disaggregating the public into individuals with heterogeneous values regarding intervention sheds light on whether there are costs associated with deception and the conditions under which presidents are likely to be punished for making false claims. When used effectively, humanitarian justifications help crowd out opportunities for dissent—they provide a rationale for the use of force that persuades cooperative internationalists and prevents opponents of the intervention from using the humanitarian toll of war to make the case against military action.[15] As a result of their broad appeal, presidents should have an incentive to emphasize humanitarian claims as often as possible, consistent with concerns that humanitarian justifications could provide a pretext for otherwise unpopular and illegitimate military action (Bellamy 2004, 2005; Evans 2004). Contrary to this intuition, I argue that the same individuals that make humanitarian justifications necessary also constrain their use. Because cooperative internationalists do not believe problems are best solved with military force, are inherently skeptical of interventions, and are attentive to foreign policy decisions, they are also expected to be sensitive to the misuse of humanitarian appeals as a cover for security goals. When humanitarian justifications are stretched beyond their role as supplementary explanations for security-driven interventions, they can generate backlash from the same individuals they are intended to persuade. The implication for leaders' justification strategies is that more is not always better when it comes to humanitarian appeals.

[15] See Krebs (2015), Krebs and Lobasz (2007), and Krebs and Jackson (2007) on how narrative and rhetorical choices set the boundaries of debate and create obstacles to dissent. Krebs and Lobasz (2007, 412) refer to this phenomenon as rhetorical coercion, "a strategy that seeks to rhetorically constrain political opponents and maneuver them into public assent to one's preferred terms of debate and ideally to one's policy stance."

The use of humanitarian justifications and potential for backlash suggest that U.S. presidents simultaneously guide and are constrained by public opinion. Humanitarian justifications can suppress dissent and help build a strong coalition of support for military action, but overreliance on these claims can generate costly backlash against the president and the intervention. Presidents thus have an incentive to use humanitarian justifications, but avoid inviting close inspection of humanitarian outcomes. To this end, I expect them to consistently use humanitarian justifications, but maintain a clear emphasis on security justifications as the primary rationale for security-driven interventions. Therefore, humanitarian justifications can facilitate intervention when used effectively, but they do not provide a blank check for military action.

Taken as a whole, the domestic coalition argument accounts for both the prevalence and limitations of humanitarian justifications in contemporary interventions. It clarifies the target audience for presidents' communication strategies and sheds light on the mechanisms of democratic accountability for the use of force by identifying the individuals most likely to impose political costs for deception and unjustified military action. The argument generates theoretical expectations for three levels of analysis—the pattern of justifications in presidential addresses, the public's response to the type and sincerity of justifications, and the White House's overarching communication strategies. Table 2.1 summarizes the expectations for each level of analysis and the method I use to evaluate these expectations in the following chapters.

Table 2.1 Expectations of the Domestic Coalition Argument by Level of Analysis

Level of Analysis	*Theoretical Expectations*	*Method of Evaluation*
Pattern of Justifications	• Presidents use humanitarian justifications widely, but limit their emphasis in security-driven interventions.	Content Analysis (Chapter 3)
Individual Responses to Justifications	• Cooperative internationalists are more supportive of humanitarian justifications than security justifications. • Militant internationalists offer high levels of support regardless of the type of justification. • Isolationists offer low levels of support regardless of the type of justification. • Cooperative internationalists are more politically engaged than isolationists.	Survey Experiments (Chapter 4)
Individual Responses to Deception	• Individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs are most sensitive to deceptive humanitarian justifications. • Individuals with militant internationalist beliefs are sensitive to deceptive security justifications, but are not sensitive to deceptive humanitarian justifications. • The attitudes of individuals with isolationist beliefs are not significantly influenced by the presence of deception.	Survey Experiments (Chapter 5)
Communication Strategies	• Discussions of speeches focus on domestic audience and consider how justifications resonate with different groups. • Communication strategies are designed to manage domestic pressure, especially from cooperative internationalists. • Concerns with the domestic coalition and efforts to persuade cooperative internationalists are present in security interventions, humanitarian interventions, and non-interventions.	Case Studies (Chapter 6, Chapter 7)

Partisanship and the Domestic Coalition

The studies outlined above and Figure 2.2 show that the public holds diverse foreign policy beliefs that influence its response to a wide range of policies and have structured foreign policy attitudes for at least the last thirty years (Kertzer et al. 2014; Rathbun et al. 2016;

Wittkopf 1986). Building on this evidence, I argue that these beliefs also shed light on who can be mobilized to support military action and the conditions under which presidents are most likely to persuade key groups. However, foreign policy beliefs are not the only source of heterogeneity in the domestic audience. How do the benefits of using foreign policy beliefs to understand the composition of the domestic coalition compare to other divisions in American politics?

Most notably, studies of both American politics and international relations reveal that individuals' partisan identities influence their attitudes towards domestic and foreign policies. The influence of partisanship extends to a wide range of attitudes, including individuals' opposition to the use of torture, responses to endorsements by international institutions, and reasons for supporting humanitarian action (Grieco et al. 2011; Kreps and Maxey Forthcoming; Wallace 2013). Partisanship also affects the incentives of political elites. Kriner and Shen (2014) demonstrate that the partisanship of members of Congress moderates their responses to casualties and willingness to criticize military action. Similarly, Trager and Vavreck (2011, 526) show that partisanship conditions the domestic pressures leaders face during international crises and creates incentives for "Democratic presidents to fight wars they will not win."

In addition to individual attitudes and incentives, elite cue theory suggests that partisanship also determines the extent to which leaders will be able to persuade the public. Berinsky (2007) argues that public opinion towards military action is determined by patterns of elite conflict. In their decision to support or oppose an intervention, individuals will listen to and seek out the advice of politicians and opinion leaders who share their political predispositions (Berinsky 2007, 975). The statements and advice of elites who do not share an individuals' political predispositions are expected to resonate less. This approach to public opinion is consistent with theories of motivated reasoning, which contend that individuals seek evidence—

in this case, public statements about military action—that is in line with their pre-existing political beliefs and discount evidence to the contrary (Taber and Lodge 2006).

Evidence of rising polarization in U.S. politics suggests that the centrality of partisanship to public opinion is poised to increase over time. Examining partisanship at the elite level, Lee (2009, 68) concludes that "The dramatic increase in partisan conflict represents one of the most striking developments in Congress over the past 25 years." While this polarization has yet to produce more ideologically extreme outcomes, it is exacerbated by presidents' attempts to champion particular issues and can limit the president's ability to influence Congress and policy (Lee 2008, 2015). Increased polarization also influences the coalition-building strategies employed during election campaigns by encouraging candidates to focus more time and resources on mobilizing their base of support rather than winning over moderate voters from the other party (Panagopoulos 2016).

Despite a consensus that Congress has become more polarized over time, the extent to which this polarization extends to the U.S. public remains a subject of debate. In one camp, studies suggest that the U.S. public has remained centrist in its views while elite polarization creates the misperception that the country is more divided than ever (Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011; McAdam and Kloos 2014). McAdam and Kloos (2014, 11) summarize this perspective with their contention that, "the deep partisan divide that characterizes today's Congress, party activists, and other political elites is typically not mirrored in the general public. Quite the opposite: the general public has remained largely centrist in its views, while the parties—especially the GOP—and their candidates have been pushed off center." Explanations for parties' shifts from the center include pressure from social movements, party sorting, and the improved coordination of party teams, while explanations for the appearance of increased public

polarization range from misperception to news coverage (Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Lee 2009; Levendusky and Malhotra 2016a, 2016b; McAdam and Kloos 2014).

By contrast, a second camp contends that polarization is on the rise among both the political elite and public. Responding to Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope's (2006) dismissal of a culture war between blue and red states, Abramowitz and Saunders (2008, 554) claim that "Polarization in America is not just an elite phenomenon. The American people, especially those who care about politics, have also become much more polarized in recent years. To a considerable extent, the divisions that exist among policymakers in Washington reflect real divisions among the American people." These findings are in line with more recent evidence that the effects of partisan polarization increasingly influence individuals' economic and political choices (McConnell et al. In press).

The Importance of Foreign Policy Beliefs in a Polarized Context

While the verdict is still out on the extent of polarization among the U.S. public, the widespread influence of partisan identity raises two questions for the strength of the domestic coalition argument: 1) Given an individual's partisan identity, do foreign policy beliefs provide any additional leverage for understanding attitudes towards military action? 2) If foreign policy beliefs and partisanship are not synonymous, does the latter moderate the effect of the former?

An individual's foreign policy beliefs are expected to correlate with his or her partisan identity because both traits correspond to similar moral foundations (Jost et al. 2003). Moral foundations theory identifies five moral foundations—harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, authority/respect, purity/sanctity, and ingroup/loyalty—that individuals hold in different combinations and at different magnitudes, which in turn influence political attitudes (Graham et al. 2013; Haidt and Graham 2007; Kertzer et al. 2014). Linking these beliefs to political

ideology, Haidt and Graham (2007, 98) find that "Political liberals have moral intuitions primarily based upon the first two foundations, and therefore misunderstand the moral motivations of political conservatives, who generally rely upon all five foundations." Alternative measures of psychological foundations also find clear differences based on ideology and demonstrate that "conservatives are more resistant to change, oppose ambiguity, and prefer definitive outcomes that provide closure" (Brutger 2016, 8; Jost et al. 2003). Notably, these studies of moral foundations gauge political ideology rather than party identification. While not a direct measure of partisanship, party and ideology are closely linked in the U.S. context and political ideology is also a central part of studies partisan polarization (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006; Fiorina and Abrams 2008).

In terms of foreign policy beliefs, the same individual-level moral foundations of harm and fairness associated with liberalism are linked to cooperative internationalism, while the community-level ingroup, authority, and purity foundations held by conservatives are linked to militant internationalism (Kertzer et al. 2014, 833–34). Isolationists are not clearly associated with any of the moral foundations (Kertzer et al. 2014). Table 2.2 summarizes the moral foundations and their connections to ideology and foreign policy beliefs.

Table 2.2 Moral Foundations of Ideology and Foreign Policy Beliefs

	Ideology		*Foreign Policy Belief*	
Foundation	Liberal	Conservative	Cooperative Internationalism	Militant Internationalism
Harm/Care	X	X	X	
Fairness/Reciprocity	X	X	X	
Authority/Respect		X		X
Purity/Sanctity		X		X
Ingroup/Loyalty		X		X

As Table 2.2 shows, because of overlap among the moral foundations that drive both foreign policy beliefs and political attitudes, individuals with liberal values are more likely to be cooperative internationalists, while individuals with conservative values are more likely to be militant internationalists. However, the values also reveal that the link between political ideology and foreign policy beliefs is not exact. In particular, conservatives hold values associated with cooperative internationalism and isolationists are not easily associated with either ideology. Partisanship, ideology, and foreign policy beliefs are thus expected to be correlated, but not exact reflections of each other.

This expectation is borne out in the sample of respondents for the survey experiments presented in Chapters 4 and 5. As the cross tabulations presented in Table 2.3 show,[16] the majority (66 percent) of individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs were Democrats, but non-negligible numbers were also Republicans (18 percent) and independents (16 percent).[17] Notably, cooperative internationalists account for 32 percent of all Republicans in the sample and 50 percent of independents. These descriptive statistics suggest that even if presidents only appeal to members of their own party or potential swing voters, Republican presidents who disregard cooperative internationalists would be overlooking a substantial portion of their own constituents.

[16] See the appendix for cross tabulations by political ideology.

[17] Respondents self-reported their partisanship on a seven-point scale that ranged from strong Democrat to strong Republican. Democrats include individuals who reported that they were strong Democrats, Democrats, or independents that leaned towards Democrats. Republicans include individuals who reported that they were strong Republicans, Republicans, or independents that leaned towards Republicans. Independents are only those individuals who did not lean towards either party. See the appendix for results that code leaners as independents and examine the distribution of strong partisans. See the Chapter 4 appendix for the full survey instrument and measures of foreign policy beliefs.

Table 2.3 Cross Tabulation of Foreign Policy Beliefs and Partisan ID

	Democrat	*Republican*	*Independent*	*Total*
Cooperative Internationalist	66% (559)	18% (150)	16% (139)	100% (848)
Militant Internationalist	27% (114)	56% (235)	17% (69)	100% (418)
Isolationist	39% (95)	32% (78)	29% (70)	100% (243)
N	769	463	278	

Percentages are calculated across rows to report the percentage of individuals with each category of foreign policy beliefs that identify with the given party. Counts reported in parentheses.

Similarly, while a majority of militant internationalists (56 percent) were Republicans, 27 percent were Democrats and 17 percent were independents. Militant internationalists make up 15 percent of all Democrats in the sample and 25 percent of the individuals who identified as independents. Therefore, Democratic presidents who fail to target militant internationalists disregard more than a quarter of potential swing voters and a sizeable percentage of their own party.

Partisanship does a particularly poor job of identifying and explaining the attitudes of isolationists who are spread more evenly across parties. The plurality of isolationists in the sample were Democrats (39 percent), but the percentage who identified as Republicans (32 percent) or independents (29 percent) were not far behind. The lack of a relationship between isolationism and partisanship is confirmed by logistic regression models, reported in the appendix, which use party to predict foreign policy beliefs. While Democrats are significantly more likely to be cooperative internationalists and Republicans are significantly more likely to be militant internationalists, the marginal effects of party on isolationists are more muted.

Changing one's party identity from non-independent to independent increased the predicted probability an individual identified as an isolationist by 0.11, but this marginal effect pales in comparison to the effect of identifying as a Democrat on the predicted probability of being a cooperative internationalist (+0.34) and the effect of identifying as a Republican on the predicted probability of being a militant internationalist (+0.34).

Together, the distribution of partisans is consistent with evidence from moral foundations theory that political ideology (and therefore partisanship) and foreign policy beliefs have common drivers. However, the number of partisans that fall outside of the modal category and the lack of a clear pattern of partisanship among isolationists suggests that foreign policy beliefs are not simply party identity by a different name. Instead, foreign policy beliefs capture more than just partisanship. By recognizing that isolationists, who cut across party lines, are inefficient targets for presidents' justifications, taking these beliefs into account provides a more accurate picture of who can be mobilized to support military action. Additionally, by focusing on when and how individuals believe the U.S. should engage with the world, foreign policy beliefs highlight the mechanisms—the activation of concerns about the protection of innocent civilians or national security—through which individuals from both parties can be convinced to support military action. As a result, foreign policy beliefs are capable of generating concrete theoretical expectations for the types of justifications needed to effectively mobilize domestic support for intervention that cannot be derived from partisanship alone.

The Partisanship of the President

In addition to correlating with foreign policy beliefs, studies of partisanship also suggest that the presidents' party identification influences the credibility of his or her justifications for military action. If individuals seek out elite cues from opinion leaders who share their political

predispositions (Berinsky 2007), a president from the opposing party is unlikely to be persuasive regardless of the justifications he or she uses. Leaders' inability to communicate with members of the opposing party is exacerbated by polarization, which makes any item on the president's agenda more contentious (Lee 2008) and creates a general dislike and distrust of the other party that "leads individuals to distrust government, especially when the opposing party is in control" (Levendusky Forthcoming). From this perspective, the connection between foreign policy beliefs and responsiveness to justifications could be moderated by partisanship to such a degree as to be inconsequential—no matter how many humanitarian justifications a Republican president uses, he or she will be unable to convince Democratic cooperative internationalists to support a military intervention led by a member of the opposing party.

However, there is also evidence that Americans possess strong national identities that can be activated in the face of international crises and threats to mitigate partisan divisions (Kam and Ramos 2008; Levendusky Forthcoming; Levendusky and Horowitz 2012; Malhotra and Popp 2012). Levendusky (Forthcoming, 8) notes that "by changing the salience of an individual's identities—partisan versus American—one can change how they evaluate those from the other party." As an inherently partisan figure, presidents will often be ill-equipped to prime the unifying national identity (Levendusky Forthcoming, 27). However, because of the president's informational and first-mover advantages, international crises mute the effects of partisanship and "The fact that the president is the president, rather than a Republican or Democrat, becomes the crucial factor" (Levendusky and Horowitz 2012, 325).

From this view, military interventions—especially in their early stages—represent the peak of the president's ability to appeal across partisan lines. Foreign policy beliefs thus help explain how individuals form opinions about military action at the moment that partisanship

matters least. Evidence from recent U.S. military actions in Syria supports this claim. Between 2013 and 2017, Barack Obama and Donald Trump—arguably two of the most polarizing U.S. political figures in recent history—both proposed military strikes in response to Syria's use of chemical weapons and oversaw military operations against ISIS forces operating in the same country. If partisanship is the dominant factor behind public attitudes towards military action, Democrats should support the action when it occurred under Obama's leadership and oppose operations conducted during Trump's presidency. Similarly, Republicans would be expected to oppose action encouraged by Obama and support action taken by Trump. Contrary to these expectations, in 2013 Pew polls revealed that 46 percent of Democrats and 56 percent of Republicans favored military action against Syria if the use of chemical weapons was confirmed (Pew Research Center 2013). When the U.S. conducted air strikes following Syria's use of chemical weapons in 2017, support among Republicans increased, but 45 percent of Democrats continued to support the action (Pew Research Center 2017b). Partisan polarization alone cannot explain Democrats' consistent level of support. It also cannot account for the bipartisan support—including 64 percent of Republicans and 60 percent of Democrats—that existed for Obama's military campaign against ISIS (Pew Research Center, U.S. Politics and Policy 2014a).

In sum, partisanship is a salient force in U.S. politics, but it does not account for the full variation in foreign policy beliefs nor does it render their effects inconsequential. Examining foreign policy beliefs produces substantive expectations for the resonance of different intervention frames and is better equipped to determine which segments of the domestic audience can be mobilized to support military action, as well as the conditions under which this mobilization is possible. However, as the polarization of the U.S. public continues, party and foreign policy beliefs are likely to interact in important ways. In Chapter 8, the conclusion poses

this interaction as an empirical question and takes up the task of understanding its implications in greater detail.

Humanitarian Justifications and International Audiences

The argument presented above focuses on variation within the U.S. public to explain presidents' consistent use of humanitarian justification. To this end, it assumes that the domestic audience is the primary target of humanitarian claims. However, humanitarian justifications could instead be employed to placate international audiences and gain international approval for intervention, which both increases the legitimacy of the intervention and indirectly bolsters public support (Chapman 2011; Chapman and Reiter 2004; Grieco et al. 2011). By many accounts, humanitarian justifications are particularly well-suited to international audiences because they frame military action in terms of internationally held standards of appropriate behavior (Finnemore 1996a, 159). Using humanitarian justifications to evoke international norms and standards such as the Responsibility to Protect thus presents intervention as a response to threats to international peace and security, rather than as a purely self-serving action to protect narrow U.S. national security interests.

While multilateral support can increase both the legitimacy of an intervention and the opportunities for burden-sharing, it is also "more time-consuming, less reliable, and more limiting than operating alone" (Kreps 2011, 6). As a result, leaders make strategic choices about when to expend the effort necessary to seek multilateral approval (Chapman 2011, 6). The consistent pattern of humanitarian justifications thus does not map onto the variation in the importance or pursuit of multilateral approval, suggesting that the international community is not the intended audience for humanitarian claims.

Additionally, unlike at the domestic level where humanitarian justifications persuade the most likely opponents of intervention, recent conflicts indicate that the opponents of intervention at the international level are often unconvinced by humanitarian appeals. For example, when the UNSC passed Resolution 688 in response to Iraq's oppression of Kurds and Shiites, Russia and China committed to veto any version that contained enforcement provisions and the non-permanent members of the Council were "anxious not to set a precedent that might legitimize Council action on humanitarian grounds alone" (Wheeler 2004, 33). Similarly, Russia, China, and India opposed the humanitarian rationale for NATO actions in Kosovo in 1999 (Wheeler 2004, 43) and, more recently, Russia and China publically rebuked the U.S. and NATO for using misleading humanitarian statements to gain support for intervention in Libya (Foust 2012).

Therefore, at the international level humanitarian claims can spark rather than circumvent opposition and they are more likely to be the subject of debate than interventions clearly defined in terms of self-defense. This international debate is particularly noteworthy because opposition to humanitarian claims most often comes from veto-holding members of the UNSC who have the power to block international approval for U.S. interventions.[18] In sum, international approval is neither consistently sought after nor most effectively obtained with humanitarian justifications. U.S. presidents' deployment of humanitarian justifications in already popular intervention is thus unlikely to be primarily directed at international audiences.

Civilians and Contemporary Conflicts

While humanitarian justifications are not limited to humanitarian interventions, their effectiveness could still be confined to contemporary conflicts, which are unique in the salience of humanitarian norms (Finnemore 2003; Garraway 2014; Wheeler 2000), the emphasis placed

[18] See Voeten (2005) on why approval from the UNSC is particularly sought after and important for establishing the legitimacy of a military intervention.

on civilians (Conway-Lanz 2014; Crawford 2014; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006), and the attention given to post-war reconstruction (Barakat and Zyck 2009; Bass 2004; Bellamy 2008; Gheciu and Welsh 2009; Orend 2002; Recchia 2009). These perspectives suggest that presidents' common use of humanitarian claims is tied to changes in warfare. They highlight both a potential scope condition to the argument—the prominence of humanitarian justifications reflects changes in the U.S. commitment to protecting civilians—and an alternative explanation for the purpose of humanitarian justifications—to prepare the public for future reconciliation and reconstruction efforts.

Growing Concern for Civilians

Contemporary conflicts can be distinguished from past eras along multiple dimensions. If the patterns highlighted in existing scholarship hold, conflict and conflict-related deaths are in decline (Gleditsch 2013; Goldstein 2011; Levy and Thompson 2011; Pinker 2011) and states are less likely than ever before to formally declare war (Fazal 2012). When war does take place, a developing consensus suggests that government and public attention to protecting civilians has increased significantly over the past decades (Evangelista 2014, 3). This increased concern with the protection of civilians can be tied to changes in norms that govern conduct in war, public concern with civilian casualties, and the types of conflicts in which the U.S. is involved—in particular, counterinsurgency efforts which require winning the hearts and minds of civilians to meet their military objectives (Conway-Lanz 2014; Crawford 2013, 2014; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006). Combined, these changes create an environment in which the U.S. not only distinguishes its military targets from the civilian population, but also publically declares its concern for civilians' well-being and desire to make their lives better. For example, as U.S. forces began strikes in Iraq on March 19, 2003, George W. Bush told the nation that "I want

Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm" and that "We come to Iraq with respect for its citizens, for their great civilization, and for the religious faiths they practice" (G. W. Bush 2003e). Days earlier, he addressed the Iraqi people directly, assuring them that the U.S. military campaign would be:

> …directed against the lawless men who rule your country and not against you. As our coalition takes away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you need. We will tear down the apparatus of terror, and we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free. In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near (Bush 2003a).

This approach stands in stark contrast to the treatment of civilian populations in past conflicts that more closely reflected total war scenarios. In total war, public morale and industrial production become critical to the war effort (Biddle 2014) and "because total war pits the belligerent energies of whole populations against one another, any member of an adversary's population counts as a legitimate target" (Saint-Amour 2014, 420). Given the fortunate absence of total war scenarios in recent decades, the effectiveness of humanitarian justifications—even among cooperative internationalists—could be limited to cases in which the target state's society is not implicated in the conflict. When military efforts are designed to break the morale of an opponent's society, humanitarian claims focused on protecting foreign civilians could appear contradictory and undermine the overall rationale for military action.

World War II offers the most recent example of U.S. military action that included the mass mobilization of entire societies as part of the war effort. In the early months of U.S involvement, Roosevelt declared, "We know what we are fighting for. We realize that the war has become what Hitler originally proclaimed it to be—a total war" (Roosevelt 1942). As the existing scholarship expects, references to the welfare or protection of German and Japanese

civilians in this case are few and far between, with rare and brief exceptions such as Truman's warning that "I urge Japanese civilians to leave those cities if they wish to save their lives" (Truman 1945). However, the absence of references to the German and Japanese people does not reflect the absence of either humanitarian justifications or concern with foreign civilians. Instead, humanitarian justifications were present throughout WWII, but focused on protecting and aiding civilians in countries under German or Japanese occupation. In the same speech in which he labeled the conflict a total war, Roosevelt (1942) evoked the suffering of civilians across Europe as a justification for the domestic costs of action:

> The price for civilization must be paid in hard work and sorrow and blood. The price is not too high. If you doubt it, ask those millions who live today under the tyranny of Hitlerisms. Ask the workers of France and Norway and the Netherlands, whipped to labor by the lash, whether the stabilization of wages is too great a "sacrifice." Ask the farmers of Poland and Denmark, of Czechoslovakia and France, looted of their livestock, starving while their own crops are stolen from their land, ask them whether "parity" prices are too great a "sacrifice." Ask the businessmen of Europe, whose enterprises have been stolen from their owners, whether the limitation of profits and personal incomes is too great a "sacrifice." Ask the women and children whom Hitler is starving whether the rationing of tires and gasoline and sugar is too great a "sacrifice."

Similar humanitarian claims also followed the advance of Allied troops into and the eventual liberation of occupied territories. Rather than "follow the pattern set by Mussolini and Hitler and the Japanese for the treatment of occupied countries," Allied forces in Italy were "already helping the Italian people in Sicily" and "providing them with the necessities of life until the time comes when they can fully provide for themselves" (Roosevelt 1943). Such efforts were part of the U.S.'s "determination to restore these conquered peoples to the dignity of human beings, masters of their own fate, entitled to freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear," a policy that Roosevelt was committed to pursuing even if it

stepped "on the toes of those Americans who, playing party politics at home, call that kind of foreign policy 'crazy altruism' and 'starry-eyed dreaming'" (Roosevelt 1943).

In sum, the norms associated with targeting civilians and separating combatants from noncombatants may operate differently in cases of total war. However, examples from WWII indicate that humanitarian justifications are not limited to conflicts in which the boundaries between societies and militaries are clearly delineated. Instead, Roosevelt used humanitarian claims to justify the costs of action throughout the war and publically recognized that these moral appeals operated along a different, but critical dimension of foreign policy. Humanitarian justifications can thus be adapted to bolster support for military action, even in total war scenarios, and their ability to build support through moral mechanisms is not inherently limited to contemporary interventions.

Anticipating Reconstruction

Rather than building a stronger coalition of domestic support, humanitarian justifications could also reflect the increased focus on post-conflict reconstruction (Barakat and Zyck 2009; Gheciu and Welsh 2009; Recchia 2009). In the past decade, peace-building and reconstruction efforts have become commonplace in U.S. foreign policy and are often construed as an extension of the conflict itself (Barakat and Zyck 2009, 1069). This emphasis on reconstruction is consistent with the "responsibility to rebuild" pillar of the Responsibility to Protect (ICISS 2001, 39) and has sparked debate over whether postwar justice—jus post bellum—is a necessary component of just war theory (Bass 2004; Bellamy 2008; Orend 2002). The prominence of reconstruction efforts in recent interventions suggests an important alternative explanation for the widespread use of humanitarian justifications: if presidents anticipate reconstruction, they could use humanitarian claims to preemptively build support for the humanitarian efforts set to

follow the initial invasion. In this case, humanitarian appeals could be useful because they generate support for a different stage of the intervention, rather than from different segments of the domestic audience.

Within and between case variation in the pattern of humanitarian justifications demonstrates that reconstruction efforts alone cannot explain the role of humanitarian appeals in contemporary interventions. First, as the previous section highlighted, humanitarian justifications have a long history in U.S. interventions and their presence does not track closely with the development of jus post bellum. Additionally, cases such as the 2011 U.S. intervention in Libya illustrate that humanitarian justifications are not limited to interventions that required a U.S. commitment to post-war reconstruction. Second, even in cases such as the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq, which included long-term reconstruction efforts, humanitarian justifications were used consistently over the course of the intervention and Bush's emphasis of humanitarian appeals did not increase as the U.S. transitioned from the initial invasion to the nation-building stage of the operation. Thus, while consistent with the goals of reconstruction efforts and jus post bellum, humanitarian justifications are not driven by these aspects of contemporary interventions.

Evaluating the Domestic Coalition Argument

The domestic coalition argument outlined in this chapter has theoretical expectations at three levels: 1) the pattern of humanitarian justifications in presidents' addresses to the nation, 2) individuals' responses to humanitarian claims and their perceived misuse, and 3) the political objectives of administrations' communications strategies. To evaluate this argument, the remainder of the dissertation employs a multi-method approach to test these expectations against alternative explanations. First, I employ content analysis to create a dataset of justifications for

all potential interventions, 1990 to 2013, and use this dataset to examine the pattern of justifications for military action. Evidence in support of this argument will demonstrate that presidents use humanitarian claims often, regardless of the type of intervention, but limit the relative emphasis placed on humanitarian explanations in security interventions. The domestic coalition expectations are tested against the alternative explanations that presidents either limit their use of humanitarian justifications to humanitarian interventions or use and emphasize humanitarian claims equally across all interventions. Second, I rely on survey experiments to determine how individuals respond to alternative justifications and whether this response is influenced by their underlying foreign policy beliefs. In this context, the domestic coalition logic expects individuals with cooperative internationalist values to be uniquely responsive to humanitarian appeals and sensitive to the deceptive use of humanitarian claims. I evaluate these expectations against the alternative explanation that foreign policy beliefs do not condition how individuals respond to alternative justifications. Third, case studies of the 1991 Gulf War and U.S. policy towards Bosnia from 1993 to 1995 demonstrate that presidents are aware of the domestic coalition and design justification strategies to appeal to a broad audience without risking backlash. The case studies also allow me to rule out the alternative explanations that the White House's communication strategy is primarily targeted at the international audience or a direct reflection of the objectives of military action. The remainder of the project now turns to the systematic evaluation of these expectations.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PATTERN OF HUMANITARIAN JUSTIFICATIONS

In the buildup to military action, one of the most important decisions U.S. presidents make is how the intervention will be presented to the public. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq offers a prime example of the strategy and gravity with which presidential administrations approach the choice of justifications for war. Prior to the intervention, Bush asserted that "We lead our publics" (Woodward 2004, 296) and to this end developed a justification strategy that combined the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with reminders of Saddam Hussein's brutality against his own people. In his radio address, Bush referenced both WMD and the Iraqi people, stating, "The burden now is on Iraq's dictator to disclose and destroy his arsenal of weapons. If he refuses, then for the sake of peace, the United States will lead a coalition to disarm the Iraqi regime and free the Iraqi people" (G. W. Bush 2003a). Concern for the Iraqi people was reinforced by evidence that Saddam Hussein posed a direct threat not only to international security, but also to their welfare. After outlining human rights groups' reports of torture and claiming, "The dictator who is assembling the world's most dangerous weapons has already used them on whole villages, leaving thousands of his own citizens dead, blind, or disfigured," Bush sent a message to "the brave and oppressed people of Iraq: Your enemy is not surrounding your country; your enemy is ruling your country. And the day he and his regime are removed from power will be the day of your liberation" (G. W. Bush 2003b). The combination of justifications Bush used in the Iraq case was both effective—polls taken days before the invasion report that 59 percent of respondents favored taking military action to end Saddam Hussein's rule (Pew 2003)—and controversial, as WMD were not found and critics warned that

humanitarian appeals had been misused (Brauman and Salignon 2004; Bellamy 2004; Evans 2004; Hehir 2008).

As the Iraq case highlights, the president's choice of justifications for intervention is intentional, important for managing public opinion, and subject to scrutiny and change over the course of an intervention. Bush's use of humanitarian justifications in the context of a predominantly security-driven intervention is particularly noteworthy because, as this chapter illustrates, it reflects the common and widespread use of humanitarian claims in the post-Cold War period. Because justifications are "literally an attempt to connect one's actions to standards of justice or, perhaps more generically, to standards of appropriate behavior" (Finnemore 1996a, 159), conventional wisdom treats humanitarian justifications as synonymous with accepted humanitarian interventions. However, Bush's humanitarian appeal in the context of a military operation primarily focused on U.S. security interests demonstrates that the utility of humanitarian justifications is not limited to cases of humanitarian intervention. To better understand the role that humanitarian justifications play in contemporary U.S. interventions, this chapter asks: When do presidents use and emphasize humanitarian justifications?

This chapter explains presidents' justification strategies as a function of the domestic audience and composition of potential coalitions of domestic support. I argue that presidents have consistently employed justification strategies that appeal a domestic audience with diverse foreign policy beliefs. Leaders have an incentive to use humanitarian claims widely to persuade cooperative internationalists—the most likely opponents of intervention—but these same individuals prevent leaders from over-using humanitarian appeals. This pattern runs counter to two alternative explanations for presidents' justification strategies: 1) that presidents have an incentive to use humanitarian claims as often as possible to persuade an emotional and

inattentive public (Almond 1950; Lippmann 1922; Mearsheimer 2011), and 2) the expectation that national security threats are the most effective means of rallying support from a prudent public (Brody 1991; Drezner 2008a; Eichenberg 2005; Jentleson 1992).

To evaluate these explanations and illustrate the pattern of justifications in post-Cold War interventions, the remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, it provides an overview of the process through which presidents develop justification strategies to bolster public support and presents two alternative hypotheses for the use and emphasis of humanitarian claims. Second, I outline the incentives the domestic coalition creates for presidents to use humanitarian claims widely while limiting their emphasis. Third, I present criteria for constructing a dataset that captures the pattern of humanitarian and security justifications in all potential U.S. interventions of the post-Cold War period. A fourth section presents the results and highlights the use and emphasis of humanitarian claims over time. Content analysis of national addresses shows that the example of Bush's rhetoric in Iraq is not unique—presidents have used humanitarian justifications in every military intervention of the past twenty-five years. However, presidents also appear to exercise discretion when using humanitarian claims in security-driven interventions, taking care to present national security as the dominant explanation for action. Combined, these results provide evidence that the pattern of justifications in the post-Cold War period is consistent with the expectations of the domestic coalition argument.

The Importance of Effective Justifications

In the buildup to military action, U.S. presidents must decide how to sell the intervention to the public and use their platform to make the case that military action is necessary. Presidents who undertake military action without public support risk political punishment, either in the following election or in their ability to pursue other items on the domestic agenda or through

tightened institutional constraints that make it more difficult for leaders to pursue their political agendas (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver 2007; Larson and Savych 2005; Tomz and Weeks 2013, 850). These constraints influence when and how the U.S. pursues military action and presidents have strong incentives to use their informational and first-mover advantages to bring public opinion in line with their policy decisions (Berinsky 2009; Druckman and Jacobs 2011; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Kernell 1997; Reiter and Stam 2002; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2010; Western 2005, 17).

Effective justifications are thus a key mediator of the relationship between the president and public support for military action—when the public is persuaded by the president's explanation, support for intervention increases and leaders can pursue military action with lower political costs. Despite their importance, the content of presidents' justifications and the conditions under which justifications effectively bolster public support remain relatively un-examined.[19] By outlining the pattern and domestic utility of justifications, this chapter sheds light on an overlooked link between presidents' foreign policy choices and public support for intervention (Krebs 2015, 15).

Public Opinion and Justification Strategies

Theories of public opinion and military action offer two alternative accounts of how presidents develop justification strategies to manage public attitudes towards intervention. First, presidents could take an "everything but the kitchen sink " approach to justifications, using all feasible claims as often as possible to placate an impulsive and inattentive public (Almond 1950; Carr 1939; Holsti 1992, 440; Lippmann 1922; Mearsheimer 2011; Morgenthau 1951).

[19] Krebs (2015) provides a notable exception, but focuses on changes in the overarching grand strategy narrative rather than on the effectiveness of different categories of justifications within individual interventions. See also (Goddard and Krebs 2015; Krebs and Jackson 2007; Krebs and Lobasz 2007).

Alternatively, presidents' rhetorical choices could be constrained by the facts of the intervention and their justifications determined by the specific situation. This explanation is consistent with accounts of a prudent public (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998), which would see through false justifications, and with the expansion of norms of humanitarian intervention, which legitimate military action as a response to humanitarian crises (Bellamy 2006; Finnemore 1996a, 2003; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Welsh 2004; Wheeler 2000). However, these explanations are inconsistent with the actual pattern of humanitarian justifications.

Justifications for an Emotional Public

Moral appeals are central to arguments that the public does not provide a meaningful constraint on military action. Unlike leaders who understand the complexities of foreign policy, the public is portrayed as emotional, inconsistent, and easily persuaded by presidential appeals (Carr 1939; P. E. Converse 1964; Holsti 1992, 440; Lipset 1988; Morgenthau 1951). From this emotional public perspective, presidents are expected to take an "everything but the kitchen sink" approach to justifications, using all possible explanations to convince the public to support "strategic aims at odds with their own interests rightly understood" (Goddard and Krebs 2015, 11). Humanitarian justifications are added to security claims because the national interest is served by shrewd calculations that do not resonate with the public and force policymakers to "camouflage their policies in anti-realist rhetoric" to avoid backlash (Kertzer and McGraw 2012, 245). Presidents thus consistently use humanitarian appeals to manage public opinion because the public always responds positively to these claims. This approach generates the following hypothesis about the use of humanitarian justifications:

> H3.1: Presidents use and emphasize humanitarian justifications consistently across all potential interventions.

Justifications for a Prudent Public

Contrary to an impulsive public that accepts any justifications, presidents could instead face an attentive and prudent public. When faced with a potential intervention, this public will weigh the costs of action relative to the likelihood of success and the legitimacy of the operation's principle policy objectives (Brody 1991; Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009; Geys 2010; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Kriner and Shen 2014). The prudent public will respond only to claims that provide additional information about the prospects of the intervention and will see through false claims. Humanitarian claims that do not reflect conditions on the ground will thus be ineffective and unattractive to presidents outside of cases of humanitarian intervention. The prevalence of humanitarian justifications in contemporary interventions is thus expected to reflect the increased practice of humanitarian intervention following the end of the Cold War (Finnemore 1996a, 2003; Welsh 2004; Wheeler 2000), in line with the following hypothesis:

> H3.2: Presidents limit their use of humanitarian justifications to interventions with policy objectives that are primarily humanitarian.

Justifications for a Diverse Domestic Coalition

The kitchen sink and situational determinants explanations assume that presidents' justifications are designed to reach a single U.S. public that considers the costs and benefits of intervention in a uniform way. However, studies of partisanship and foreign policy beliefs demonstrate that rather than an "undifferentiated whole" (Berinsky 2007, 977), the U.S. public is a diverse audience with foreign policy preferences that vary systematically based on individuals' views of when and how the U.S. should engage in international affairs (Holsti and Rosenau 1988; Kertzer et al. 2014; Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; Wittkopf 1994; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983). Connecting presidents' justification strategies to evidence of heteorgeneity in

the domestic audience, I argue that the pattern of presidents' justifications for military action reflects their need to build a broad coalition of approval from a public with diverse foreign policy beliefs. Security justifications alone are often insufficient for this coalition building process. Instead, presidents also employ humanitarian appeals to persuade the individuals who are most likely to form a costly political opposition. Therefore, the combination of security and humanitarian explanations evident in Bush's justifications for the Iraq war is common in presidential speeches because it maximizes the potential for domestic support. In security interventions, this combination appeals to both individuals with militant internationalist values—the most consistent supporters of military action—and individuals with cooperative internationalist values—those otherwise most likely to actively oppose military action. The importance of cooperative internationalists' support and their response to humanitarian appeals creates an incentive for presidents to use humanitarian claims in security and humanitarian interventions, which is reflected in the pattern of justifications.

The Consequences of Coalitions

The domestic coalition argument contends that the importance of persuading individuals with cooperative internationalist values both requires and constrains the use of humanitarian justifications in contemporary interventions. As a result of their broad appeal, presidents should have an incentive to use humanitarian claims in security and humanitarian interventions. However, the same individuals that make humanitarian claims necessary also constrain their use. In particular, cooperative internationalists are sensitive to the misuse of humanitarian appeals as a cover for security goals. When humanitarian justifications are stretched beyond their role as supplementary explanations for security-driven interventions, they can generate backlash from the same individuals they are intended to persuade. The implication for leaders' justification

strategies is that more is not always better when it comes to humanitarian appeals. While including humanitarian claims helps build a coalition of domestic support for security-driven interventions, their benefits are only realized if security justifications remain prominent. Therefore, presidents have an incentive to use humanitarian claims widely but limit their emphasis in security interventions. The pattern of justifications in the post-Cold War period is expected to reflect this incentive:

> H3.3: Presidents regularly use humanitarian justifications to justify security-driven interventions; however, they limit their emphasis of humanitarian appeals in these cases.

Table 3.1 summarizes each of the alternative explanations for the pattern of presidents' justifications alongside the observable implications. The following section presents a research design that uses content analysis of presidential speeches to differentiate between the three hypotheses and further examine the pattern of humanitarian claims in contemporary interventions.

Table 3.1 Observable Implications for the Pattern of Justifications

Explanation	Hypothesized Justification Pattern	Observable Implications
Emotional Public	**H3.1:** Presidents use and emphasize humanitarian justifications consistently across all potential interventions.	Humanitarian justifications are used and emphasized equally across all types of interventions.
Prudent Public	**H3.2:** Presidents limit their use and emphasis of humanitarian justifications to interventions with policy objectives that are primarily humanitarian.	Humanitarian justifications are present and emphasized only in potential humanitarian interventions.
Domestic Coalition	**H3.3:** Presidents use humanitarian justifications widely, but limit their emphasis in security-driven interventions.	Humanitarian justifications are present across all intervention types, but their emphasis is limited in security-driven interventions.

Measuring Justifications in Potential Interventions

Definitions and Scope Conditions

As outlined in Chapter 1, justifications are the public and overt rationale leaders use to convince their publics that military action is legitimate, necessary, and worthy of support. Regardless of the primary motivation for action, presidents may choose to justify interventions in terms of national security or humanitarian concerns. National security justifications reference threats to the security of the domestic population or the U.S. national interests. In other words, these justifications establish the benefits of the intervention for the U.S. By contrast, humanitarian justifications refer to the welfare or protection of foreign civilians and establish how intervention will benefit citizens of the target state. These categories of justifications are not mutually exclusive and presidents can combine claims and change their emphasis of different

categories over the course of an intervention. Building on these definitions, the resulting dataset is comprised of humanitarian and security justifications used by U.S. presidents to explain potential interventions from 1990 to 2013.

In some cases, presidents also evoked a third category of ideological justifications which refer to the promotion of democratic institutions and U.S. values. These justifications combine aspects of humanitarian and security rationales. Cooperative internationalists are likely to respond to the implication that democracy will lead to better representation and quality of life for the target state's citizens. Militant internationalists, by contrast, are likely to be persuaded by the association of democratic institutions with regional security and stability. This chapter presents descriptive data on the pattern of ideological justifications, but these justifications are not included in the main analysis for three reasons. First, ideological concerns alone cannot provide a legitimate, internationally accepted justification for military action, which reduces their relative influence and ability to provide a pretext for intervention. Second, as the descriptive data shows, these claims constitute a minor percentage of all justifications and are not a prominent part of presidents' justification strategies. Third, because these claims are not expected to resonate differently with cooperative and militant internationalists, they do not provide added insight into the relative influence of the domestic coalition.

Constructing a Dataset of Potential Interventions

Evaluating presidents' justification strategies first requires defining all cases of potentially justified interventions. An analysis focused only on justifications for interventions that took place would introduce bias by selecting on the success of the justification strategy. In other words, cases that ended in the use of military force were sufficiently well justified to generate the public support necessary to initiate military action. Alternatively, examining all

crises would include cases in which the president never considered military action or the need to build a domestic coalition of support. Therefore, to systematically analyze the pattern of humanitarian justifications in contemporary interventions, the first step is to create a dataset of all potential interventions that could have been justified to the public. This new dataset of potential intervention includes only cases in which there was an increased likelihood of military hostilities (Wilkenfeld and Brecher 1984) and the crisis warranted sufficient public attention from the president to create the possibility of an official justification for action. It is thus built on the assumption of democratic accountability—for a military intervention to take place, the president needs public approval, and before the president can ask the public to support intervention he or she must first make sure it is aware of the underlying crisis.

The starting point for constructing the dataset was all cases listed in either the UCDP Armed Conflict (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015) or the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) datasets (Palmer et al. 2015). I combined crises from these two sources because UCDP provides good coverage of low-level internal conflicts, but omits a number of conflicts that escalated from international threats, while the MID data captures international crises, but omits states' threats against their own citizens. When taken together, the two sources provide a comprehensive list of intra- and interstate crises for the 1990 to 2013 period. To establish which cases received public presidential attention, I then searched the Public Papers of the Presidents database for references to crises in either the UCDP or MID data. Cases were included in the new dataset of potential interventions if they met each of the following three criteria: 1) the crisis was publicly mentioned by the president in an official speech or document; 2) the mention addressed a specific and immediate crisis in detail; and 3) the mention implied that the U.S. was willing to take coercive action to address the crisis.

1. Public Mention by the President

For a conflict to be potentially justified, its existence must first be part of the president's public foreign policy agenda. In other words, the president must make sure that the public knows about the crisis before he or she can convince it to care about the crisis. The first criterion—that the president mentions the crisis in an official statement or document—is designed to limit the dataset to cases in which the crisis was sufficiently high on the president's foreign policy agenda to warrant public attention. While the foreign policy agenda is largely events-driven (Wood and Peake 1998), the number of crises included in the UCDP and MID datasets suggest that leaders have to prioritize the attention they focus on different events. By searching for references to the given crisis in all official documents available through the Public Papers of the Presidents, including memoranda, letters to Congress, and news conferences, this strategy captures all cases that were salient enough to be publically presented. Including new conferences and exchanges with reporters in the search ensures that the dataset captures all issues that were salient enough to force a response from the president even if the White House would have preferred to keep the issue out of the public sphere.

2. Detailing a Specific and Immediate Crisis

Given the number of crises, many publicly acknowledged conflicts are not addressed in sufficient depth to facilitate a justification for U.S. action. For example, presidents often list ongoing conflicts to provide an overview of international affairs, as Clinton (1993b) did in his remarks at the United States Military Academy Commencement: "As we scan today's bloodiest conflicts, from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia to Armenia and Sudan, the dynamics of the cold war have been replaced by many of the dynamics of old war." While this speech identified a number of ongoing conflicts, it did not outline details or highlight specific aspects of

the conflicts that make them worthy of the U.S. public's attention. This broad reference to multiple crises stands in stark contrast to Clinton's (1993a) detailed discussion of the situation in Iraq, in which he explained, " We continue to keep the situation in Iraq under close scrutiny. We have observed no penetrations by Iraqi aircraft of the No-Fly Zone below 32 degrees north latitude since Wednesday's coalition warning." Unlike the commencement address, this statement identifies both the specific source of concern in the Iraq case and commits the U.S. to close and continued attention. The second criterion distinguishes between these two types of statements to ensure that the reference reflects detailed and specific attention to a crisis. Additionally, the crisis must be immediate, reflecting either the escalation of an ongoing conflict or a new conflict. This condition is intended to rule out statements on "the continuation of national emergencies." While the dataset includes the initial declaration of a national emergency with respect to the target state, I do not consider the continuation alone to provide sufficient evidence that the possibility of military hostilities was substantively heightened relative to the previous year.

3. Threat of Coercive Action

Finally, attention to a crisis does not indicate that the U.S. is ready or willing to take military action in the given case. Presidents may express concern about conflicts without indicating either that the U.S. has a responsibility to respond or that an appropriate response would include military force. The third criterion ensures that the response being justified includes the potential for coercive action. Coercion is operationalized as action that would take place without the consent of the target state. It includes phrases that: 1) identify an outcome towards which the U.S. would like the target state to move, such as "we urge" or "we call on," and 2) are coupled with the possibility of U.S. action as a response, such as "we must not permit"

or "all options are on the table." It excludes presidents' commitments to work with or offer support to the government of the target state to address the conflict. The dataset also excludes potential interventions against other nuclear powers based on the assumption that nuclear deterrence prevents military intervention from being considered in these cases.

Content Analysis of Justifications

Having established the cases of potential intervention for the post-Cold War period, I then collected all national addresses that mentioned a target state for a potential intervention in the relevant year. National addresses are defined as any prepared statement given by the president in an official capacity that either: 1) were given from the White House, or 2) explicitly identified the nation as a whole as the immediate audience. These selection criteria exclude the non-prepared portions of news conferences and exchanges with the press—i.e., responses to questions following the president's opening statement—as well as remarks given on the campaign trail or at events or fundraisers. They also exclude proclamations and memos to Congress that were written rather than spoken communications because different language may be used for different modes of communications and because these communications target elites in Congress rather than the general public. Commonly included statements are State of the Union addresses, weekly radio addresses, the prepared portions of news conferences, and statements on events or crises.[20] The resulting sample contains 801 speeches from George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama covering the 24 years from 1990 to 2013. While this sample does not capture every presidential justification for military force, it holds constant the intended audience and factors such as audience partisanship, connections to the military, and location that could influence leaders' choice of justification. Limiting the sample to prepared

[20] A detailed description of the type and frequency of presidential statements is provided in the appendix.

remarks also ensures that the justifications used are intentional and reflect a political message the White House planned to communicate.

From the national addresses, I then randomly sampled five speeches from each year to read and code justifications for intervention. Based on this manual coding I created lists of words associated with each of the three categories of justifications[21]—security, humanitarian, or ideological—searched the sample for occurrences of these words, and calculated the rate at which each word correctly corresponded to its justification category. Phrases that consistently and correctly identified the relevant justification[22] were included in the dictionaries for each category.[23] I imported the dictionaries into the Yoshikoder content analysis program (Lowe 2015) to calculate the number of times presidents used each category of justifications in national addresses referencing a case of potential intervention. The resulting unit of analysis is a speech addressing a potential intervention.

Automated content analysis is invaluable for systematically examining the pattern and consequences of presidents' justifications for military action because the volume of text in presidential speeches makes comprehensive manual coding infeasible; however, the method requires strong assumptions. Most significantly, content analysis assumes a stable communication process in which words have the same meaning every time they are used (Krebs 2015, 301). I follow Krebs' (2015, 301) suggestions for mitigating concerns about instability by "analyzing a narrower range of texts—from a single or relatively homogeneous set of speakers, from a relatively short time span, from a single country—and by generating search-terms and

[21] These categories were also developed inductively from reading the sampled speeches.
[22] The results reported in this paper use dictionaries of all phrases that correctly identified the relevant justification category at least 60% of the time. The tradeoff here is between avoiding counting phrases that do not reflect justifications and omitting relevant justifications by using dictionaries that are too narrow.
[23] The dictionary for each category and corresponding percentage of correct mentions is included in the appendix.

coding rules based on a context-sensitive reading of select tests and secondary literature." First, I focus on four presidents of a single country within a 24-year period in which the international system and the U.S.'s position in it remained relatively stable. This focus assuages concerns about major rhetorical shifts or changing points of reference. In other words, these administrations had access to similar toolkits of justifications and addressed voting publics with some shared historical experiences. Second, the dictionaries used to measure each justification category were created based on a context-sensitive manual coding of a sample of speeches and their exclusivity to the given justification category.

Dependent Variables: The Use and Emphasis of Justifications

The domestic coalition argument has implications for two dependent variables: the use and emphasis of different categories of justifications. Use captures whether the justification is included as part of the official rationale for action in a given speech. To map the use of justifications across time and different types of interventions I created a binary "use" variable that takes the value of one if the given speech includes at least one justification from the relevant category and zero otherwise.

Emphasis captures the relative prominence of a justification within the speech. It is measured as the percentage of all justifications in a given speech that are from the relevant category. For example, to calculate the emphasis placed on humanitarian justifications in a particular speech, I divided the number of humanitarian justifications by the number of total justifications. Measuring emphasis as a percentage of all justifications has two benefits. First, recognizing that presidents often combine justifications, emphasis can be used to evaluate which category of justification provided the primary explanation for action. Second, dividing by the number of total justifications accounts for variation in the length of speeches and the propensity

of some presidents to give longer addresses. This approach helps standardize the measure over time and presents a more accurate illustration of the pattern of justifications across presidents.

Independent Variable: Intervention Type

The domestic coalition argument contends that presidents have an incentive to use humanitarian justifications as often as possible, but expects cooperative internationalists to constrain the extent to which leaders can credibly emphasize humanitarian appeals in security-driven interventions—too few humanitarian justifications will not maximize cooperative internationalists' support; too many humanitarian justifications and this same group will become skeptical. If presidents anticipate the need for a broad coalition of support when developing justification strategies, they are thus expected to include humanitarian justifications in all cases, but to limit their emphasis of humanitarian appeals in security-driven interventions. To this end, the main independent variable of interest is the type of potential intervention, either humanitarian or security-driven. Drawing on Finnemore's (2003, 53) definition of humanitarian interventions as "deploying military force across borders for the purpose of protecting foreign nationals from man-made violence," potential interventions are coded as humanitarian if U.S. military action would address violence that primarily threatened foreign civilians rather than U.S. strategic interests. By contrast, security interventions address threats to U.S. national security or regional interests.

Interventions were sorted into humanitarian or security categories based on news coverage of the precipitating crisis prior to the president's first address.[24] This approach ensures that the classification of the underlying conflict is both prior and external to the president's choice of justifications. However, the same factor that makes humanitarian justifications worthy

[24] A list of the intervention type assigned to each potential intervention is included in the appendix.

of study also makes the underlying conflicts inherently difficult to characterize—almost all violent conflicts involve a combination of security and humanitarian threats. Here I manage this challenge by applying Jentleson and Britton's (1998) categorization of interventions by primary policy objectives to the underlying crisis that precedes intervention. Crises that media coverage discusses *primarily* in terms of threats of cross-border aggression, spillover violence, attacks on oil and economic resources, terrorist attacks, or the devolution of power to terrorist groups are classified as potential security interventions. Crises discussed *primarily* in terms of refugees, starvation, forced migration, attacks on civilians or civilian areas, human rights violations, or threats to democratic institutions are classified as potential humanitarian interventions. If justifications are driven by the facts of the crisis, this approach identities the justification strategy that represents the path of least resistance and minimizes the president's risk of being accused of using justifications insincerely.

Based on these categories, two variables capture the type of intervention referenced in a given speech. The "humanitarian case" variable takes the value of one if the speech references a potential humanitarian intervention and zero otherwise. Similarly, the "security case" variable takes the value of one if the speech references a potential security intervention and zero otherwise.

The Pattern of Justifications

General Trends

The overall pattern of justifications highlights the time and effort U.S. presidents devote to publicly justifying potential interventions. On average, post-Cold War presidents gave 33 speeches addressing potential interventions per year, with a total of 801 speeches over the 1990-

2013 period, 665 of which include at least one justification for military action.[25] However, there is variation between presidents and across time in terms of both the quantity of public statements and the number of justifications for action. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that George W. Bush both gave the largest number of speeches over the course of his presidency and, by extension, also offered the most justifications for military action. By contrast—and to be expected given that his presidency covered only one term—George H.W. Bush offered the fewest speeches and justifications. Between these two extremes, Clinton offered more speeches than Obama, but Obama provided more justifications.

Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 Number of Speeches and Justification by President



The distribution of speeches and justifications among presidents is unsurprising when placed in the context of the number of U.S. military interventions that each administration oversaw. A closer look at the number of speeches and justifications, offered in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, reveals that years with the highest number of speeches and justifications map onto incidents of major U.S. intervention. In the 1990s, the most speeches were given in 1999 and 1994,

[25] There are 136 speeches that referenced a potential intervention but did not justify military action using a phrase included in the content analysis dictionaries. Many of these speeches mention the potential intervention briefly, without justification, but a small subset of speeches justifies interventions in terms of ideological goals such as democracy promotion.

respectively. The 1999 spike corresponds with U.S. participation in airstrikes in Kosovo, while the 1994 spike corresponds with increasing U.S. involvement in Bosnia, as well as intervention in Haiti. In the 2000s, the number of speeches and justifications reached their peak in 2003 when the U.S. was involved in ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan and began Operation Iraqi Freedom. After 2010, the number of speeches and justifications declined, with the exception of 2011 when the U.S. conducted Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya. These descriptive data suggest that the dataset of justifications has face validity—both the number of speeches and the number of justifications are highest during periods of major U.S. military operations when the president is expected to be particularly concerned with providing a public rationale for action to maintain public support.

Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 Number of Speeches and Justifications per Year



The Use of Humanitarian Justifications

Pattern of Humanitarian Justifications

Turning to the content of presidents' statements, the pattern of justifications indicates that humanitarian claims make up a substantively significant part of explanations for military action. Presidents employed humanitarian claims in more than half—60 percent—of all individual speeches justifying a potential intervention. Security justifications were also prevalent across

potential interventions. Presidents referenced security concerns in 67 percent of all speeches. As Figure 3.5 shows, security justifications were more often the primary explanation for action, but presidents have relied on humanitarian appeals in high numbers across the last 25 years. Understanding the utility and limits of these justifications thus addresses an important aspect of the narrative used to mobilize support for contemporary interventions.

Figure 3.5 Yearly Trends in the Percentage of Justifications[26]



While humanitarian claims are present across the post-Cold War period, there is a notable dip in their relative emphasis in the early 2000s. However, this decline in emphasis does not signal a turn away from humanitarian appeals. Instead, as Figure 3.6 shows, the overall number of justifications reached a peak during this period—a reflection of ongoing wars in Afghanistan

[26] To illustrate the trend in humanitarian justifications, Figures 3.5-3.7 use a lowess smoother, which takes preceding and subsequent values into account for each point. The figures report smoothing with a bandwidth of 0.4, which uses 40% of the data to smooth each point.

and Iraq—and George W. Bush used both security and humanitarian justifications in the greatest numbers during 2003. The change in relative emphasis shown in Figure 3.5 thus reflects an increase in the presence of security justifications rather than a decrease in the number of humanitarian claims.

Figure 3.6 Yearly Trends in the Number of Justifications



While these patterns indicate that humanitarian justifications were used and emphasized across the post-Cold War period, there is also evidence of potentially significant trends over time. Explaining time trends in justifications is beyond the scope of this chapter's focus on determining whether the use and emphasis of humanitarian claims is limited to cases of humanitarian intervention. It is also not the focus of the broader domestic coalition argument, which aims to explain the domestic incentives behind presidents' consistent use and limited emphasis of humanitarian claims in security interventions rather than the specific amount of

humanitarian justifications in a given year. However, the domestic coalition argument contends that presidents have an incentive to limit their emphasis of humanitarian claims in security interventions and, by extension, can place greater emphasis on these justifications in cases of humanitarian intervention. Building on this premise, the argument expects over time variation to generally reflect changes in the proportion of potential interventions with primarily humanitarian objectives. Figure 3.7 juxtaposes the trend in presidents' emphasis of humanitarian justifications over time with the trend in the percentage of potential interventions each year that would address primarily humanitarian concerns. While not an exact match, comparing the two trends illustrates that changes in the yearly emphasis of humanitarian justifications roughly corresponds to changes in the presence of potential humanitarian interventions.

Figure 3.7 Trends in Humanitarian Justifications and Potential Humanitarian Interventions



Use of Justifications by Intervention Type

Having established that humanitarian justifications were used throughout the post-Cold War period, the question then becomes whether the pattern of these justifications across different types of interventions reflects the expectations of the domestic coalition argument. Table 3.2 summarizes the pattern of justifications by intervention type and confirms that—contrary to the prudent public expectation that justifications are determined by the situation—humanitarian claims were often used in both humanitarian and security-driven interventions. In fact, presidents included humanitarian justifications in the majority of their speeches, regardless of the type of intervention. The widespread use of humanitarian justifications in both humanitarian and security interventions is consistent with the expectations of the domestic coalition argument.

Table 3.2 Summary of Included Justifications by Intervention Type

Speeches Including:	Humanitarian Interventions	Security Interventions
Humanitarian Justifications	184 (71%)	330 (57%)
Security Justifications	155 (59%)	412 (71%)
No Justifications	42 (16%)	96 (17%)
Total	261	579

Note: Percentages do not sum to 100 because speeches can include both humanitarian and security justifications.

The Emphasis of Humanitarian Justifications

The common use of humanitarian justifications supports the first expectation of the domestic coalition hypothesis and rules out the prudent public alternative. However, the domestic coalition argument also expects that the same pressure to persuade cooperative internationalists reflected in the widespread use of humanitarian appeals also constrains the

emphasis of humanitarian claims in security interventions. A closer analysis of the emphasis placed on humanitarian justifications is required to confirm this hypothesis and rule out the emotional public alternative. Table 3.3 shows that, on average, presidents placed considerably less emphasis on humanitarian justifications in speeches that addressed potential security interventions. Contrary to the emotion public hypothesis which expects the White House to take a kitchen sink approach to justifications, presidents do not use humanitarian claims as often as possible. Instead, they appear to exercise discretion in their choice of primary justifications based on whether the potential intervention was humanitarian or security driven. This pattern is consistent with presidents concerned with bringing cooperative internationalists into the domestic coalition while avoiding the risk of backlash from these same individuals.

Table 3.3 Average Emphasis of Justifications per Speech by Intervention Type

	Humanitarian Interventions	Security Interventions
Humanitarian Justifications	0.52 (0.40)	0.29 (0.35)
Security Justifications	0.32 (0.36)	0.54 (0.40)
N	261	579

Note: Table reports the mean percentage of justifications in a given speech that reference humanitarian or security concerns. Standard deviations reported in parentheses.

In sum, the pattern of justifications reveals that humanitarian claims are common across humanitarian and security-driven interventions, but their emphasis is limited in security-driven cases. These findings are consistent with the argument that presidents use humanitarian claims because they anticipate the need for a broad coalition of domestic support, but temper their emphasis of humanitarian appeals in security interventions to avoid backlash. The results indicate that more is not always better when it comes to humanitarian justifications and

contradict the expectations of both the prudent and emotional public explanations, as summarized in Table 3.1 above.

Ideological Justifications

In addition to humanitarian and security justifications, presidents also use ideological explanations—references to the protection or promotion of democracy and U.S. values—to make the case for military action. However, as Figure 3.8 illustrates, the prominence of ideological justifications falls far short of humanitarian and security appeals. These justifications peaked in 2005 when the U.S. was engaged in democracy promotion efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, but were used in only 35 percent of speeches addressing potential humanitarian interventions and 36 percent of speeches addressing potential security interventions. Additionally, as Figure 3.9 shows, even in 2005—their maximum point—ideological justifications accounted for less than a quarter of all justifications used to make the case for military action. Ideological claims are thus part of the president's rhetorical toolkit, but are not a central component of justification strategies.

Figure 3.8 Number of Ideological, Humanitarian, and Security Justifications by Year



Figure 3.9 Emphasis of Ideological Justifications



Conclusion

The pattern of justifications for potential interventions shows that presidents across the post-Cold War period spent considerable time and effort presenting military action to the public. Additionally, humanitarian justifications are a central and commonly used part of presidents' attempts to make the public case for intervention. Conventional wisdom has assumed that presidents have incentives use humanitarian claims in security-driven interventions either always or very rarely, but content analysis of national addresses indicates that the actual pattern of justifications falls between these two extremes. Presidents employ humanitarian claims in the majority of their speeches on potential interventions, but consistently limit the emphasis placed on humanitarian appeals in security-driven cases. This pattern of justifications is consistent with the domestic coalition argument, which asserts that presidents' justification strategies are both driven and constrained by cooperative internationalists.

However, while presidents use humanitarian justifications in a pattern consistent with the domestic coalition argument, content analysis of statements cannot determine whether this pattern resonates with the public. Instead, a number of questions remain. Do individuals' foreign

policy preferences influence how they respond to justifications for military action? Under what conditions do humanitarian justifications have a positive effect on public support for intervention? Do individuals impose political costs on leaders who misuse humanitarian claims? Chapters 4 and 5, respectively, turn to individual-level data collected from survey experiments to address these questions.

CHAPTER FOUR

WHO RESPONDS TO HUMANITARIAN JUSTIFICATIONS?

In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush explained the 2001 U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan as "a sustained campaign to drive the terrorists out of their hidden caves and to bring them to justice" (G. W. Bush 2001). However, Bush immediately followed this security rationale with a humanitarian appeal, saying "At the same time, we are showing the compassion of America by delivering food and medicine to the Afghan people, who are, themselves, the victims of a repressive regime" (G. W. Bush 2001). Bush's use of humanitarian justifications in the Afghanistan case offers yet another example of their puzzling presence in contemporary interventions because the operation already had unprecedented levels of public support—90 percent of respondents supported military action (Cable News Network 2001) even though 82 percent correctly anticipated this was the beginning of a long and costly war (ABC News/Washingon Post 2001). The presence of humanitarian justifications in popular security interventions like this one is particularly surprising given evidence that the U.S. public is more likely to support realist goals that protect U.S. national security (Drezner 2008; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Kertzer and McGraw 2012) and "does not appear to care enough about human rights to invest significant American resources" (McFarland and Mathews 2005, 308). If the public as a whole prefers security rationales, who responds to humanitarian justifications?

The pattern of U.S. presidents' justifications outlined in the previous chapter shows that humanitarian claims are neither a consistent moral window dressing designed to placate an emotional public nor limited to cases of humanitarian crisis in which the U.S. has no clear national interests at stake. Instead, presidents appear to use humanitarian appeals as a central part

of their justification strategies and to deploy these claims in calculated ways. However, the presence of humanitarian justifications alone is insufficient to determine whether these appeals affect public support for military action. Leaders could be incorrect in their assessment of public opinion—either because concern with foreign civilians resonates more with elites than the public (Drezner 2008) or because the salience of humanitarian appeals has declined over time—and use humanitarian rhetoric unnecessarily. In this chapter I draw on a series of survey experiments to demonstrate that humanitarian appeals play an important role in mobilizing public support—even in popular security interventions—because these claims resonate with cooperative internationalists who are a source of politically costly opposition. The goal of the experiments is to investigate whether cooperative internationalists' response to humanitarian claims makes the support of these individuals a feasible explanation for the pattern of justifications outlined in Chapter 3.

The chapter proceeds by laying out the conventional wisdom on public attitudes towards military interventions, which cannot account for the prevalence of humanitarian justifications. It then outlines the expectations for how a disaggregated domestic audience responds to alternative justifications for war and presents an experimental design to test these expectations. The results of the survey experiments show that while there are costs to including humanitarian claims, these justifications significantly increase support among individuals with cooperative internationalist values who are politically engaged and less persuaded by security rationales. I then consider how justifications change respondents' views of the president and concerns about intervention and investigate the relative weight individuals assign to humanitarian claims when they are used in combination with security justifications. The following section presents the results of

manipulation and robustness checks and the final section outlines the implications of these findings for the domestic coalition argument.

Public Attitudes Towards Military Intervention

Gaining the public's consent for military action is critical in democracies because a dissatisfied domestic audience can make it difficult for the White House to pursue its political agenda in the short-term and can vote the president and his party out of office in the long-term (Reiter and Stam 2002; Russett 1993; Tomz and Weeks 2013). To date, studies of public attitudes towards the use of force have focused on how individuals respond to details about the expected costs and outcomes of interventions. This research demonstrates that, all else equal, the public is most likely to support military action when the risk of casualties and financial costs is low and the prospect of success is high (Eichenberg 2005; Flores-Macias and Kreps forthcoming; Gartner 2008; Gartner and Segura 1998; Geys 2010; Kriner and Shen 2014; Mueller 1973). Multilateral approval and the intervention's primary objectives act as signals that allow the public to make inferences about an intervention's costs and consequences (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Grieco et al. 2011; Thompson 2006; Voeten 2001). Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009, 20) synthesize these factors to argue that "support for continuing a military operation (or, for that matter, starting such an operation) in the face of mounting combat casualties is a function of the interactive effect of two underlying attitudes: expectations about the likelihood that the military operation will be a success and belief in the initial rightness of the decision to launch the military operation."

Presidents have a unique ability to influence the perceived rightness of interventions; however, less attention has been paid to how the public responds to presidents' efforts to frame their decision to take military action (Aldrich et al. 2006, 496; Berinsky and Druckman 2007;

Druckman and Jacobs 2015). Presidents' public justifications provide frames for the intervention that encourage the public to emphasize humanitarian or security concerns when evaluating military action (Chong and Druckman 2007, 637). Presidents' information advantages on matters of foreign policy make their frames especially important and give leaders considerable leeway to set the terms of the debate about the costs and benefits of using military force (M. Baum and Groeling 2010; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). In particular, successful justification strategies bolster public support and stifle dissent by leaving "opponents without access to the rhetorical materials needed to craft a socially sustainable rebuttal" (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 36). As a result, understanding how humanitarian and security justifications for action bolster or undercut public support is central to the study of how leaders prepare domestic audiences for war.

Consistent with the alternative explanations outlined in Chapter 3, accounts of public attitudes towards military action also provide competing expectations for how individuals respond to justifications that frame intervention in humanitarian terms. On one hand, humanitarian justifications can evoke impulsive and emotional concerns about foreign civilians and generate high levels of public support that give leaders an incentive to use this frame as often as possible. Alternatively, if public support for interventions is driven by concerns about U.S. national security, the absence of clear security threats in humanitarian frames will make them less effective than security explanations.

The Emotional Public's Humanitarian Impulses

Early accounts of public opinion present the public as an inattentive mass that responds impulsively and positively to the emotions evoked by humanitarian and moral appeals (Almond 1950; Carr 1939; Lippmann 1955; Morgenthau 1951, 1978). This emotional response is used as evidence that the public cannot be trusted with complex foreign policy decisions and is the

individual-level implication of the emotional public hypothesis tested in Chapter 3. In the post-Cold War environment, increased international and media attention to humanitarian crises heightened fears that the public's humanitarian impulse could push the U.S. into ill-advised conflicts. In particular, technological changes coupled with the development of norms of humanitarian intervention raised the prospect of a CNN effect in which "real-time communications technology could provoke major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to global events" (Robinson 1999, 301). Concern with the public's emotional response to humanitarian crises peaked following U.S. actions to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq in 1991 and intervention in Somalia in 1993, as both cases "appeared to involve graphic and emotive media reporting of suffering people influencing policy-makers to conduct humanitarian interventions" (Robinson 2011, 3). Taken as a whole, this view implies that the public responds both uniformly and positively to humanitarian claims, consistent with the following hypothesis:

> H4.1: In the aggregate, public support is highest in response to humanitarian justifications.

The Prudent Public's Realpolitik Preferences

The view of the public as impulsive and sensitive to emotional appeals is challenged by evidence that the U.S. domestic audience holds realpolitik preferences, often associated with realist elites, that emphasize the protection of U.S. national security interests (Drezner 2008; Kertzer and McGraw 2012). Drezner (2008, 63) contends that when it comes to the use of force, the U.S. public is "leery about liberal-style interventions" and "consistently place realist foreign policy objectives—the securing of energy supplies, homeland security—as top foreign policy priorities." These findings are in line with evidence that support is higher for interventions in pursuit of national security objectives than for humanitarian missions (Feaver and Gelpi 2004, 63). A public with realpolitik preferences for U.S. foreign policy is the individual-level iteration

of Chapter 3's prudent public hypothesis and is expected to consent only to interventions that protect U.S. national security and promote U.S. national interests. These limits to the availability of public consent act as a check on the president's ability to pursue aggressive or ill-advised foreign policies (Jentleson 1992; Reiter and Stam 2002; Reiter 2012; Russett 1993). A public focused on protecting the national interest will be most convinced by justifications that reference threats to U.S. national security. By contrast, from this perspective humanitarian claims should do little to bolster public support for military action. This account of public attitudes presents the following hypothesis:

> H4.2: In the aggregate, public support for humanitarian justifications is lower than support for security justifications.

Justifications for a Diverse Domestic Coalition

Despite their divergent expectations about the public's response to humanitarian appeals, both of the previous accounts are based on the implicit assumption that the public reacts uniformly to the presidents' claims and, as a result, they cannot explain the pattern of justifications outlined in Chapter 3. By contrast, the domestic coalition argument implies that there is no such thing as a one-size-fits all justification. Instead, individuals' underlying foreign policy beliefs systematically influence how they respond to humanitarian and security justifications for the use of force. Outlined in detail in Chapter 2, studies of foreign policy beliefs divide the public into three categories—militant internationalists, cooperative internationalists, and isolationists—based on individuals' attitudes towards U.S. engagement in international affairs and preferences for the form this engagement should take (Kertzer et al. 2014; Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; Wittkopf 1986, 1994; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983). As Chapter 2 argues, cooperative internationalists are the key target audience for presidents' justifications. These individuals can sustain long-term support for intervention, but are skeptical

of the use of military force. As a result, presidents will have to work to persuade cooperative internationalists that military action is necessary and prudent. This group stands in contrast to militant internationalists who offer consistently high support for intervention in pursuit of either security or humanitarian objectives. Militant internationalists thus form the base of support for intervention and are expected to be easily persuaded by any type of presidential justification. Alternatively, isolationists do not offer long-term support for military action, regardless of the justification, but also are not a politically costly source of opposition. Taking foreign policy beliefs into account, the importance of persuading cooperative internationalists raises the question: under what conditions do justifications resonate with these individuals?

Cooperative internationalists are defined by their support for active engagement in international affairs and their preference for the diplomatic or multilateral pursuit of humanitarian objectives (Wittkopf 1990). These beliefs capture "the distinction between the self and other in international affairs" (Kertzer et al. 2014, 829). As a result, individuals with cooperative internationalist values are more likely to respond to foreign policy objectives presented in terms of concern for others, the mechanism that underlies support for humanitarian interventions more broadly (Kreps and Maxey Forthcoming). Building on these value dimensions, I expect that in the absence of an overwhelming threat or direct attack security justifications, which emphasize the protection of one's own security and interests, will have limited resonance with cooperative internationalists. By contrast, humanitarian justifications focus on the protection and promotion of the welfare of foreign civilians and therefore directly evoke concern with harm done to others. I thus expect humanitarian claims to most effectively bolster support for intervention among individuals with cooperative internationalist values.

Humanitarian claims are a particularly attractive rhetorical choice because they allow presidents to mobilize cooperative internationalists while still appealing to militant internationalists. Militant internationalists favor an active role for the U.S. in the world and view military force as an effective means for pursuing foreign policy objectives (Kertzer et al. 2014, 830). Based on their belief that military strength facilitates foreign policy success, these individuals will consistently support leaders' efforts to solve international problems—either security or humanitarian—with military action. I therefore expect both security and humanitarian justifications to bolster the support of individuals with militant internationalists beliefs. Taken as a whole, their ability to resonate with both cooperative and militant internationalists indicates that humanitarian justifications mobilize the broadest plausible coalition of domestic supporters.

While humanitarian justifications have the potential to influence all internationalists, neither humanitarian nor security claims consistently persuade isolationists. Isolationists are defined by their preference for disengagement from international affairs, "a tendency manifested in opposition to both foreign military interventions and the projection of American force constitutive of MI [militant internationalism], as well as hostility to globalist policies such as humanitarian aid and multilateral cooperation characteristic of CI [cooperative internationalism]" (Kertzer et al. 2014, 831). Because they do not approve of intervention in pursuit of any foreign policy objectives, I expect isolationists to offer the lowest levels of support for both humanitarian and security justifications. Regardless of the president's justification strategy, unless the U.S. is immediately and obviously under attack, isolationists are thus an unlikely and unsustainable source of support for intervention. However, because these individuals are also expected to be the least politically engaged and "are not so much opposed as they are nonsupportive" (Schneider 1983, 43), the absence of their support poses few political costs.

In sum, the domestic coalition argument expects individuals' underlying foreign policy beliefs to systematically influence how they respond to alternative justification strategies. Security justifications influence militant internationalists, but humanitarian justifications maximize support from both militant and cooperative internationalists. Presidents' widespread use of humanitarian claims across humanitarian and security interventions, illustrated in Chapter 3, thus bolsters the potential support of internationalists and helps build a stable domestic coalition. This argument presents the following hypotheses:

> H4.3a: Cooperative internationalists are more supportive of humanitarian justifications than security justifications.
>
> H4.3b: Militant internationalists offer high levels of support regardless of the type of justification.
>
> H4.3c: Isolationists offer low levels of support regardless of the type of justification.
>
> H4.3d: Cooperative internationalists are more politically engaged than isolationists.

Gauging the Public's Response: Research Design

The analysis of presidents' justifications for potential interventions in Chapter 3 clarifies the pattern of official rhetoric and indicates that leaders speak as though they have an incentive to use humanitarian claims in all potential interventions. However, the analysis of national addresses does not consider whether humanitarian appeals are successful or work the way the domestic coalition argument expects. Here, I employ survey experiments to provide a more direct test of how individuals respond to humanitarian claims and investigate the extent to which individuals' foreign policy beliefs influence the justifications they find persuasive. The experiments vary both the justifications used to explain a hypothetical intervention and whether experts agreed with or disputed the president's rationale for action. An experimental approach is necessary in this case because it controls the information respondents receive about a potential

intervention and separates support for different types of justifications from respondents' approval of the current president. While observational data collected in the context of ongoing interventions is invaluable for measuring public support for specific conflicts, existing survey and polling data cannot account for the full range of justifications and intervention frames to which respondents have been exposed.

Measuring Foreign Policy Beliefs

Before receiving information about the hypothetical intervention, respondents answered a series of demographic questions and an item that probed the foreign policy beliefs theoretically expected to influence how individuals respond to justifications. The indicators for cooperative and militant internationalism are drawn from the standard measures of foreign policy orientations validated by Kertzer et al. (2014, Appendix) and the measure of isolationism is drawn from the Chicago Council Survey questions used by Mandelbaum and Schneider (1979, 42–43).[27] Previous studies rely on a battery of foreign policy questions that are then collapsed into measures of internationalism or isolationism. However, in the experimental context, asking extended batteries of questions in addition to the treatment has significant shortcomings. First, presenting respondents with multiple questions about foreign policy can prime their approach to intervention and bias responses to the treatment scenario (J. M. Converse and Presser 1986, 39–40). Second, requiring respondents to answer a long series of questions, before or after the treatment scenario, increases the likelihood that they will satisfice and give non-meaningful responses to either the treatment or the foreign policy questions (McDermott 2011, 33).

Instead, building on the items evaluated by Kertzer et al. (2014, Appendix, 3–4), I developed three indicators that gauge whether respondents identify most with cooperative

[27] The measure of isolationism is also consistent with the ANES question used by Kertzer (2013) in his study of isolationists and foreign policy mood.

internationalist, militant internationalist, or isolationist beliefs. Individuals were coded as holding cooperative internationalist beliefs if they thought "It is essential for the United States to work with other nations to solve problems such as overpopulation, hunger, and pollution." Respondents with militant internationalist values agreed that "It is important for the United States to maintain a strong military to ensure world peace" and those with isolationist beliefs selected "It is best for the future of the United States if we stay out of world affairs." The survey randomized the order of these response options.

To mitigate the risk of priming individuals' responses to the experimental treatments, the foreign policy belief question was included with other demographic items at the beginning of the survey. Additionally, the question wording probed general beliefs about the role of the U.S. in the world rather than specific beliefs about military interventions. Measuring foreign policy beliefs at the beginning of the survey also ensured that respondents' treatment assignment did not influence their reported foreign policy preferences.

Treatment Conditions: Justifications for Intervention

Following the demographic and foreign policy questions, the survey experiment randomly assigned respondents to read quotes in which a hypothetical president advocated for intervention using one of three categories of justifications—humanitarian, security, or a combination of humanitarian and security claims—summarized in Table 4.1. First, the survey informed participants that the scenario was hypothetical, but "reflects actions taken by presidents from both political parties and is NOT about any specific country in the news today." In each condition respondents were then told that "Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar" and that they were reading excerpts from a hypothetical president's address to the nation about this conflict. In the humanitarian condition, the president

called for intervention because the foreign regime posed a threat to "its own civilians, including innocent women and children" and had "killed thousands of its own people and directly targeted civilians." In the security condition, the president called for action against a foreign regime that posed a threat to "the security of the United States, including the American people" because it had "created a safe haven for terrorists and threatened the United States." The quotes for the combined condition reported that military action was necessary because the foreign regime presented a threat to "its own civilians and to the security of the United States. It has created a safe haven for terrorists and killed thousands of its own people."[28]

Table 4.1 Experimental Treatments

Condition:	*Numar poses a grave threat to…*	*It has…*	*The safety of…*
Humanitarian	…its own civilians, including innocent women and children.	…killed thousands of its own people and directly targeted civilians.	…Numar's civilians is at stake and we must act.
Security	…the security of the United States, including the American people.	…created a safe haven for terrorists and threatened the United States.	…the United States is at stake and we must act.
Combined	…its own civilians and the security of the United States.	…created a safe haven for terrorists and killed thousands of its own people.	…Numar's civilians and the United States is at stake and we must act.

The content of the quotations was designed to mirror the rhetoric used by all four post-Cold War presidents to make the case for interventions in the Gulf War, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Drawing on the rhetoric used in past interventions increases the external validity of the treatments. It helps ensure that the quotes reflect common rhetorical conventions and justifications presidents have actually used to explain military actions. Additionally, combining

[28] See the appendix for the full text of the quotes and the survey instrument, as well as findings from a control scenario. The design is loosely based on Tomz (2007), Tomz and Weeks (2013), and Trager and Vavreck (2011).

the claims of Democratic and Republican leaders makes it more difficult for respondents to associate the justifications with a particular political party.

Information from Experts

Following the hypothetical president's statement, respondents were told that experts either publicly agreed or publicly disputed the president's reasons for intervention. Bullet points then summarized both the president's justification for action and the extent to which it corresponded with or diverged from the experts' account. The combination of presidential and expert explanations creates the ten experimental conditions summarized in Table 4.2. Including expert opinions acknowledges that individuals receive information about interventions from multiple sources and that the president's account of an intervention must compete with elite and media discourse. In this chapter, I focus on the sincere conditions in which experts agreed with the president's explanation for action to evaluate support for alternative justifications. However, the experiment also included insincere and illegitimate conditions. In the insincere condition, experts disagreed with the president's public justification for action but believed he had a legitimate reason for intervention. Respondents in the illegitimate condition were told that experts both disagreed with the president's justification and thought action would only promote the president's own political interest. Chapter 5 further leverages the insincere and illegitimate treatments to investigate the extent to which humanitarian justifications can be used as a false pretense to bolster support for security-driven or illegitimate interventions.

Table 4.2 Experimental Conditions (President's Justifications/Experts' Explanation)

	Humanitarian	*Security*	*Combined*	
Sincere	Humanitarian/ Humanitarian	Security/ Security	Security and Humanitarian/ Security and Humanitarian	
Insincere	Humanitarian/ Security	Security/ Humanitarian	Security and Humanitarian/ Security	Security and Humanitarian/ Humanitarian
Illegitimate	Humanitarian/ President's Political Agenda	Security/ President's Political Agenda	Security and Humanitarian/President's Political Agenda	

After providing information about the president's justifications and experts' explanations, the survey probed participants' support for the hypothetical intervention and their willingness to take action to express their opinion about the use of force. Along with additional demographic questions and measures of expected intervention outcomes, the follow-up questions included a manipulation check (Mutz and Pemantle 2015; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidnko 2009) that examined respondents' ability to recall how the president justified the intervention.

The experiment was fielded using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to a sample of 1,571 U.S. adults in July 2016. MTurk samples are not nationally representative—respondents are on average more educated, liberal, and likely to be female than the general population (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012). However, in addition to evidence that MTurk samples can produce treatment effects roughly comparable to national samples (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan 2014), the same characteristics that are shown to be over-represented in MTurk samples are also more likely to be associated with cooperative internationalist values. In the context of this study, this platform helped ensure the group of interest—cooperative internationalists—was sufficiently represented in the sample to facilitate subgroup analysis.

Respondent Demographics: Who Are the Cooperative Internationalists?

Respondents' self-reported foreign policy beliefs confirm that individuals with cooperative internationalist values made up the largest proportion of the sample. Of the 1,517 participants, 56 percent reported cooperative internationalist beliefs, 28 percent chose the militant internationalist indicator, and 16 percent expressed isolationist sentiments. The percentage of cooperative internationalists in this sample is in line with the average number of Chicago Council Survey respondents who selected cooperative internationalists policies as "very important" foreign policy goals (see Chapter 2).

Compared to militant internationalists and isolationists, the group of cooperative internationalists contained more women, liberals, Democrats, and individuals with at least a college education. By contrast, the militant internationalist group included a higher number of conservatives, Republicans, and religious individuals than the other foreign policy orientations. The isolationist category consisted of more men and individuals without a college degree. Table 4.3 summarizes the demographic information for each category of foreign policy beliefs.

Table 4.3 Demographic Information by Foreign Policy Belief

	Cooperative Internationalist	*Militant Internationalist*	*Isolationist*	*All Respondents*
Gender *(0=Female; 1=Male)*	0.42	0.46	0.51	0.44
Education *(0=Less than College; 1=College)*	0.55	0.51	0.46	0.52
Religion *(1=Not Important; 5=Very Important)*	2.80	3.68	2.74	3.03
Ideology *(1=Conservative; 7=Liberal)*	4.96	3.26	4.14	4.36
Party ID *(1=Republican; 7=Democrat)*	4.94	3.44	4.14	4.39
N	850	419	243	1510

Political Engagement

In addition to the standard demographic questions, the survey also gauged respondents' levels of political engagement. The domestic coalition argument contends that cooperative internationalists are an important target audience for presidents' justifications because these individuals are both skeptical of military action and politically engaged. This combination of skepticism and engagement suggests that cooperative internationalists are the most likely source of vocal and politically costly domestic opposition to military action. Like cooperative internationalists, militant internationalists are also expected to be politically active, but their consistent support for military action makes them an unlikely source of dissent. Alternatively, isolationists do not support interventions, but their lack of political engagement makes them a low-risk opposition. The theory thus implies that cooperative and militant internationalists are more politically engaged than isolationists (hypothesis 4.3d). To evaluate this observable

implication, the survey included three questions related to individuals' level of engagement with politics and foreign policy decisions.

First, to determine how likely individuals were to become vocal opponents of intervention, the survey presented respondents with a list of activities and asked them to select any actions they would be willing to take to express their opinion about the intervention. The order of the response options was randomized and included: 1) use social media to express my opinion about the military action; 2) sign a petition about the military action; 3) write a letter to the editor of my local newspaper expressing my opinion about the military action; 4) contact my Member of Congress to express my opinion about the military action; 5) participate in a rally about the military action; and 6) none of the above. I then used the total number of actions each individual selected to create an additive index of potential opposition that ranges from zero to five. When they opposed the hypothetical intervention, individuals with cooperative internationalists values, on average, were willing to take a significantly higher number of actions to express their opposition than militant internationalists or isolationists.[29] Cooperative internationalists were willing to take an average of 1.69 actions to express their opposition, compared to 1.35 actions for militant internationalists and 1.49 actions for isolationists. Similarly, the modal response for cooperative internationalists was two actions, compared to zero actions for militant internationalists and one action for isolationists. Substantively these results indicate that the average individual with cooperative internationalist beliefs takes one more action to express his or her opposition to intervention than the average militant internationalist or isolationist. However, the findings for this measure of political engagement do not support the hypothesis that militant internationalists are more vocal in their opposition than isolationists.

[29] For the difference between cooperative and militant internationalists, p=0.01. For the difference between cooperative internationalists and isolationists, p=0.08.

Instead, militant internationalists reported the lowest level of willingness to express their opinions about intervention. Table 4.4 below outlines the percentage of respondents willing to take each type of action based on their foreign policy beliefs.

Table 4.4 Opposed and Willing to Take Action by Foreign Policy Belief

	Cooperative Internationalists	*Militant Internationalists*	*Isolationists*	*All Respondents*
Social Media	47%	39%	47%	46%
Petition	55%	42%	51%	52%
Letter to the Editor	10%	13%	10%	11%
Contact Member of Congress	38%	31%	27%	34%
Rally	18%	11%	15%	16%
None of the Above	24%	32%	26%	26%
Index Score	1.69	1.35	1.49	1.58
N	483	141	195	820

Table reports the percentage of respondents who opposed intervention that were willing to take each type of action. The index score reports the average number of actions individuals who opposed intervention were willing to take.

In addition to taking action to oppose intervention, the survey also probed respondents' levels of political engagement with measures of attention to politics and past voting behavior. As before, the domestic coalition argument expects that internationalists are more attentive to politics and more likely to have voted in the past election than isolationists. Participants' responses offer support for these expectations. On average, both militant and cooperative internationalists reported keeping track of politics several times a week or daily, while the average isolationist paid attention to politics a few times a week or less. Internationalists also

reported voting in the last general election in significantly higher numbers than isolationists. More than 70 percent of cooperative and militant internationalists voted in 2012, compared to only 57 percent of isolationists. Table 4.5 presents the results for individuals' attention to the news and past voting behavior.

Table 4.5 Attention to News and 2012 Vote by Foreign Policy Beliefs

How often would you say you get news about politics from TV, radio, newspaper, or online outlets?	Cooperative Internationalists	Militant Internationalists	Isolationists	All Respondents
A couple of times a month or less (1)	6%	6%	7%	7%
Once a week (2)	12%	11%	11%	11%
2-3 times a week (3)	22%	22%	23%	23%
Daily (4)	39%	37%	37%	37%
Several times a day (5)	22%	24%	21%	21%
Average	3.58	3.61	3.34	3.55
Did you vote in the 2012 general election?				
Yes	71%	73%	57%	69%
No	29%	27%	43%	31%
N	850	419	243	1,512

Taken as a whole, the findings indicate that both militant and cooperative internationalists are engaged in politics; however, militant internationalists are unlikely to oppose military action and do not pose a threat to stable domestic coalitions. Isolationists are more likely than militant internationalists to actively oppose intervention, but these individuals are less attentive politics and their lower voting rate suggests their discontent is unlikely to become a problem at the polls. By contrast, cooperative internationalists are willing to take action to express their opposition in the highest numbers and are sufficiently attentive to politics to react

quickly to potential interventions and threaten leaders' prospects for reelection. This unique combination of traits makes their support critical for managing the political costs of military action and sustaining interventions and is consistent with the argument that cooperative internationalists are the most important target audience for presidents' justifications.

Justifications and Support

Having established cooperative internationalists as a key source of costly domestic dissent, the question then becomes: what types of justifications help presidents bolster support for intervention among these individuals? The domestic coalition argument produces two sets of expectations for how individuals will respond to alternative justifications based on their foreign policy beliefs. First, the combination of humanitarian and security justifications is expected to generate support from both cooperative and militant internationalists. Second, the inclusion of humanitarian justifications should have the greatest influence on support among cooperative internationalists who otherwise offer lower levels of approval for military interventions. These hypotheses stand in contrast to alternative explanations that assume a homogeneous public and expect individuals to offer either consistently higher or lower support for humanitarian justifications, regardless of their underlying foreign policy beliefs. Table 4.6 summarizes the hypotheses associated with each explanation that are tested in the following subsection.

Table 4.6 Expected Public Responses to Justifications

Explanation	Hypothesis
Emotional Public	**H4.1:** In the aggregate, public support is highest in response to humanitarian justifications.
Prudent Public	**H4.2:** In the aggregate, public support for humanitarian justifications is lower than support for security justifications.
Domestic Coalition	**H4.3a:** Cooperative internationalists are more supportive of humanitarian justifications than security justifications.
	H4.3b: Militant internationalists offer high levels of support regardless of the type of justification.
	H4.3c: Isolationists offer low levels of support regardless of the type of justification.

The Magnitude of Support

Comparing levels of support across the three sincere categories of justifications—humanitarian, security, and combined—Figure 4.1 reveals that the combination of humanitarian and security justifications received the highest support. However, all three sincere categories of justifications generated a majority of support and there are no statistically significantly differences in the level of approval.[30] The consistency of the magnitude of support across justification categories contradicts the hypotheses based on the public's humanitarian impulses or realpolitik preferences. Additionally, this uniformity of support reinforces the puzzle of

[30] 59 percent of respondents supported the intervention justified in humanitarian terms, 54 percent the security intervention, and 62 percent the intervention justified with a combination of humanitarian and security appeals.

humanitarian justifications: Why do leaders consistently use these claims alongside security explanations if security justifications alone are sufficient?

Figure 4.1 Mean Percentage of Support by Justification Category



Presidents' widespread use of humanitarian appeals is particularly surprising when the seemingly minimal changes in support are combined with evidence that adding humanitarian claims to security justifications increases expectations of humanitarian outcomes. After gauging respondents' level of support for the hypothetical intervention, the survey also probed participants' thoughts and expectations for the outcome of an intervention. Respondents were asked, "If the U.S. takes military action in this case, how likely do you think each of the following outcomes will be: 1) Civilians in Numar will be safe. 2) The U.S. will be more secure." The results indicate that the content of the president's justifications significantly influenced respondents' expected outcomes. As Table 4.7 shows, participants in the combined condition who received both humanitarian and security justifications expected that civilians would be safe in significantly higher numbers than respondents who read only security justifications. A significantly higher number of individuals in the combined condition also expected the U.S. would be more secure compared to individuals in the humanitarian-only condition. These findings suggest that presidents' justifications are not empty rhetoric. Instead,

how the president speaks about the necessity of military action shapes public expectations about the intervention's outcome. Adding humanitarian justifications to security claims thus raises the bar for success and is a politically costly decision. On the surface, unnecessarily increasing the stakes of a security intervention by including humanitarian justifications appears risky and ill-advised.

Table 4.7 Expected Intervention Outcomes by Treatment Condition

	Humanitarian	*Security*	*Combined*
Civilians in Numar will be safe.	0.64 (0.04)	0.36*** (0.04)	0.58 (0.04)
The U.S. will be more secure.	0.44 (0.04)	0.64*** (0.04)	0.60*** (0.04)
N	153	151	154

Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare each category of justification to the humanitarian baseline. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

The Effects of Justifications by Foreign Policy Beliefs

The domestic coalition argument explains the widespread use of humanitarian justifications in the face of political costs by asserting that presidents need not only a majority of support, but a majority that includes both cooperative and militant internationalists. Humanitarian justifications are necessary to persuade cooperative internationalists because they appeal to concern with harm done to others and emphasize humanitarian goals. Disaggregating the survey respondents by their foreign policy beliefs provides evidence consistent with this explanation. As Table 4.8 shows, the results confirm that cooperative internationalists offer lower support for security justifications than militant internationalists.[31] The analysis also demonstrates that cooperative internationalists are the only group whose support increases

[31] See the appendix for a similar disaggregation of support based on party identification. As expected, the results speak to the connections between partisanship and foreign policy beliefs, but are not identical. In particular, independents do not map smoothly onto the pattern of support among isolationists.

significantly when humanitarian justifications are added to security justifications. When the hypothetical president justified intervention using only security justifications, a minority of cooperative internationalists supported intervention. By contrast, when the hypothetical president used only humanitarian justifications or combined humanitarian and security appeals, a majority of cooperative internationalists supported intervention. Gaining the support of these individuals is thus the benefit that presidents receive for including humanitarian claims in security-driven cases.

Table 4.8 Foreign Policy Beliefs and Support for Intervention

	Security	*Combined*	*Difference*
Cooperative Internationalists	0.48 (0.05)	0.60 (0.05)	0.13* (0.07)
Militant Internationalists	0.82 (0.06)	0.83 (0.06)	0.01 (0.08)
Isolationists	0.33 (0.10)	0.31 (0.09)	0.03 (0.23)
N	153	151	

Table reports results from two-tailed tests of proportions. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

More specifically, disaggregating respondents by their foreign policy beliefs reveals that adding a humanitarian appeal to security justifications increased support for intervention among cooperative internationalists by 13 percent, a statistically significant change. By contrast, the inclusion of humanitarian claims did not significantly affect the average levels of support among individuals with militant internationalist or isolationist beliefs. As expected, militant internationalists offered consistently high levels of support, well above the majority threshold, for all hypothetical interventions. Isolationists, on the other hand, did not offer a majority of support for intervention, regardless of the justifications the president used to make the case for military action.

This pattern of support is also consistent with respondents' approval of intervention when the president offered only humanitarian justifications, outlined in Table 4.9. Cooperative internationalists supported the president's description of a humanitarian intervention at a comparable level to support for the combined justifications and a significantly higher level than the security-only justifications ($p=0.09$)—61 percent supported the humanitarian-only justification. As expected, cooperative internationalists are thus persuaded by humanitarian claims in either humanitarian or security interventions but are less convinced by security rationales. Similarly, isolationists are not convinced by humanitarian claims in any context, with only 21 percent offering their support for the humanitarian-only category. The conditional support of cooperative internationalists and non-support of isolationists stands in contrast to militant internationalists who offered consistent levels of support across all types of justifications—78 percent for humanitarian, 82 percent for security, and 83 percent for combined justifications. These results are consistent with the domestic coalition hypotheses which expect that adding humanitarian claims to security justifications is key for gaining the support of cooperative internationalists but has little effect on the support of individuals with alternative foreign policy beliefs.

Table 4.9 Support for Humanitarian Justifications by Foreign Policy Beliefs

	Humanitarian	*Difference from Cooperative Internationalists*
Cooperative Internationalists	0.61	
	(0.05)	
Militant Internationalists	0.78	0.17*
	(0.06)	(0.08)
Isolationists	0.21	0.40***
	(0.08)	(0.10)
N	153	

Table reports results from two-tailed tests of proportions. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Motivations and Mechanisms: How Humanitarian Justifications Influence Support

The experimental results provide strong evidence that humanitarian justifications increase support among cooperative internationalists, but two questions remain: 1) How do justifications influence respondents' perceptions of intervention? 2) How do respondents weight humanitarian and security claims when these justifications are used in combination? In terms of the first question, the addition of humanitarian appeals could increase support by changing how respondents think about the president's motivation for action and/or by changing what factors participants themselves thought about when deciding to support or oppose intervention. In terms of the second question, when presented with both humanitarian and security justifications, respondents can assume the president is equally motivated by each concern or privilege one set of objectives over the other. Similarly, in this scenario respondents themselves may think equally about humanitarian and security threats or their decision may be guided primarily by one set of concerns. Understanding how respondents weight humanitarian and security justifications in the combined scenario lays the foundation for determining whether the perceived sincerity of presidents' rhetoric influences support. To address these questions and investigate the

mechanisms through which humanitarian claims bring cooperative internationalists into the domestic coalition, the survey asked respondents about the president's motivation for action and about how they made the decision to support or oppose intervention.

The President's Motivations for Action

First, the survey gauged how respondents perceived the president's motivation for action. Participants were asked: "Which of the following do you think is the most important reason the President decided to take military action?" Response options were presented in random order and included protecting the civilians of Numar, upholding international standards, protecting U.S. security, demonstrating that the U.S. is a strong country, and protecting the president's own political agenda. The response options gauged the relative resonance of humanitarian and security concerns, but did not use the same language as the treatments. This approach is intended to force respondents to pause and think about the president's underlying motivation in addition to what he said in the national address. Motivations focused on protecting civilians and upholding international standards are in line with the international norms of humanitarian intervention and related doctrines such as the Responsibility to Protect (Bellamy 2006; Finnemore 1996a; ICISS 2001; Wheeler 2000). A president motivated by concerns about protecting U.S. security and demonstrating the U.S. is a strong country would builds on the demonstrated importance of U.S. national security and maintaining a reputation for resolve (Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014; Huth 1997; Kertzer 2016; Kertzer, Renshon, and Yarhi-Milo 2015). Finally, the president's desire to protect his own domestic political agenda is designed to correspond to the expert information in the illegitimate treatment conditions and draws on evidence that "Politicians particularly cannot afford to be seen as calling for war in order to reap personal electoral benefits" (Gaubatz 1999, 17).

Based on these options, if respondents believe that justifications are informative expressions of the president's motivations for action, protecting civilians or upholding international standards should be associated with humanitarian justifications. Similarly, protecting U.S. national security and demonstrating U.S. strength will be linked to security justifications. Protecting the president's own political interests is not expected to resonate with respondents in the sincere conditions, but captures individuals who assume the president always has an ulterior motive for action. Most importantly, this question provides insight into how respondents privilege humanitarian or security justifications when these claims are combined. Respondents can either assume that the president is equally concerned with humanitarian and security objectives or that humanitarian goals are less important in a security-driven intervention. The former case implies that presidents should use humanitarian claims cautiously to avoid muddying the security narrative. The latter suggests that humanitarian justifications broaden the domestic coalition even when humanitarian objectives are not the central aspect of the intervention.

As expected, the findings reveal that significantly more respondents in the humanitarian category believed that the president's motivation was to protect civilians or uphold international standards. Additionally, a significantly higher number of individuals in the security condition reported that the president's most important motivation was to protect U.S. national security. Results from the combined condition indicate that, on average, individuals presented with both humanitarian and security justifications believe the president's primary motivation is to protect U.S. national security. As Table 4.10 illustrates, compared to the humanitarian-only condition, the combination of humanitarian and security justifications significantly increased the number of respondents who thought the president was primarily concerned with protecting national

security. However, the combined condition did not augment the president's perceived concern with the civilians of Numar compared to the security-only category. The absence of a significant increase in perceptions of the president's concern with civilians holds when respondents are broken down by their foreign policy beliefs.[32] Taken as a whole, these findings indicate that humanitarian claims influence individuals' perceptions of the president's motivation for action, but are assumed to be less important than security objectives when combined with security appeals. The president thus appears to reap the benefits of including humanitarian justifications alongside security claims even if he does not convince that target audience—cooperative internationalists—that his motives are primarily humanitarian.

Table 4.10 President's Motivation for Action by Justification

Most important reason for the president's decision:	*Humanitarian*	*Security*	*Combined*
Civilians	0.44	0.11***	0.12***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
International Standards	0.20	0.04***	0.18
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
U.S. Security	0.14	0.58***	0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.08)
U.S. Strength	0.13	0.15	0.11
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Political Agenda	0.09	0.12	0.12
	(0.02)	(0.03	(0.03)
N	153	151	154

Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare each category of justification to the humanitarian baseline. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

[32] For cooperative internationalists, 7 percent in the security condition and 12 percent in the combined condition thought the president was primarily motivated by concern for the people of Numar (p=0.2723). For militant internationalists, 15 percent in the security condition and 17 percent in the combined condition believed this was the president's motivation (p=0.8752). For isolationists, 17 percent in the security condition and 4 percent in the combined condition thought Numar's people were the main motivation for action (p=0.1311).

Individual Motivations

In addition to shaping perceptions of the president's motivations, justifications also prime respondents to think differently about supporting or opposing an intervention. Thus, even if respondents in the combined condition assume the president cares primarily about national security concerns, they may still consider the protection of civilians or the need to uphold international standards in their own assessments of the conflict. To investigate how the president's justifications affected respondents' thoughts about intervention, the survey asked: "Which of the following did you think about most in your decision to support or oppose the military action?" Response options were again presented in random order and included concern about harm done to civilians in Numar, upholding international standards, threats to U.S. security, and demonstrating the U.S. is not a weak actor. As before, humanitarian justifications are expected to heighten concerns about harm to civilians and upholding international standards while security justifications augment concerns about threats to U.S. security and appearing weak. In addition to determining how participants thought about humanitarian and security justifications, this question also probes the objectives that respondents privileged when presented with a combination of claims.

In line with expectations, Table 4.11 reveals that humanitarian justifications significantly increased respondents' concern with harm done to civilians and upholding international standards, while security justifications led to significantly more thoughts about threats to U.S. national security. Unlike the president's motivation, there is also evidence that the combination of humanitarian and security justifications increased individuals' humanitarian concerns. In the security condition, 18 percent of respondents reported that concern about harm done to civilians influenced their decision to support or oppose intervention and only seven percent considered the

importance of upholding international standards. Adding a humanitarian claim alongside the security justification significantly increased individuals' attention to these concerns to 26 and 12 percent, respectively (p=0.087 and p=0.089, respectively). However, the largest percentage—58 percent—of respondents in the combined condition reported that they thought about threats to U.S. national security when deciding to support or oppose the intervention. The dramatic increase in thoughts about U.S. national security suggests that when presented with humanitarian and security justifications, respondents consider humanitarian objectives but privilege security concerns.

Table 4.11 Motivations behind Respondent Support by Justification

Most important reason:	*Humanitarian*	*Security*	*Combined*
Civilians	0.47	0.18***	0.26***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
U.S. Security	0.29	0.70***	0.58***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
U.S. Strength	0.07	0.06	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
International Standards	0.17	0.07***	0.12
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
N	153	151	154

Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare each category of justification to the humanitarian baseline. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Further disaggregating respondents' motivations based on their foreign policy beliefs, reported in Table 4.12, reveals that all groups thought the most about security concerns in the combined category. However, for individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs, adding humanitarian claims to security justifications significantly increased their concern with the welfare of civilians and significantly decreased their focus on military strength. Among the

foreign policy groups, cooperative internationalists also reported significantly higher concern with civilians and lower concern with U.S. security than the other groups.[33]

Table 4.12 Motivations behind Respondent Support by FPB

Most important reason:	*Humanitarian*	*Security*	*Combined*
Civilians			
CI	0.55 (0.05)	0.20 (0.04)***	0.36 (0.05)**
MI	0.49 (0.07)	0.15 (0.06)***	0.12 (0.05)***
ISO	0.17 (0.08)	0.13 (0.07)	0.15 (0.07)
U.S. Security			
CI	0.19 (0.04)	0.68 (0.05)***	0.50 (0.05)***
MI	0.27 (0.07)	0.67 (0.08)***	0.71 (0.07)***
ISO	0.67 (0.10)	0.79 (0.08)	0.65 (0.09)
U.S. Strength			
CI	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
MI	0.13 (0.05)	0.15 (0.06)	0.07 (0.04)
ISO	0.13 (0.07)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
International Standards			
CI	0.24 (0.05)	0.09 (0.03)***	0.13 (0.04)*
MI	0.11 (0.05)	0.03 (0.03)	0.10 (0.05)
ISO	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.15 (0.07)
N	153	151	154

Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare each category of justification to the humanitarian baseline within each foreign policy group. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. CI=cooperative internationalist; MI=militant internationalist; ISO=isolationist.

Responses to the presidential and individual motivation questions indicate that when participants are presented with a combination of humanitarian and security justifications they both assume that presidents are primarily motivated by security concerns and privilege these

[33] The lower concern with U.S. security is only statistically significant in comparison to militant internationalists; however, there is a substantive difference of 15 percent between cooperative internationalists and isolationists.

concerns in their own assessments of the conflict. It is therefore unlikely that including humanitarian claims bolsters the support of cooperative internationalists by convincing them that military action will really be a humanitarian intervention. Instead, the evidence suggests humanitarian appeals win over cooperative internationalists by increasing their relative focus on humanitarian concerns and decreasing their focus on and skepticism towards security goals. Humanitarian justifications prime respondents to think about the need for intervention in terms of harm done to civilians and upholding international standards, even when individuals do not believe the president's motive is primarily humanitarian. Among cooperative internationalists, the inclusion of these justifications also decreases individuals' focus on security objectives. The following chapter builds on these findings to investigate how far presidents can stretch the sincerity of humanitarian justifications before they become ineffective.

Robustness and Manipulation Checks

The experimental design presented in this chapter directly manipulates the variable of interest—presidential justifications—and controls the information respondents receive about military action to shed new light on the importance of humanitarian claims. However, experimental findings are sensitive to factors such as question wording, respondents' attention to and understanding of the treatment, and baseline assumptions. To examine the robustness of the results, the survey also included questions that rule out potential confounders, a manipulation check, and a pretest of a control scenario to establish respondents' baseline support for a publically acknowledged intervention. Additionally, not all potential security interventions include connections to terrorism, which may present a particularly salient and effective security threat. To investigate whether the scope of the findings is limited to cases with a terrorist threat, I designed an additional experiment to examine responses to humanitarian claims in the context of

a more traditional foreign policy restraint scenario which involves "efforts to affect the external behavior of another state that aggressively threatens the United States, its citizens, or its allies," similar to the 1991 Gulf War (Jentleson 1992, 53).

Potential Confounders: Success, Casualties, and Costs

The previous section shows that both cooperative and militant internationalists offer high levels of support for humanitarian justifications and that these justifications are key to persuading cooperative internationalists. However, rather than being moved by the humanitarian appeal itself, respondents could support the hypothetical intervention because they associate humanitarian claims with other strategically desirable factors. In particular, respondents could assume interventions justified in humanitarian terms are more likely to be successful, less likely to involve U.S. military casualties, or less likely to incur high financial costs than interventions presented only in terms of security objectives. In this case, presidents could replace humanitarian appeals with credible information about the costs and consequences of intervention to gain the support of cooperative internationalists and build a stable domestic coalition.

To rule out this alternative explanation for the influence of humanitarian justifications, the survey asked respondents whether they agreed that if the U.S. took military action: 1) the operation would be successful; 2) the U.S. would suffer many military casualties; and 3) the operation would cost the U.S. a lot of money. Because the scenario was hypothetical and provided relatively little information about the intensity of the conflict, respondents were instructed to answer this question based on their "best guess and what you've read about the situation in Numar." While not a direct measure of how individuals respond to costs, these questions can determine whether individuals make systematically different assumptions about the success and costs of interventions justified in humanitarian terms and whether these

assumptions account for the different levels of support. If assumptions about success, casualties, and costs are behind the increase in cooperative internationalists' support, their expectations of success should be significantly higher and expectations of casualties and costs should be significantly lower in the combined and humanitarian categories. Table 4.13 presents respondents' expectations for each justification category.

Table 4.13 Expected Success and Costs by Justification

	Humanitarian	*Security*	*Combination*
Success			
Cooperative	0.71	0.63	0.64
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Militant	0.84	0.79	0.90
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Isolationist	0.71	0.50	0.58
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Casualties			
Cooperative	0.66	0.68	0.64
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Militant	0.51	0.44	0.48
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Isolationist	0.58	0.63	0.85**
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Financial Costs			
Cooperative	0.94	0.93	0.95
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Militant	0.91	0.82	0.90
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Isolationist	0.83	0.88	0.96
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.04)
N	153	151	154

Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare each category of justification to the humanitarian baseline within each foreign policy group. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

The results outlined in Table 4.13 reveal few significant differences in the expected success, casualties, or costs of intervention based on the type of justification. In particular, cooperative internationalists did not report significantly higher expectations of success or significantly lower expectations of casualties or costs when presidents employed humanitarian appeals. There is thus no evidence that these factors confound cooperative internationalists' significantly higher support for interventions justified with humanitarian claims.

More generally, the majority of respondents assumed the intervention would be successful, involve military casualties, and incur high financial costs, regardless of their foreign policy beliefs or the justifications used. The results suggest that justifications' heterogeneous effect on support operates through mechanisms other than changing individuals' perceptions of the likely success and costs of intervention. Additionally, the findings are consistent with my contention that humanitarian appeals are uniquely capable of convincing cooperative internationalists intervention is worthwhile and cannot be easily replaced by information about the prudence of military action.

Manipulation Check

In addition to confounders, online survey experiments also raise the concern that respondents will skim or skip the text of the hypothetical scenario and fail to internalize the intended treatment. In this case, the differences in support would not be directly linked to the experimental manipulation. To evaluate and guard against this possibility, the survey included a manipulation check at the end of the main questionnaire (Mutz and Pemantle 2015; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidnko 2009). The manipulation question asked participants: "To the best of your recollection, what points did the president use to explain the military action in Numar?" Response options included: 1) Only humanitarian: the quotes talked about protecting

the civilians of Numar; 2) Only security: the quotes talked about the safety of the United States; 3) Both humanitarian and security: the quotes talked about protecting the civilians of Numar and the safety of the United States; and 4) Neither humanitarian nor security: the quotes didn't mention protecting the civilians of Numar or the safety of the United States. Table 4.14 outlines responses to the manipulation check.

Table 4.14 Recollection of the President's Justifications by Treatment

To the best of your recollection, what points did this president use to explain the reasons for military action?	*Humanitarian Treatments*	*Security Treatments*	*Combined Treatments*
Humanitarian	**71 %**	4 %	10 %
Security	7 %	**72 %**	7 %
Combined	20 %	21 %	**81 %**
None of the Above	2 %	3 %	2 %
N	456	451	605

Table reports percentage of respondents for each response option. Correct answers shown in bold.

In each treatment condition, the majority of respondents correctly identified the justifications the presidents used to explain military action. The most common mistake for individuals in the humanitarian and security conditions was to incorrectly report that presidents had used both justifications. If respondents made this mistake systematically, it would bias the findings against the domestic coalition argument and the significantly higher support for combined justifications reported in Table 4.8 above. In the combined condition, respondents mistakenly remembered the humanitarian versus the security justification in roughly equal numbers. This distribution of responses suggests that individuals understood and internalized the treatments, increasing confidence that the differences in support for intervention are a result of the experimental manipulation.

Control Condition: Establishing a Baseline of Support

A common challenge for survey experiments involving international relations scenarios is the absence of a plausible baseline. In the context of this study, the absence of justifications is an implausible point of comparison because there is no case of overt military action in the post-Cold War period in which the U.S. president asked the public to support intervention without explaining why the crisis was important. Instead, a pretest of the experimental design fielded to 147 U.S. adults via MTurk in May 2016 approximated a baseline of support by including a control condition in which respondents read the text of the president's speech without the specific justifications for action. Participants were told that as part of an address to the nation, the president said: "My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kundu—why it matters and where we go from here. This is not a world we should accept. For generations, the United States of America has been an advocate for peace. While we cannot be the world's police force, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After reading the control scenario, only 39.6 percent of respondents supported intervention. Support for this control condition can be interpreted as individuals' willingness to support military action based only on the information that the president thinks intervention is necessary. The low level of approval is consistent with the expectation that the president must actively persuade the public to support intervention by explaining why action is both legitimate and necessary.

However, in the absence of explicit justifications individuals are likely to assume the president has an unexpressed motivation for intervention. In addition to the standard support question, respondents in the control pretest were also asked why they thought the U.S. was

taking action in this scenario. As Table 4.15 shows, absent a clear justification, the largest percentage of respondents assumed the president was motivated by humanitarian concerns, i.e., to protect the people of Kundu. By contrast, only 11 percent of respondents thought the intervention addressed U.S. national security. About 21 percent of respondents, respectively, assumed the military action would protect U.S. economic interests or promote democracy.

Table 4.15 Assumed Motivations for Intervention in the Control Scenario

Which of the following best explains why the U.S. is taking action in this situation?	*Percentage of Respondents*
To protect U.S. national security.	11.6 %
To protect the people of Kundu.	45.6 %
To protect U.S. economic interests.	21.8 %
To promote democracy around the world.	21.1 %
N	147

The results from the control scenario increase confidence in the robustness of the main experimental findings in two ways. First, the low level of approval for the un-justified scenario compared to all categories of justifications indicates that presidents' public explanations for action have a substantively important effect on support for intervention. Second, evidence that some respondents assume an intervention involves humanitarian objectives even when presidents do not use humanitarian justifications should work against the significant effect of explicit humanitarian justifications found in the main experiment. That the addition of humanitarian claims significantly increases support among cooperative internationalists—even if some of these respondents assume humanitarian motives absent any justification—increases confidence that explicit humanitarian justifications are a substantively important signal.

Support for Alternative Security Scenarios

The security justifications presented in both the security and combined conditions of the main experiment told respondents that the conflict in Numar demanded a response because its regime had "created a safe haven for terrorists and threatened the United States." Given ongoing U.S. military operations against ISIS and the salience of the war on terror in the overarching national security narrative (Krebs 2015), references to terror may have a unique effect on support for intervention that limits the generalizability of the results. Theoretically, any bias introduced by references to terrorism should work in the opposite direction of the significant effect of humanitarian claims reported above—all groups should be most likely to offer support for security justifications when the security threat evokes both salient examples such as the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the potential for an imminent attack on U.S. soil. However, to investigate whether the results hold across alternative security scenarios, I conducted a preliminary experiment to compared support for alternative security justifications and examined the effect of humanitarian justifications in the context of a foreign policy restraint scenario. This experiment was fielded in June 2016 to a sample of 607 U.S. adults, again using Amazon's Mechanical Turk. In each condition, respondents again received excerpts from a hypothetical president's address to the nation, this time about an ongoing violent conflict in Kumar. Table 4.16 summarizes the justifications respondents received for each of the experimental conditions.[34] Unlike the main experiment, these prompts did not provide respondents with information about experts' opinions.

[34] The full text of the survey experiment is included in the appendix.

Table 4.16 Treatment Conditions for Alternative Security Justifications

	The regime in Kumar has…	*The safety of…*
Humanitarian	…killed thousands of its own people and poses a threat to its civilians	…thousands of civilians is at stake…when the safety of thousands of civilians is at risk, we must act.
Terror	…created a safe haven for terrorists and its actions pose a threat to U.S. military security.	…the United States is at stake…when the safety of the United States is at risk, we must act.
Foreign Policy Restraint	…invaded its neighboring state and its actions pose a threat to U.S. military security.	…the United States is at stake…when the safety of the United States is at risk, we must act.
Combined (Humanitarian & Foreign Policy Restraint)	…invaded its neighboring state and killed thousands of civilians.	…the United States is at stake…when the safety of thousands of civilians is at risk, we must act.

The results from this preliminary experiment, presented in Figure 4.2, demonstrate that respondents did offer significantly higher support for an intervention justified with references to terrorism while justifications focused on restraining foreign aggression received low levels of approval. Aggregate support for the humanitarian and combined conditions remained high.

Figure 4.2 Support for Alternative Security Justifications



These results indicate that justifications focused on restraining foreign aggression elicit a significantly different response that justifications focused on terrorism. However, the main effect of interest for the domestic coalition argument—increased support from cooperative internationalists when humanitarian claims are added to security justifications—is also present in the foreign policy restraint scenario. As Table 4.17 shows, adding a humanitarian claim to the foreign policy restraint explanation increased the support of cooperative internationalists by 15 percent (p=0.0328). This increase is also substantively significant because it moved cooperative internationalist from a majority of opposition to a majority of support. As before, the presence of humanitarian justifications did not significantly influence the support of militant internationalists or isolationists. A majority of militant internationalists supported the intervention regardless of the type of justifications used, while support from isolationists remained low across all justification categories. Combined, the results of this preliminary experiment indicate that while references to terrorism are particularly effective security justifications, the effect of humanitarian justifications on cooperative internationalists' support is consistent across alternative security rationales.

Table 4.17 Comparison of Alternative Security Justifications by Foreign Policy Beliefs

	Humanitarian	Terror	FPR	Combined (Humanitarian & FPR)
Cooperative Internationalists	0.53 (0.43, 0.64)	0.49 (0.39, 0.60)	0.38 (0.28, 0.47)	0.53 (0.43, 0.63)
Militant Internationalists	0.67 (0.49, 0.84)	0.72 (0.52, 0.93)	0.58 (0.36, 0.80)	0.72 (0.52, 0.93)
Isolationists	0.15 (0.04, 0.27)	0.31 (0.17, 0.45)	0.26 (0.12, 0.40)	0.36 (0.21, 0.50)
N	154	151	150	152

Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals reported in parentheses to facilitate comparisons across and within columns.

Conclusions

Humanitarian justifications are both commonplace in U.S. interventions and influence the president's ability to mobilize domestic support for the use of military force. The experimental findings presented in this chapter highlight the importance of humanitarian justifications by demonstrating that these claims are uniquely capable of generating a majority of support from cooperative internationalists. Cooperative internationalists are a key target audience for presidential justifications because they are skeptical of security claims, willing to actively oppose intervention, and politically engaged. The importance of persuading these individuals accounts for the consistent use of humanitarian appeals in contemporary interventions.

The experimental findings also confirm that militant internationalists are the most reliable supporters of military action. Regardless of the type of justification used, individuals with these values consistently offered the highest level of support for intervention. This result is in line with the domestic coalition argument that militant internationalists are politically engaged but a low risk source of dissent because of they almost always approve of the use of force as a means to solving international problems. Responses to the survey experiment also confirm that isolationists are less politically engaged than internationalists and offer little support for interventions justified in either humanitarian or security terms. This group is thus an inefficient target for presidents' justifications because they are unlikely to be persuaded regardless of the explanations used.

The experimental findings also shed light on how respondents weight humanitarian and security claims when these justifications are used in combination. First, there is evidence that justifications influence both how individuals perceive the president's motivations for action and what concerns they themselves consider when deciding to support or oppose intervention.

Interventions justified in humanitarian terms increased both respondents' thoughts about harm done to civilians and upholding international standards and their belief that the president was motivated primarily by these concerns. Similarly, justifications that emphasized security increased thoughts about threats to U.S. national security and the perception that the president was mainly concerned about guarding against these threats. However, when humanitarian and security justifications are combined, respondents assumed the president privileged security concerns. Despite the primary status given to security claims, the findings also show that even in combination the presence of humanitarian appeals effectively primes respondents' concern with harm done to civilians and upholding international standards. The effect of humanitarian justifications on the reasons respondents decided to support or oppose intervention was particularly important among cooperative internationalists.

Evidence that humanitarian justifications influence individuals' perceptions of intervention even when security objectives are primary raises concerns about the misuse of humanitarian claims. To the extent that humanitarian claims still bolster support when they do not match the intervention's principle objective, presidents can use these appeals to provide a false pretense for otherwise unpopular military actions. Additionally, the common misuse of humanitarian claims can undermine their effectiveness in cases of actual humanitarian crisis and create obstacles to preventing mass atrocities (Bellamy 2004; Evans 2004). The following chapter addresses these questions in depth by examining how far presidents can stretch the sincerity of humanitarian appeals and how respondents' foreign policy beliefs shape their sensitivity to insincere claims.

CHAPTER FIVE

DECEPTION, BACKLASH, AND THE MISUSE OF HUMANITARIAN JUSTIFICATIONS

The previous chapter demonstrates that humanitarian justifications play a critical role in mobilizing domestic support for military action. When they are effective, humanitarian claims persuade cooperative internationalists while still appealing to the militant internationalist base and help presidents build the broadest possible domestic coalition. The broad appeal of these justifications should give leaders an incentive to highlight humanitarian claims equally, if not more often than security justifications, which raises concerns about their potential misuse. To the extent that individuals respond to humanitarian claims, regardless of whether they match the intervention's objectives, presidents may use these appeals to circumvent constraints on military action and provide a pretext for otherwise unpopular interventions. Furthermore, the over-use of humanitarian claims could make the public skeptical of future humanitarian efforts and hinder responses to mass atrocities (Bellamy 2005).

The pattern of justifications outlined in Chapter 3 assuages the most severe pretext concerns and the limited emphasis placed on these claims in security interventions suggests that presidents exercise discretion in their use of humanitarian appeals. To better understand the domestic incentives behind this pattern and shed light on the limits of humanitarian appeals, this chapter asks: Under what conditions are humanitarian justifications effective? To what extent do individuals punish the president for deceptive justifications? I contend that the importance of including cooperative internationalists in the domestic coalition both requires and constrains leaders' use of humanitarian appeals. Because they are attuned to politics and concerned with humanitarian objectives, cooperative internationalists are particularly sensitive to the misuse of humanitarian justifications. As a result, attempts to extend humanitarian claims beyond their role

as supplementary explanations in security interventions will generate backlash from the same individuals they are intended to persuade. In line with the pattern of justifications outlined in Chapter 3, presidents thus face domestic incentives to use humanitarian claims broadly, but also to limit their emphasis—more is not always better in terms of maximizing the effectiveness of humanitarian appeals.

To evaluate the political backlash I expect to deter the president from misusing humanitarian justifications, the chapter first outlines ongoing debates about the opportunities for and costs of deception in democracies. These sections demonstrate that justifications are a most likely site for deception and that the misuse of humanitarian claims carries additional, negative consequences. The following section outlines the domestic coalition argument's expectations about the effects of sincerity and contends that the importance of including cooperative internationalists limits deceptive humanitarian claims. Building on the survey experiment introduced in Chapter 4, I detail how this experimental design varies the sincerity of justifications to test the limits of humanitarian claims. The results indicate that presidents incur a variety of political costs in response to deceptive justifications. Additionally, the source of the backlash varies based on the content of the deceptive justification—cooperative internationalists impose political costs for the misuse of humanitarian claims, while militant internationalists impose political costs for the misuse of security explanations. On the surface, evidence that leaders face significant backlash for deceptive rhetoric appears to have positive implications for democratic accountability for the use of force. However, the findings also reveal that presidents can avoid these costs by telling "half-truths" and there is no evidence that backlash against one intervention affects the president's reputation in the long-term.

Deception in Democracies

Defining Deceptive Justifications

Presidents have multiple pathways to deception. They can secretly provoke adversaries to create an impetus for escalation or begin diversionary wars to rally support and overcome domestic discontent (Brody 1991; Gelpi 1997; Oakes 2012; Reiter 2012). Additionally, presidents can exercise their information advantage to disseminate propaganda and "frame issues in misleading ways, cherry-pick supporting evidence, suppress damaging revelations, and otherwise skew the public debate in advantageous directions" (Schuessler 2015, 3).[35] Here, I focus on the president's ability to obscure the character of an intervention in official justifications for the use of force. Justifications are a most likely case for deception because, as the next sub-section details, they represent the arena in which the president's first-mover and information advantages on matters of foreign policy are strongest (Howell, Jackman, and Rogowski 2013; Kernell 1997; Neustadt 1980; Western 2005).

In his comprehensive account of deceit in war, Schuessler defines deception as "deliberate attempts on the part of leaders to mislead the public about the thrust of official thinking" (Schuessler 2015, 8). Deception includes outright lies about the nature and aim of military action, but also encompasses leaders' attempts to spin or conceal problematic information from international and domestic audiences (Mearsheimer 2011, 15). In the context of public justifications for military action, the president's true motivations for action cannot be

[35] In his overview of leaders' lies, Mearsheimer (2011) further divides propaganda strategies into seven different categories of lies: 1) fearmongering, 2) strategic cover-ups, 3) nationalist mythmaking, 4) liberal lies, 5) social imperialism, 6) ignoble cover-ups, and 7) inter-state lies. The deceptive use of security justifications falls most closely into the category of fearmongering because it attempts to "motivate the public to take the threat seriously and make the necessary sacrifices to counter it" (Mearsheimer 2011, 22). The deceptive use of humanitarian justifications falls most closely into the category of liberal lies because, to the extent that it frames the use of military force in terms of protecting the welfare of foreign civilians, it is "designed to cover up the behavior of states when it contradicts the well-developed body of liberal norms" (Mearsheimer 2011, 22).

directly observed and thus cannot be compared with official statements to create an objective measure of deception. Given these limitations, deception here captures cases in which the president's public justification is *perceived* to diverge from the true impetus for military action by a consensus of experts. This definition follows the approach of Krebs and Jackson (2007, 42) who argue that "it does not matter whether actors believe what they say, whether they are motivated by crass material interests or sincere commitment. What is important is that they can be rhetorically maneuvered into a corner, trapped into publicly endorsing positions they may, or may not, find anathema." In other words, to understand the conditions under which deception limits the effectiveness of humanitarian justifications, it matters less if a president believes he is lying to the public than if his words can be presented as lies and used to inflict political costs.

When experts perceive the president's justification to sincerely and accurately reflect the rationale for action, they do not dispute his public explanation and there is no evidence of deception. Alternatively, when experts perceive that the president is offering an insincere—and thus deceptive—justification for action, they will publicly dispute this explanation and offer an alternative account of the conflict. This approach to deception reflects the process through which elite discourse casts doubt on presidents' accounts of military action and recognizes the role that elite consensus plays in rallying or muting public support (Brody 1991, 66–67).

Deception and the President's Information Advantage

In the international arena, the high stakes and iterative nature of international politics make deception risky and rare. State leaders are inherently skeptical of their counterparts and work to verify each other's claims, increasing the likelihood that deception will be exposed. Presidents perceived as insincere lose credibility with other leaders and undercut their ability to maintain functioning diplomatic relationships (Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012). It is thus difficult for

presidents to effectively lie to other leaders and the potential benefits of international deception do not outweigh the costs (Mearsheimer 2011, 28).

By contrast, at the domestic level presidents have an information advantage on matters of foreign policy that makes deception a more feasible and attractive strategy. The complexity of collecting and interpreting information related to foreign policy decisions makes the public particularly dependent on elite information (Western 2005, 15). In the context of military interventions, the president holds a "near-monopoly control over information" (Kernell 1997, 183) and a first-mover advantage that allows him to respond directly and decisively to international crises, setting the terms of the debate that follows (Schuessler 2015, 6; Western 2005, 17). The presidency is also "endowed with the public trust," which increases the likelihood that public opinion will be responsive to presidential appeals (Western 2005, 17). Combined, these advantages make the presidency the leading national security institution and primary source of justifications for military action (George 1980; Howell, Jackman, and Rogowski 2013; Kernell 1997; Meernik 1994; Neustadt 1980). This information advantage gives leaders an incentive to manipulate public opinion (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000), but declines over the course of a conflict as elite discourse and media coverage help the public close the information gap (Baum and Groeling 2010; Baum and Potter 2008, 48). The risks and limits of deception are thus best evaluated at the domestic level where both the incentives for misleading rhetoric and the president's information advantage are greatest.

The Costs and Benefits of Deception

Despite widespread recognition of the incentives for deception, scholars remain divided over the extent to which presidents can get away with deceiving their publics. Many realist accounts view the public as ill-informed and susceptible to misinformation, making deception

both effective and low in risk. As Mearsheimer argues, "It is reasonably easy for policymakers to lie to their publics" and, because policymakers can manipulate both the content and flow of information, "most people will be inclined to trust what their leaders tell them unless there is hard evidence that they are being deceived" (Mearsheimer 2011, 58). From this perspective, deception allows leaders to circumvent democratic constraints on leaders' ability to go to war and "deception will backfire only in the event that a war goes badly" (Schuessler 2015, 17). The expected benefits of deception thus outweigh the costs as long as the intervention is successful. As a result, leaders will often decide domestic deception is worth the risk.

An alternative, liberal institutionalist view contends that democratic processes prevent deception by increasing the likelihood that deception will be exposed and leaders will face costly political backlash (Reiter 2012). This account "allows that even elected leaders may be motivated to deceive in order to provide themselves more freedom of action in foreign policy. However, elected leaders are deterred from engaging in deception, especially deception over high salience matters like the initiation of war" (Reiter 2012, 595). Similarly, in his review of historical cases of deception, Alterman concludes that presidents cannot lie about matters of war and peace without inflicting significant damage (Alterman 2004, 314). From this view, attempts to deceive the domestic audience will be quickly exposed and leaders punished. The costs of deception thus outweigh the benefits and by imposing these costs democratic institutions effectively prevent leaders from deceiving their publics.

These ongoing debates draw on evidence from historical cases to investigate how presidents perceived and responded to the political costs associated with deception. However, these accounts do not consider how the public responds to being deceived—the central

mechanism of democratic accountability. Extending these accounts to the level of public support generates the following alternative hypotheses:

> H5.1: Deception works. The public responds positively to deceptive claims and leaders do not face political backlash.
>
> H5.2: Deception is not effective. The public responds negatively to deceptive claims and leaders face political backlash.

Deception and Humanitarian Claims

The deceptive use of humanitarian justifications warrants increased attention because these claims carry two additional and negative consequences. First, to the extent that humanitarian claims bolster public support for action (Boettcher 2004; Eichenberg 2005; Jentleson and Britton 1998), they can provide a pretext for otherwise unpopular interventions. For example, critics of the 2003 Iraq war raised the concern that the Bush administration misused humanitarian appeals to sustain support for the intervention and confuse the public when the weapons of mass destruction rationale became untenable (Bellamy 2004; Fisher 2003). Humanitarian justifications are particularly susceptible to this type of misuse because violent conflicts inevitably threaten the wellbeing of civilians, which makes allusions to humanitarian crises feasible in a wide range of cases. Additionally, because humanitarian justifications do not require proof of a tie to U.S. national security interests (Finnemore 2003, 52), they can be used to make the case for military actions such as preventative war that would otherwise have questionable status under international law (Evangelista 2008, 21).

Second, the widespread use of humanitarian claims in the absence of humanitarian objectives can create public skepticism and undermine the credibility of future appeals (Bellamy 2005). Declining public acceptance of humanitarian claims is especially problematic to the extent that it prevents action to address mass atrocities. Summarizing this concern in the context

of the 2003 Iraq war, Gareth Evans, one of the foremost R2P norm entrepreneurs, asserted that, "to the extent that the invasion was based on Saddam Hussein's record of tyranny over his own people—but again, poorly and inconsistently argued, and with the Council bypassed—we have seen almost choked at birth what many were hoping was an emerging new norm justifying intervention on the basis of the principle of 'responsibility to protect'" (Evans 2004, 6).

Justifications in general and humanitarian justifications in particular are therefore a most likely case for deception. However, to date studies of deception in foreign policy have been limited by the implicit assumption that all individuals are equally important to the domestic coalition and respond to deceptive claims in a uniform way. The following section uses foreign policy beliefs to disaggregate public opinion towards deception. It contends that the constraining power of democratic publics is exercised primarily by individuals with cooperative and militant internationalist values. Recognizing diversity in the public's foreign policy beliefs highlights the conditions under which leaders face political backlash for their use of deceptive justifications. It also demonstrates that the composition of the domestic coalition explains the limited emphasis of humanitarian justifications outlined in Chapter 3.

Deceptive Justifications and the Domestic Coalition

Deception, like justifications, resonates differently with individuals based on their underlying foreign policy beliefs. The domestic coalition argument outlined in Chapter 2 contends that individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs possess a unique set of characteristics that makes them particularly sensitive to the misuse of humanitarian claims. First, these individuals are primarily concerned with humanitarian objectives and inherently skeptical of military action. As Chapter 4 shows, the majority of cooperative internationalists are not convinced by security justifications and offer significantly higher support military intervention

when it is cast in humanitarian terms. Therefore, when experts cast doubt on the validity of the president's humanitarian appeals, it increases cooperative internationalists' skepticism and decreases their support for military action.

Second, because individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs are attuned to and engaged in politics they are more likely to be exposed to contradictory accounts of the intervention. Their heightened political engagement also gives these individuals the skills needed to create an active opposition and impose political costs when humanitarian claims are misused. As a result, when the president stretches humanitarian justifications beyond their role as supplementary explanations in security-driven interventions, he generates backlash from cooperative internationalists—the very group humanitarian justifications are intended to persuade. In the short-term, the backlash of cooperative internationalists negatively influences both individuals' support for intervention and their approval of the president. In the long-term, the misuse of humanitarian claims makes cooperative internationalists skeptical of the president's humanitarian rhetoric and less likely to support humanitarian efforts in the future.

However, the difficulty of conclusively disproving humanitarian appeals and the complex nature of contemporary interventions give presidents leeway to tell "half-truths"—i.e., emphasizing insincere humanitarian justifications alongside sincere security justifications. Demonstrating that an intervention contains no valid humanitarian objectives presents a significantly higher bar for critics than suggesting that humanitarian objectives are not the primary rationale for military action. Among cooperative internationalists, these half-truths do not create sufficient skepticism to significantly lower support for intervention or impose political costs on leaders.

Taken as a whole, the conditions under which cooperative internationalists are persuaded by humanitarian justifications explain the seemingly mismatched pattern of widespread use and limited emphasis illustrated in Chapter 3. The role of cooperative internationalists in imposing political costs for the misuse of humanitarian justifications presents the following hypothesis:

> H5.3a: Individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs are most sensitive to deceptive humanitarian justifications.

In contrast to cooperative internationalists, individuals with military internationalist or isolationist foreign policy beliefs are less influenced by deceptive justifications. Unlike cooperative internationalists, militant internationalists offer broad support for military interventions and focus on security objectives. As a result, these individuals are less sensitive to deceptive humanitarian justifications and are more likely to give the president the benefit of the doubt in his pursuit of military action. However, this tolerance for insincerity does not extend to security justifications, which evoke the objectives that most concern militant internationalists. Instead, a president who employs a false security explanation will face political backlash from the base of the domestic coalition—individuals with militant internationalist beliefs.

Alternatively, isolationists are unlikely to support military intervention, regardless of the category or sincerity of the justifications used. Evidence of deception can further decrease isolationists' support for intervention, but because their baseline level of approval is low, the effect of deception will be muted by a floor effect. These characteristics of militant internationalists and isolationists generate the following hypotheses for their reactions to deception:

> H5.3b: Individuals with militant internationalist beliefs are sensitive to deceptive security justifications, but are not sensitive to deceptive humanitarian justifications.

> H5.3c: The attitudes of individuals with isolationist beliefs are not significantly influenced by the presence of deception.

Measuring Reactions to Deception: Research Design

The experimental results presented in Chapter 4 examine variation in the president's justifications for military action to determine which individuals respond to humanitarian claims. In addition to the type of justification, the survey experiment also varied the extent to which experts agreed with the president's official explanation for military action to measure support at different levels of deception. Together, variation along these two dimensions—type of justification and sincerity of justification—creates ten experimental conditions, summarized in Table 5.1. In this chapter, I compare public attitudes between each level of sincerity (i.e., down the columns of Table 5.1) to investigate the effects of increasing deception.[36]

Table 5.1 Experimental Conditions (President's Justifications/Experts' Explanation)

	Humanitarian	*Security*	*Combined*	
Sincere	Humanitarian/ Humanitarian	Security/ Security	Security and Humanitarian/ Security and Humanitarian	
Insincere	Humanitarian/ Security	Security/ Humanitarian	Security and Humanitarian/ Security	Security and Humanitarian/ Humanitarian
Illegitimate	Humanitarian/ President's Political Agenda	Security/ President's Political Agenda	Security and Humanitarian/President's Political Agenda	

As before, all respondents were presented with a hypothetical scenario in which "Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar" and told they were reading an excerpt from the president's address to the nation about this conflict.[37] Participants assigned to the humanitarian category read a statement in which the president said, "Numar poses a grave threat to its own civilians, including innocent women and children." In the

[36] The sample for this survey is the same as that described in Chapter 4. As before, the survey was fielded to 1,517 U.S. adults in July 2016 using Amazon's Mechanical Turk.

[37] To mitigate the influence of current events, all respondents were also explicitly told that "The situation reflects actions taken by presidents from both political parties. It is NOT about the current president or president-elect and it is NOT about any specific country in the news today."

security category, respondents read that "Numar poses a grave threat to the security of the United States, including the American people," and in the combined category the president said, "Numar poses a grave threat to its own civilians and the security of the United States." Following the president's explanation, respondents were then presented with information from experts who either publicly agreed with or disputed the official justifications for military action. Comparing levels of support between conditions in which experts agreed and conditions in which experts disputed the president's explanation captures the effect of perceived deception on attitudes towards military intervention.

Operationalizing Deception

Justifications are a most likely case for deception because, given the president's information advantages, the burden of proof required to demonstrate that an intervention did not contain the stated policy objectives is high. This characteristic of deceptive justifications also presents a challenge for designing accurate and valid experimental manipulations. Providing respondents with smoking gun evidence that the president lied about the impetus for intervention would be unrealistic in this context and undermine the experiment's external validity. Additionally, explicitly informing respondents that the experts' account of the intervention was accurate while the president's account was deceptive would prime on a key dependent variable—trust in the accuracy of the president's explanation. To avoid these pitfalls, this experiment investigates the limits of deception by gradually casting doubt on the sincerity of the president's justifications for action and evaluating how changes in sincerity influence individuals' attitudes.

The survey experiment manipulates the sincerity of justifications by providing expert information because this is the mechanism through which studies of democratic constraints expect institutions to deter deception. These accounts contend that the presence of a free press

and media coverage of interventions amplify elite discourse to expose deception (M. A. Baum and Potter 2015; Berinsky 2007; Reiter 2012; Saunders 2015). Upon hearing experts undermine the president's justification for action, the public is then expected to impose political costs that punish the president for his deceptive claims. Presenting participants with the president's justification for action alongside the response and alternative account of experts reflects this hypothesized process.

Additionally, the scenario tells respondents that "most experts" have publicly agreed with or disputed the president's explanation for military action. Presenting an expert consensus reduces the risk that respondents will assume disagreement is part of a partisan strategy that includes only the president's political opponents. Respondents are also presented with experts' alternative explanations for military action to separate disagreement about the rationale for action from opposition to the intervention itself. For example, in the insincere humanitarian category, respondents are told that experts believe the president is concerned with national security rather than foreign civilians, but are not told whether experts approve or disapprove of the security-driven intervention. This approach helps distinguish the effects of the president's deception from the effects of expert opposition.

Levels of Deception

Within this framework, I measure the effects of deception at three levels, summarized in Table 5.2. First, the sincere justification conditions capture the effect of the president's explanation for military action when there is no perceived deception. In this case, respondents receive information that most experts publically agreed with and reiterated the president's rationale for action. By contrast, the insincere and illegitimate justification categories introduce

the prospect of deception by telling respondents that most experts said the president's official explanation did not reflect the real impetus for military action.

Table 5.2 Expert Information by Treatment Condition

Experts thought…				
	Humanitarian	*Security*	*Combo*	
Agree	(1)…military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians.	(2)…military action would mainly protect U.S. security.	(3)…military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.	
Disagree, legitimate	(4)… instead of concern for civilians, the real motivation of the U.S. action was to protect U.S. security.	(5)… instead of concern for U.S. security the real motivation of the U.S. action was to protect Numar's civilians.	(6)… instead of concern for civilians the only motivation of the U.S. action was to protect U.S. security.	(7)... instead of concern for U.S. security the only motivation of the U.S. action was to protect Numar's civilians.
Disagree, illegitimate	(8)… protecting Numar's civilians was a story to cover up the President's own political agenda.	(9)… protecting U.S. security was a story to cover up the President's own political agenda.	(10)… protecting Numar's civilians and U.S. security was a story to cover up the President's own political agenda.	

Although both include perceived deception, the insincere and illegitimate categories are distinguished by the legitimacy of the explanation experts presented as the president's real motivation for action. An intervention is considered legitimate if it falls within the parameters for legal military action established by international law. The United Nations Charter establishes a general prohibition on the use of force with exceptions for states' right to self-defense and threats to international peace and security recognized by the Security Council (United Nations 1945).[38]

[38] The prohibition on the use of force can be found in Article 2(4), which states: "All members [of the United Nations] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." The exception for self-defense is presented in Article 51: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of an individual or collective self-defense." The response to threats to international peace and security is established in Chapter VII, Article 39: "The Security Council shall determine the

In practice, the right to self-defense outlined in Article 51 has been interpreted to include anticipatory self-defense, which allows states to lawfully use force to address immediate threats to their security before an armed attack takes place (Arend and Beck 1993, 79). Similarly, the Chapter VII provision for addressing threats to international peace and security and related agreements such as the 1948 Genocide Convention and 2005 World Summit resolutions legitimate the use of military force to protect foreign civilians (Bellamy 2006; Finnemore 2003, 79). Within this framework, both humanitarian and security justifications can thus provide legitimate rationales for military action. However, the use of military intervention to promote a leader's own domestic political agenda, in line with theories of diversionary war, violates the prohibition on "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" and is an illegitimate rationale for intervention (United Nations 1945, Article 2(4)).

Building on these definitions, the insincere categories present respondents with a scenario in which experts disputed the president's justifications for the military action but thought there was a legitimate explanation for intervention. These conditions are in line with conflicts in which leaders attempt to spin a military action they believe will be necessary but unpopular (Mearsheimer 2011, 16). In the insincere humanitarian condition, the president emphasizes humanitarian concerns while experts claim the intervention is primarily motivated by threats to U.S. national security. Similarly, in the insincere security condition, the president justifies intervention based on threats to U.S. national security while experts claim military action would primarily address humanitarian concerns. For the combined justification categories, the experiment varies the sincerity of one justification at a time. In the insincere humanitarian combination, the president uses humanitarian and security justifications while experts claim the

existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken…to maintain or restore international peace and security."

intervention would only address security objectives. The insincere security combination reverses this pattern and respondents are told that while the president used both humanitarian and security justifications, experts claim the intervention would only address humanitarian objectives. The insincere combination conditions represent cases in which the president tells half-truths by including one deceptive justification alongside an accepted explanation for military action.

In contrast to the insincere conditions, in the final three conditions experts claim the president employed deception to cover up an otherwise illegitimate military action. For each category of justifications—humanitarian, security, and combined—respondents were told that most experts said the president's explanation "was a story to cover up the President's own political agenda." These scenarios represent the most severe cases of deception and prime the possibility that the president is pursuing a diversionary war. The illegitimate scenarios are in line with concerns that the salience of humanitarian appeals creates an incentive for leaders to use these claims as a pretext for otherwise illegitimate and unpopular interventions (Goodman 2006).

Measuring Foreign Policy Beliefs

In addition to support for the treatment scenario, the survey experiment also measured individuals' foreign policy beliefs using the questions detailed in Chapter 4. As before, the indicators for cooperative and militant internationalism are drawn from the standard measures of foreign policy orientations validated by Kertzer et al. (2014, Appendix) and the measure of isolationism is drawn from the Chicago Council Survey questions used by Mandelbaum and Schneider (1979, 42–43). Based on their responses, individuals can be divided into three groups: cooperative internationalists, militant internationalists, and isolationists.[39]

[39] The foreign policy beliefs question asked respondents to choose from a randomized list: "Which of the following best reflects the role you think the United States should play in the world." Cooperative internationalists selected: "It is essential for the United States to work with other nations to solve problems such as overpopulation, hunger, and pollution." Militant internationalists chose: "It is important for the United States to maintain a strong military to

The Consequences of Deception

After providing information about the president's justifications and experts' responses, the survey asked a series of questions to investigate the extent to which leaders are punished for deception and the long-term consequences of insincere justifications. I consider three dimensions along which leaders can face political backlash as punishment for deception: support for the intervention, support for the president, and trust in the president. To gauge whether increasing deception undermines public consent for military action, the survey first asked respondents whether they supported the hypothetical intervention. Alongside questions about the mechanisms of individual support and expected intervention outcomes, respondents were then presented with questions designed to measure the influence of deception on the president's reputation. The first gauged the potential electoral costs of deception by asking: "If the hypothetical president were running for reelection, how likely would you be to vote for him?" The second captured whether deception decreased trust in the president relative to experts, asking: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The president described the situation in Numar accurately."

In addition to short-term political costs, the survey also probed the long-term consequences of deception by asking respondents to consider and report their support for a future humanitarian crisis. This scenario was designed to evaluate whether the misuse of humanitarian claims undermines the public's commitment to preventing future mass atrocities. All respondents were first told that they would read about "another situation this hypothetical president faced about a year after taking military action in Numar." They were then presented with a statement from the hypothetical president that combined the rhetoric used to condemn genocides in

ensure world peace." Isolationists reported that: "It is best for the future of the United States if we stay out of world affairs." See Chapter 4 for a detailed description of these indicators, as well as their strengths and weaknesses.

Rwanda and Bosnia and more recent humanitarian crises in Libya and Syria. As in the original scenario, the quotes were designed to mirror the language used by presidents from both parties in response to past conflicts. In his address to the nation about this future crisis, the hypothetical president said:

> …tonight I have received gruesome evidence that genocide is taking place in Rundu. Innocent civilians, including women and children, are being massacred in their homes by neighbors who support Rundu's government. The United States cannot be the world's police force, but when we can stop children from being killed in their own homes, we have a responsibility to act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined the United States must respond to this crisis with military action.

Following this statement, respondents were asked if they would oppose or favor U.S. military action in this situation.

Probing current and future attitudes in a single survey limits the external validity of the findings—respondents are less likely to remember the details and critiques of a previous intervention when years rather than minutes have passed. In light of this challenge, the results for future interventions should be interpreted as a most likely case for capturing negative effects of deception. If information about deceptive justifications is not salient enough to influence respondents' attitudes towards humanitarian efforts moments later, it is unlikely to undermine humanitarian efforts that occur weeks, months, or years in the future.

Taken as a whole, the survey experiment uncovers the conditions under which presidents are punished for deceptive justifications and highlights the short and long-term consequences of deceptive claims. The experimental design also tests the domestic coalition argument's expectation that the misuse of humanitarian claims is constrained by the same individuals they are intended to persuade. The follow sections present the results and evaluate the hypotheses related to each of these questions.

The Political Costs of Deception

Before examining how foreign policy beliefs shape responses to deception, the first step is to determine the extent to which the public punishes leaders for their use of deceptive claims. To distinguish between the ongoing debates over the role of deception in democracies, this section presents results for the public's aggregate response to deceptive claims. The findings illustrate the short-term and long-term political costs of deceptive rhetoric. Table 5.3 summarizes the relevant hypotheses and their observable implications in the context of official justifications for military action.

Table 5.3 Alternative Explanations for the Aggregate Effects of Deception

Hypothesis	Observable Implications
H5.1: Deception works. The public responds positively to deceptive claims and leaders do not face political backlash.	• Support for intervention does not significantly decline as deception increases. • Support for the president's reelection does not significantly decline as deception increases. • Belief that the president described the situation accurately does not significantly decline as deception increases.
H5.2: Deception is not effective. The public responds negatively to deceptive claims and leaders face political backlash.	• Support for intervention significantly declines as deception increases. • Support for the president's reelection significantly declines as deception increases. • Belief that the president described the situation accurately significantly declines as deception increases.

Backlash and Support for Intervention

The first and most immediate dimension along which deceptive claims can generate backlash is by diminishing support for the intervention justified in insincere terms. Findings that

show support is not significantly reduced would provide evidence for hypothesis 5.1 (deception works), while evidence that support declines significantly would be consistent with hypothesis 5.2 (deception is not effective). Table 5.4 outlines the proportion of respondents who supported intervention in each condition. The results indicate that deception creates a negative backlash in support for the intervention, but this effect is not consistent across all categories of justifications.

Table 5.4 Aggregate Support by Level of Deception

	Humanitarian	*Security*	*Combined*	
Sincere	0.59 (0.52, 0.67)	0.54 (0.46, 0.62)	0.62 (0.54, 0.69)	
Insincere	0.36 (0.28, 0.44)	0.42 (0.34, 0.50)	0.55[#] (0.47, 0.63)	0.51[##] (0.43, 0.59)
Illegitimate	0.30 (0.23, 0.37)	0.35 (0.27, 0.42)	0.33 (0.25, 0.40)	
N	456	451	606	

Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals reported in parentheses to facilitate comparison across rows and down columns. [#]Insincere humanitarian claim, sincere security claim. [##]Insincere security claim, sincere humanitarian claim.

Compared to both types of deceptive claims—insincere and illegitimate—sincere justifications received consistently and significantly higher support. Individuals also consistently offered the lowest levels of support when experts reported that the underlying intervention was illegitimate. However, the difference between support for insincere and illegitimate justifications was only statistically significant in the combined categories, which suggests leaders face comparable levels of backlash for deceptive justifications regardless of the legitimacy of the alternative rationale experts provide for the underlying intervention. Additionally, comparing support across rows fails to provide evidence of a significant difference in the costs associated with deceptive humanitarian versus security justifications—deception carries the same costs

regardless of its content. This pattern is consistent with the expectations of liberal institutionalist arguments, summarized in hypothesis 5.2, which expect deceptive justifications to be ineffective and thus rare among democratic leaders.

Despite the overall trend, the combined justification categories highlight the conditions under which presidents can reap the benefits of deceptive justifications without facing a significant backlash against the intervention. In the insincere combined categories, the president employed half-truths, combining either a sincere security justification with a deceptive humanitarian claim or a sincere humanitarian justification with a deceptive security claim. The results show that support did not significantly decrease when experts believed the president used deceptive humanitarian claims alongside sincere security justifications to explain a security-driven intervention. Similarly, a narrow majority of respondents continued to support intervention when experts accused the president of employing deceptive security justifications alongside sincere humanitarian appeals. These findings imply that leaders can employ half-truths to bolster the support from a broad audience without the risk of backlash.

Deception and Reelection

In addition to backlash against the relevant intervention, a president accused of deception also faces backlash against his reelection and reputation.[40] First, democratic accountability for the use of force is rooted in the public's ability to vote against leaders who act contrary to its interests. To examine the extent to which deceptive claims have electoral consequences, Table 5.5 reports the proportion of respondents who were likely to vote for the president's reelection based on the level of deception.

[40] The survey experiment also examined whether deception influenced opinions about how well the president handled the crisis. Responses to this question correlate closely with respondents' willingness to support the president's reelection and are reported in the appendix.

Table 5.5 Reported Likelihood of Voting to Reelect the President

	Humanitarian	*Security*	*Combined*	
Sincere	0.60 (0.52, 0.68)	0.60 (0.52, 0.68)	0.63 (0.55, 0.71)	
Insincere	0.41 (0.33, 0.49)	0.43 (0.35, 0.51)	0.53[#] (0.45, 0.61)	0.57[##] (0.49, 0.65)
Illegitimate	0.41 (0.33, 0.49)	0.39 (0.31, 0.47)	0.34 (0.27, 0.42)	
N	456	451	606	

Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals reported in parentheses to facilitate comparison across rows and down columns. [#]Insincere humanitarian claim, sincere security claim. [##]Insincere security claim, sincere humanitarian claim.

The results confirm that democratic leaders risk an electoral backlash if they use deceptive justifications. Across all categories of justifications, the majority of respondents reported being likely to vote for the president's reelection when experts confirmed his account of military action. However, when experts cast doubt on the president's rationale for action—either by suggesting that the military action was driven by an alternative explanation or was illegitimate—the proportion of respondents willing to support the president's bid for reelection declined significantly to include a minority of individuals. These results illustrate that presidents who use deceptive justifications risk backlash at the polls and are consistent with the expectations of hypothesis 5.2. However, as before, the findings also suggest presidents can circumvent political backlash by combining sincere and insincere justifications. In both of the insincere combined conditions, presidents who told half-truths received likely votes from a majority of participants. The negative effects of deception were further mitigated in the insincere security combination where the proportion of respondents likely to vote for the president was not statistically different from those who read two sincere justifications.

Deception and Presidential Authority

The evidence suggests that in the short-term deceptive justifications lower support for the intervention and reduce respondents' willingness to vote for the president. From this perspective, leaders are punished for deception and the risk of political costs should provide a disincentive for the use of deceptive justifications outside of the context of half-truths. However, theories of belief perseverance suggest that deceptive justifications may be worth the risk because they allow leaders to set the terms of the debate and influence individuals' long-term perceptions of the conflict. Information advantages magnify these benefits in the case of presidents' justifications for military action. To investigate whether presidents' authority on matters of foreign policy mitigates the short-term risks of deception, Table 5.6 reports the proportion of respondents who agreed the president described the situation accurately. These findings clarify the weight respondents placed on the president's account of the situation relative to information from experts.

Table 5.6 Agree the President Described the Situation Accurately

	Humanitarian	*Security*	*Combined*	
Sincere	0.82	0.62	0.78	
	(0.76, 0.88)	(0.55, 0.70)	(0.71, 0.84)	
Insincere	0.57	0.46	0.57[#]	0.66[##]
	(0.49, 0.65)	(0.38, 0.54)	(0.49, 0.65)	(0.59, 0.74)
Illegitimate	0.55	0.46	0.49	
	(0.47, 0.63)	(0.39, 0.54)	(0.41, 0.57)	
N	456	451	606	

Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals reported in parentheses to facilitate comparison across rows and down columns. [#]Insincere humanitarian claim, sincere security claim. [##]Insincere security claim, sincere humanitarian claim.

While increased deception significantly decreased the proportion of respondents who thought the president described the situation accurately, the decline was less dramatic than the

drops in support and votes reported above. Across both the insincere and illegitimate categories, almost half of all respondents viewed the president's explanation as accurate. This evidence is consistent with the expectation that the public views the president as the authority on military action and suggests that experts must meet a heavy burden of proof to convince the public that alternative accounts are correct. Surprisingly, respondents' trust in the president's accuracy was lowest in the security conditions. While not conclusive, this implies that individuals may require more evidence to believe a conflict poses a direct threat to U.S. national security than to believe the conflict poses a humanitarian threat to foreign civilians.[41]

Combined, the aggregate results suggest that there are immediate and political costs associated with deceptive justifications. Leaders who rely on insincere claims risk undermining support for military action and losing votes, consistent with the argument that democratic institutions constrain the president's ability to lie to their publics about military action. However, the risks associated with deception are not absolute. Instead, the findings also indicate that leaders can mitigate these costs by relying on half-truths to bolster support and by using their institutional authority to shape long-term perceptions of the intervention. In short, leaders can manage the costs of deception as long as insincere claims are accompanied by a grain of truth. However, this strategy will only be effective in circumventing domestic dissent if the relevant domestic coalition—cooperative and militant internationalists—is persuaded by the half-truth. The following section disaggregates public opinion to evaluate the domestic coalition argument and investigate this claim in greater detail.

[41] Alternatively, individuals could infer other information from humanitarian justifications and assume that humanitarian interventions will be faster, easier, or cheaper. However, Kreps and Maxey (2017) demonstrate that support for humanitarian interventions operates through a sense of moral obligation rather than assumptions about the relative costs or consequences of military action.

Who Responds to Deception

In the context of the domestic coalition argument, the aggregate results imply that leaders can employ half-truths that combine deceptive humanitarian justifications with sincere security claims to build a broad coalition of support. However, as Chapter 4 showed, the composition of the domestic coalition matters as much as its magnitude and the use of half-truths will only be effective if they persuade cooperative internationalists. Despite the aggregate results, convincing cooperative internationalists is not a given—their focus on humanitarian objectives and attentiveness to politics make these individuals particularly attuned to the misuse of humanitarian claims. Additionally, because cooperative internationalists are also the most likely source of active opposition, their dissent can impose political costs that do not appear in the aggregate. To more accurately capture the potential for costly backlash, this section examines the extent to which individuals' underlying foreign policy beliefs influence their response to deception. Table 5.7 summarizes the relevant hypotheses and observable implications.

Table 5.7 Hypothesized Effects of Deception by Foreign Policy Beliefs

Hypothesis	Observable Implications
H5.3a: Individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs are most sensitive to deceptive humanitarian justifications.	Among cooperative internationalists: • Support for intervention declines significantly when the leader uses humanitarian claims deceptively. • Support for the president's reelection declines significantly when the leader uses humanitarian claims deceptively. • Attitudes towards security justifications are not significantly influenced by deception.
H5.3b: Individuals with militant internationalist beliefs are sensitive to deceptive security justifications, but are not sensitive to deceptive humanitarian justifications.	Among militant internationalists: • Support for intervention significantly when the leader uses security claims deceptively. • Support for the president's reelection declines significantly when the leader uses security claims deceptively. • Attitudes towards humanitarian justifications are not significantly influenced by deception.
H5.3c: The attitudes of individuals with isolationist beliefs are not significantly influenced by the presence of deception.	Among isolationists: • Support for intervention is low but does not significantly decline when the leader uses deceptive claims. • Support for the president's reelection does not significantly decline when the leader uses deceptive claims.

The Backlash of Cooperative Internationalists

To evaluate these hypotheses, Table 5.8 reports the effect of increasing deception on individuals' support for humanitarian justifications based on their underlying foreign policy beliefs. In line with the expectations of the domestic coalition argument, cooperative internationalists' support for intervention dropped dramatically and significantly when expert information contradicted the president's humanitarian appeal. Additionally, cooperative internationalists are the only group that reported a significant decline in support. While no group

approved of the use of humanitarian claims as a cover for illegitimate military action, the support of militant internationalists and isolationists did not significantly change when experts suggested the humanitarian justification was insincere. Individuals with cooperative internationalist values thus appear to be more responsive to the misuse of humanitarian justifications than groups with alternative foreign policy beliefs. The reduced support of cooperative internationalists—who are key to building stable domestic coalitions—suggests that presidents cannot effectively rely on humanitarian claims as the sole pretext for security-driven or illegitimate interventions. Instead, leaders who attempt to misuse these claims will face a backlash in support from the very group humanitarian justifications are intended to persuade.

Table 5.8 Effect of Sincerity of Humanitarian Justifications on Support for Intervention by Foreign Policy Beliefs

	Cooperative Internationalists	*Militant Internationalists*	*Isolationists*
Sincere	0.61	0.78	0.21
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Insincere	0.27***	0.73	0.11
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Illegitimate	0.33***	0.42***	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)
N	254	121	81

Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare support at each level of deception to the sincere baseline within each category of foreign policy belief. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

In addition to a backlash against the intervention itself, Table 5.9 provides evidence that the backlash in respondents' willingness to support the president's reelection bid is driven by cooperative internationalists.[42] While the misuse of humanitarian justifications made cooperative internationalists significantly less willing to support the president's reelection, the support of

[42] Cooperative internationalists' agreement that the president described the situation accurately also declined significantly as deception increases. Full results are reported in the appendix.

militant internationalists and isolationists was not significantly changed. Combined, these findings imply that cooperative internationalists are both most responsive to and the central force that punishes leaders for the deceptive use of humanitarian claims. If cooperative internationalists did not play a key role in the domestic coalition, presidents would have more leeway to misuse humanitarian appeals.

Table 5.9 Effect of Sincerity of Humanitarian Justifications on Support for President's Reelection by Foreign Policy Beliefs

	Cooperative Internationalists	*Militant Internationalists*	*Isolationists*
Sincere	0.64	0.69	0.29
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Insincere	0.34***	0.70	0.18
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Illegitimate	0.45**	0.47**	0.21
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)
N	254	121	81

Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare support at each level of deception to the sincere baseline within each category of foreign policy belief. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

The Misuse of Security Justifications

Given that cooperative internationalists hold leaders accountable for the misuse of humanitarian justifications, the question becomes: are these individuals equally sensitive to all deceptive justifications? The domestic coalition argument contends that cooperative internationalists are particularly sensitive to the misuse of humanitarian appeals because they: 1) care most about humanitarian objectives, and 2) are attuned to foreign policy decisions. This same logic suggests that militant internationalists, who are also attuned to foreign policy decisions but care most about security objectives, are especially responsive to the misuse of security justifications. From this view, there is a division of labor among the groups that impose

costs for deception—cooperative internationalists punish leaders for abusing humanitarian appeals, while militant internationalists punish leaders for the deceptive use of security explanations. Isolationists are consistent opponents but their backlash carries few political costs—they offer low levels of support for military action, regardless of the level of deception, and are unlikely to become a vocal opposition.

In line with these expectations, Table 5.10 reports support for security justifications based on both the level of sincerity and individuals' foreign policy beliefs. The results show that cooperative internationalists' support for the security-driven intervention was consistently low, but did not significantly decline when security justifications appeared insincere. Only when experts suggested the underlying intervention was illegitimate did cooperative internationalists' support drop significantly. Cooperative internationalists thus appear to be less persuaded by security justifications, but also less sensitive their misuse.

Table 5.10. Effect of Sincerity on Security Justifications by Foreign Policy Beliefs

	Cooperative Internationalists	*Militant Internationalists*	*Isolationists*
Sincere	0.48	0.82	0.33
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Insincere	0.40	0.59**	0.07*
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Illegitimate	0.26***	0.62**	0.12*
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)
N	257	130	64

Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare support at each level of deception to the sincere baseline within each category of foreign policy belief. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Alternatively, information that the president used deceptive security claims significantly reduced support among militant internationalists by more than 20 points. While the insincere condition still received the support of a majority of militant internationalists, the dramatic decline

among the most enthusiastic supporters of military action is substantively threatening to the stability of the domestic coalition. Additionally, as expected, isolationists offered the lowest support for security justifications across all levels of deception. Isolationists' support significantly decreased when experts disputed the president's justifications, but because the decline moves support from very low to extremely low, the substantive consequences of this change are negligible.

Half-Truths and Foreign Policy Beliefs

Disaggregating responses to deception reveals that cooperative internationalists impose costs for the misuse of humanitarian claims, while militant internationalists impose costs for the misuse of security claims. When combined, the threat of punishment from both segments of the domestic coalition provides a disincentive that prevents deception. To clarify the conditions under which internationalists constrain deception, the question then becomes: do half-truths allow leaders to mitigate the backlash from these individuals?

To address this question, Table 5.11 outlines the proportion of respondents who supported intervention in conditions where the president combined humanitarian and security justifications. The findings imply that presidents can avoid backlash from both cooperative and militant internationalists when deceptive justifications are combined with sincere explanations. While support decreased slightly, there is no significant difference in cooperative internationalists' support for the sincere combination compared to the combination of deceptive humanitarian and sincere security claims. Similarly, the support of militant internationalists did not significantly decline when insincere humanitarian claims were used alongside a sincere security justification. There was a significant drop in support among militant internationalists in

the insincere security combination; however, this condition retained support from the majority of militant internationalists.

Table 5.11 Effect of Sincerity on Support for Combined Justifications

	Cooperative Internationalists	*Militant Internationalists*	*Isolationists*
Sincere	0.60	0.83	0.31
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Insincere Humanitarian	0.53	0.86	0.25
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Insincere Security	0.52	0.67*	0.30
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Illegitimate	0.29***	0.43***	0.18
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.09)
N	339	168	98

Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare support at each level of deception to the sincere baseline within each category of foreign policy belief. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

The Domestic Coalition and Democratic Accountability

Overall, these results indicate that insincere or illegitimate justifications alone cannot effectively generate support for intervention. Through a variety of political costs, cooperative and militant internationalists punish leaders who use deceptive justifications to make the case for military action. Cooperative internationalists hold leaders to account for deceptive humanitarian claims, while militant internationalists impose costs for the misuse of security justifications. On the surface, the findings appear to be good news for democratic accountability for the use of force—leaders face significant, immediate, and electoral consequences when caught attempting to deceive their publics. However, even internationalists can be persuaded by half-truths. Presidents can thus reap the benefits of humanitarian appeals, even in security-driven

interventions, as long as these justifications supplement uncontested security claims. These incentives and constraints help account for the prevalent use and limited prominence of humanitarian justifications in post-Cold War interventions, illustrated in Chapter 3.

So far, the experimental results presented here and in the previous chapter indicate that adding humanitarian claims to security justifications bolsters the support of cooperative internationalists, but the support of these individuals is also particularly sensitive to insincere humanitarian claims. Presidents can mitigate backlash from cooperative internationalists by employing half-truths that combine sincere security and insincere humanitarian appeals. In this case, the support of cooperative internationalists is not significantly different from their support for sincere humanitarian claims, but it is also statistically similar to their support for sincere security justifications (see Chapter 4, Table 4.8). The similarity of support levels raises the question: Can the addition of insincere humanitarian justifications generate more support from cooperative internationalists than sincere security justifications alone? The results presented above and previously in Table 4.8 cannot speak directly to this question because comparing diagonally across the columns in Table 5.1 varies two factors at once: the presence of a humanitarian justification and information about experts' agreement or disagreement with the president. Consequently, it is not possible to disentangle the extent to which any differences or similarities in cooperative internationalists' support are driven by the addition of a humanitarian appeal versus information that experts think the president could be lying. Thus, while presidents have a clear incentive to use humanitarian justifications in a manner that appears sincere or does not draw attention to their insincerity—i.e., by limiting their emphasis in primarily security-driven interventions—the exact threshold at which the benefits of humanitarian half-truths are

sufficient to build and maintain a stable domestic coalition remains an open question and an important area for future research.

The Long-Term Consequences of Deception

To this point, I have focused on the immediate domestic benefits presidents gain from employing humanitarian justifications for military action. Adding a limited number of humanitarian claims to a security-driven intervention bolsters public support among the most likely opponents of intervention and is key to building a stable domestic coalition. However, the consistent use and misuse of humanitarian justifications has the potential to undermine the public's support for humanitarian efforts in the long-term. To evaluate this risk, this section details participants' responses to a second, future intervention scenario justified in exclusively humanitarian terms by the same hypothetical president.

Support for Future Humanitarian Interventions

Respondents were first asked whether they would favor or oppose U.S. military action in response to the future humanitarian crisis. This question gauged the extent to which exposure to deceptive justifications in one intervention influences individuals' willingness to support future interventions. The results are outlined in Table 5.12.

Table 5.12 Favor U.S. Military Action in Future Humanitarian Crisis by Treatment

	Humanitarian	*Security*	*Combined*	
Sincere	0.65 (0.57, 0.73)	0.70 (0.63, 0.77)	0.69 (0.61, 0.76)	
Insincere	0.56 (0.48, 0.64)	0.65 (0.58, 0.73)	0.68[#] (0.61, 0.76)	0.70[##] (0.62, 0.77)
Illegitimate	0.61 (0.54, 0.69)	0.65 (0.57, 0.72)	0.63 (0.55, 0.70)	
N	456	451	606	

Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals reported in parentheses to facilitate comparisons across rows and down columns. [#]Insincere humanitarian claim, sincere security claim. [##]Insincere security claim, sincere humanitarian claim.

Individuals who read sincere justifications from the president in the first scenario offer high levels of support for military action in the future humanitarian crisis. However, this group's support for the future intervention was not statistically or substantively different from individuals who initially read insincere or illegitimate justifications. Respondents in the insincere humanitarian condition are the exception to this trend. These individuals offered significantly lower support for the future military action than respondents in any other treatment condition. Surprisingly, support in this condition was also significantly lower than support from individuals who received an illegitimate humanitarian justification in the first scenario. The substantive significance of this effect is muted by the fact that approval remained high and was not affected by the use of humanitarian claims as a pretext for illegitimate interventions—the type of abuse that has historically raised the most concern among human rights advocates and critics of military action. Therefore, while the misuse of humanitarian claims can reduce support for future interventions, this effect only appears when insincere humanitarian claims are used as a cover for security-driven interventions and may not be large enough to create a politically costly backlash.

Long-Term Effects on the President's Reputation

Given the limited effects of deceptive humanitarian claims on support for future interventions, the question then becomes: does deception influence the president's reputation in the long-term? The survey used two questions to gauge whether deception affected confidence in the president's decisions about future interventions. First, respondents were asked if they trusted the president's ability to handle the future humanitarian crisis. The levels of trust outlined in Table 5.13 are consistent with the effect of deception on support for the future intervention. Individuals' trust in the president's ability to handle the future humanitarian crisis is high across all categories of justifications. In line with the pattern of future support, individuals in the insincere humanitarian condition were the only respondents to offer a significantly lower degree of trust, on average, compared to the sincere condition.[43] There is no evidence that the president's past use of illegitimate claims significantly reduced trust in his ability to manage future military actions.

Table 5.13 Trust the President's Handling of the Future Humanitarian Crisis

	Humanitarian	*Security*	*Combined*	
Sincere	0.74 (0.67, 0.81)	0.67 (0.60, 0.75)	0.69 (0.62, 0.77)	
Insincere	0.58 (0.50, 0.66)	0.69 (0.61, 0.76)	0.68[#] (0.60, 0.75)	0.65[##] (0.57, 0.72)
Illegitimate	0.65 (0.58, 0.73)	0.61 (0.54, 0.69)	0.63 (0.55, 0.71)	
N	456	451	606	

Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals reported in parentheses to facilitate comparison across rows and down columns. [#]Insincere humanitarian claim, sincere security claim. [##]Insincere security claim, sincere humanitarian claim.

[43] The difference in trust for the sincere humanitarian category and the insincere humanitarian category has a p-value of 0.0040.

The second question gauged the long-term effect of deception on the president's authority by asking respondents if they believed the president had described the new humanitarian crisis accurately. The results in Table 5.14 indicate that previous evidence of deception did not undermine the president's position as an authoritative source of information about the future intervention. Across all treatment conditions, regardless of whether experts disputed the president's previous explanations for action, a strong majority of respondents believed the president had described the situation in Rundu accurately. This overwhelming confidence in the accuracy of the president's account includes the insincere humanitarian condition, despite these respondents' lower levels of support and trust in the president's ability to handle this situation.

Table 5.14 Agree the President Described the Crisis Accurately

	Humanitarian	*Security*	*Combined*	
Sincere	0.81 (0.75, 0.87)	0.79 (0.72, 0.85)	0.82 (0.76, 0.88)	
Insincere	0.77 (0.70, 0.83)	0.81 (0.74, 0.87)	0.77[#] (0.70, 0.84)	0.84[##] (0.79, 0.90)
Illegitimate	0.79 (0.73, 0.86)	0.79 (0.73, 0.86)	0.81 (0.75, 0.87)	
N	456	451	606	

Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals reported in parentheses to facilitate comparison across rows and down columns. [#]Insincere humanitarian claim, sincere security claim. [##]Insincere security claim, sincere humanitarian claim.

Combined, the findings indicate that deception carries few long-term consequences for either future interventions or the credibility of the president. On the one hand, these results assuage the most extreme concerns about the misuse of humanitarian claims—the majority of individuals remained willing to support a humanitarian intervention to end mass atrocities even after the president used humanitarian justifications as a cover for security-driven or illegitimate interventions. On the other hand, the absence of any long-term consequences for the president's

reputation suggests that the political backlash against deception may be short-lived. These results also underscore the previous findings that suggest leaders maintain authority over matters of foreign policy, even when their claims are disputed, and can use this authority to mitigate the political costs of deception.

Conclusions and Implications

Humanitarian justifications are critical to mobilizing domestic support for military interventions, but do not given the president free rein to pursue military action. Instead, the experimental findings presented in this chapter demonstrate that for humanitarian claims to effectively bolster public support, the president must use them sincerely or in combination with undisputed security justifications. Presidents who rely on justifications that experts perceive as deceptive face immediate political backlash in terms of support for the intervention, their prospects for reelection, and confidence in their foreign policy. The negative consequences of deception are not limited to humanitarian justifications—leaders face comparable political costs for the use of deceptive security claims—but different segments of the public impose these costs for different justifications. Individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs punish leaders for the misuse of humanitarian justifications, while individuals with militant internationalist beliefs hold leaders accountable for deceptive security justifications.

Combined, the ineffectiveness of deceptive claims and success of half-truths helps explain the pattern of president's humanitarian justifications outlined in Chapter 3. Leaders use humanitarian claims widely to bring cooperative internationalists into the domestic coalition, but will face political backlash if they use humanitarian claims as the primary rationale for action in security interventions. To avoid this backlash, leaders have a strong incentive to limit their emphasis of humanitarian claims in security-driven cases.

Taken as a whole, the experimental results presented here and in Chapter 4 demonstrate that individuals with cooperative internationalist values respond to humanitarian justifications as the domestic coalition argument expects. However, they cannot determine why presidents include humanitarian justifications in their communication strategies. Instead of an intentional strategy to target cooperative internationalists and build a stable domestic coalition, the support of cooperative internationalist could be a positive side effect of a communication plan designed for international or elite audiences. The following chapters employ case studies to disentangle the motivations behind presidents' justifications and determine whether the White House develops communication strategies with the domestic coalition in mind.

CHAPTER SIX

HUMANITARIAN JUSTIFICATIONS, SECURITY GOALS: THE GULF WAR, 1990-1991

The preceding chapters establish that both the president's pattern of justifications in the post-Cold War period and how the public responds to these justifications are consistent with the expectations of the domestic coalition argument. The evidence shows that presidents use humanitarian claims widely across both humanitarian and security interventions and that the inclusion of humanitarian appeals helps bring cooperative internationalists into the domestic coalition. However, leaders also limit the emphasis placed on humanitarian claims in security interventions and cooperative internationalists impose political costs on the president when humanitarian justifications appear insincere. Having illustrated the pattern of justifications and the public's response, what remains to be seen is whether presidents know and care about the appeal of humanitarian claims and the sources heterogeneity in the public's foreign policy beliefs. Does presidential rhetoric reflect a strategy aimed at building a domestic coalition among a public with diverse foreign policy preferences or is the pattern of humanitarian claims an unintentional side effect of strategies developed in response to other concerns?

While the intent behind a given strategy cannot be directly observed, this chapter employs a case study of the 1991 Gulf War to investigate the extent to which concern about the domestic coalition drives the development of presidents' communication strategies in security interventions. I examine speech drafts, press guidance, meeting agendas, and internal memos to evaluate the when and why the George H.W. Bush administration included humanitarian claims in its public addresses. Within this case I consider: 1) the pattern of justifications, 2) whether justifications are part of a coherent communication strategy, 3) whether the administration considers the domestic coalition, and 4) how concerns about the domestic audience compare to

concern about the international audience and military objectives. The chapter uses the Gulf War case to investigate these questions because it represents one of the most consequential security interventions of the post-Cold War period.

In the remainder of the chapter I outline the case selection and structured questions that guide the qualitative analysis. The following section presents the expectations of the domestic coalition argument and alternative explanations, before turning to the details of the case. Examining the development of the communication strategy over the course of the Gulf War, shows that the Bush administration was sensitive to the need for public support, developed a coherent strategy aimed at persuading the domestic audience, recognized the diversity of public attitudes, and addressed this diversity to avoid backlash and domestic opposition.

The Domestic Coalition in Context

The domestic coalition argument produces empirical expectations at three levels: 1) the pattern of justifications for action in national addresses, 2) the public's response to the president's justifications, and 3) the process through which the presidential administration develops its justification strategy. The quantitative evidence consistently supports the domestic coalition expectations. Chapter 3 demonstrates that presidents use humanitarian claims widely, but limit their emphasis in security interventions. Chapters 4 and 5 show that this strategy is not misguided. Humanitarian justifications persuade cooperative internationalists, but leaders face backlash from these same individuals if they over-emphasize humanitarian appeals. This chapter examines interactions between the president, his staff, and political elites to demonstrate that the Bush administration was both aware of and responsive to the importance of maintaining a stable coalition of domestic support than includes diverse foreign policy beliefs. It examines the White House's communication strategy in the 1991 Gulf War to demonstrate that the consistent

presence of humanitarian claims in security interventions reflects an intentional strategy of the White House, directed towards key players in the domestic coalition.

The domestic coalition argument has three implications for the process through which presidential administrations develop communication strategies for military interventions. First, it implies that justification strategies are driven primarily by the administration's concern with generating support from the domestic audience rather than the international audience or political elites. Second, the argument suggests that presidents and their staffs recognize that the domestic audience holds diverse views about foreign policy and that uniting across these views is important for building and maintaining support. While presidents are unlikely to refer to individuals as cooperative internationalists, they acknowledge groups that hold the same underlying values—a preference for cooperative approaches to conflict and concern with non-military objectives—will be skeptical of the use of force and develop communication strategies that appeal to the broadest possible audience. Third, in addition to recognizing diverse foreign policy attitudes, the domestic coalition explanation also expects concern about backlash to constrain presidents' emphasis of humanitarian claims in security interventions. In the development of communication strategies, the available justifications are limited by the risk the same groups that are skeptical of military action will impose political costs if leaders stretch humanitarian claims too far.

Alternative Explanations

If the domestic coalition argument is correct, documents from the Gulf War are expected to reveal that the White House considered the domestic audience in the development of it justification strategy and aimed to unite across different foreign policy beliefs while avoiding backlash against the misuse of humanitarian claims. However, the pattern of humanitarian

justifications illustrated in Chapter 3 could be the side effect of three alternative processes: attention to the international audience, elite debate, and humanitarian objectives. The domestic coalition argument and the first two alternatives are not mutually exclusive—presidents may employ humanitarian claims to meet multiple domestic and international goals simultaneously—however, evidence that the international audience was the primary target of the White House communication strategy would falsify the domestic coalition hypothesis. Additionally, evidence in support of the humanitarian objective alternative would suggest that humanitarian justifications are not part of a strategic communication plan and stand in direct contradiction to the domestic coalition explanation.

First, rather than targeting the domestic audience, humanitarian claims could be intended to appease the international audience. International support is critical for facilitating burden-sharing, maintaining the legitimacy of the operation, and avoiding open-ended commitments of troops and resources (Hurd 1999; Kreps 2007; Milner and Tingley 2013; Thompson 2006). Humanitarian justifications evoke the international norms of humanitarian intervention and reinforce "basic rules of the system about what action is permitted and where the boundaries of sovereign control lie" (Finnemore 2003, 2). Given their link to international standards for military action, presidents could include humanitarian justifications in an attempt to build international support for intervention. If the international audience is the target of humanitarian justifications, the president is expected to primarily emphasize humanitarian claims in response to international dissent.

Second, humanitarian justifications could be included to placate other political elites and ensure elite cues do not undermine support for intervention (Berinsky 2007, 2009; Brody 1991; Western 2005). As Saunders suggests, "the importance of elite cues yields strategic incentives

for leaders to bargain with and accommodate key elites, who can impose costs on leaders that may influence how democracies use force in ways unanticipated by voter-driven accounts" (Saunders 2015, 467). In this case, presidents are expected to emphasize humanitarian claims primarily in response to dissent from opinion leaders or to appease skeptical actors within the administration. In practice, justification strategies are not mono-causal, and within any given intervention humanitarian claims can be used to appeal to all three of these audiences. However, the case study demonstrates that concern about the domestic coalition is the primary mechanism behind the administration's use of humanitarian claims.

By contrast, the final alternative stands in direct opposition to the domestic coalition argument. Rather than providing evidence of a strategic appeal to key audiences, this alternative suggests that the prevalence of humanitarian claims reflects the prevalence of humanitarian objectives in contemporary interventions. The confluence of the unfreezing of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) following the end of the Cold War, expanding definition of humanity following decolonization, and evolving human rights norms placed increased attention on the treatment of civilians during war (Crawford 2002; Evangelista 2014, 3; Finnemore 1996a). These changes both enabled humanitarian interventions and increased the salience of humanitarian objectives focused on saving strangers (Wheeler 2000). From this perspective, humanitarian justifications are evidence of changes in the nature of security interventions rather than a strategic effort to bolster support for military action. If humanitarian justifications reflect humanitarian objectives, the prominence of these justifications in public addresses should mirror their prominence in internal discussions of military strategy.

Table 6.1 summarizes the expectations and observable implications for the domestic coalition argument and each of the three alternative explanations.

Table 6.1 Explanations and Observable Implications

Explanation	Observable Implications
Domestic Coalition	• Discussions of speeches focus on domestic audience and consider how justifications resonate with different groups. • Speeches targeted at subgroups with cooperative internationalist values rather than the national audience place particular emphasis on humanitarian arguments. • Humanitarian justifications are present throughout the intervention. • Officials voice concern about backlash against the overuse of humanitarian claims.
International Audience	• Humanitarian claims appear primarily in response to international dissent.
Elite Debate	• Humanitarian claims appear primarily in response to dissent from opinion leaders or following internal debates about the prudence of intervention.
Humanitarian Objectives	• The emphasis of humanitarian claims in external speeches mirrors the prominence of humanitarian objectives in internal discussions.

Case Selection and Methodology

To evaluate the validity of alternative explanations for the pattern of humanitarian justifications, this chapter conducts a case study of the Gulf War. The analysis begins with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and ending following the withdraw of Iraqi troops and the end of coalition attacks on February 28, 1991. It includes both Operation Desert Shield, which deployed defensive forces to Saudi Arabia, and Operation Desert Storm, which engaged in combat operations against the Iraqi Army.

Structured Questions

To structure the analysis, I rely on set questions to evaluate the theoretical expectations outlined in Table 6.1 (George and Bennett 2005; Saunders 2015, 47). Specifically, the case study is structured around six sets of questions: 1) What is the pattern of justifications? 2) Are justifications part of a coherent communication strategy? 3) Is the administration concerned with public opinion? Does it recognize diversity in the public's foreign policy beliefs? 4) Is the

administration concerned with domestic opposition? From what sources? 5) How does concern with the domestic audience compare to concern with other audiences? and 6) To what extent does the prevalence of humanitarian justifications reflect humanitarian objectives?

Answers to these questions are based on archival materials collected from the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library.[44] My data collection efforts focused on files from: 1) the communications staff, including drafts of national addresses, press guidance, and internal memos and meeting agendas, 2) domestic political advisors, including memos and meetings involving the Chief of Staff, election campaign staff, reports from and communications with polling firms, and communications with Congress, and 3) diplomatic and military advisors, including memos and meetings with the State Department, National Security Council, and Joint Chiefs. Documents from communications staff and domestic advisors examine whether humanitarian claims are part of an intentional strategy designed to maintain a domestic coalition of support. Following Druckman and Jacobs (2011, 2015), internal polling data sheds light on the groups the White House considers strategically important. Documents from diplomatic and military advisors are used to evaluate the international audience and humanitarian objectives alternatives. Comparing communication between the different actors allows me to consider whether justifications are a product of internal elite debates.

Foreign Policy Beliefs in Context

As outlined in Chapter 2, I expect the White House to acknowledge and adapt its message to appeal across sources of heterogeneity in the public's foreign policy beliefs. However, I do not expect leaders and communications staff to discuss these divisions in the same cooperative and

[44] This research and the archival materials presented in Chapter 7 were supported by a National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant, No. 155974.

militant internationalist language used by political scientists. The unlikely presence of this standardized language within the White House presents a challenge for the case studies in terms of identifying when attention to specific constituencies reflects a concern with cooperative or militant internationalists. To overcome this challenge, I use two strategies to classify groups within the cases as cooperative or militant internationalists. First, I consider the issues the group raised in its expressions of support or opposition and map these issues onto the value dimensions associated with cooperative and militant internationalism. Groups that emphasize a preference for diplomatic strategies, the importance of using force only as a last resort, concern that the intervention meet just war standards, or hesitancy about the human costs of war are classified as holding positions consistent with cooperative internationalist values. Alternatively, groups that commend or lobby for overwhelming demonstrations of military force, criticize the White House for waiting to take military action, or view diplomacy as a weak, ineffective tool of foreign policy are consistent with militant internationalist values. Isolationists may take the form of either pacifists who cannot be convinced to support military action as a matter of principle or libertarians (Holsti and Rosenau 1996) who believe U.S. efforts to solve international problems only make the situation worse.

Second, studies of foreign policy beliefs and sample demographics from the surveys conducted in Chapters 4 and 5 shed light on the factors correlated with cooperative internationalism that are most likely to serve as proxies for this group in White House conversations. In their analysis of the structure of public foreign policy attitudes, Mandelbaum and Schneider's (1979, 43) equivalent of cooperative internationalists are shown to be relatively young and well educated and less likely to be southerners. Demographic information collected as part of the survey experiments reported in Chapters 4 and 5 show that women, liberals, and

college educated individuals were disproportionately associated with cooperative internationalist values. Based on these demographic trends, administrations that collect information about and tailor their communication strategy to appeal to students or young professionals, women, or liberals can be thought of as targeting the segments of the population most likely to hold cooperative internationalist values. The president's concern with cooperative internationalists is thus likely to appear in archival materials as concern with persuading these demographic or interest groups.

Conflict Overview

The buildup to the Gulf War began on August 2, 1990 when Iraqi forces invaded and occupied Kuwait. In remarks to reporters that afternoon, President George H.W. Bush condemned the military invasion and called for "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces" (G. H. W. Bush 1990a). At the same time, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 660, the first of twelve resolutions, to condemn the invasion and demand that Iraqi forces withdraw (UNSC 1990a). In response to Iraqi aggression, the U.S. deployed defensive forces to Saudi Arabia to begin Operation Desert Shield on August 7, while the UN authorized the enforcement of sanctions and the use of "all means necessary" to remove Iraq from Kuwait if the government did not comply by January 15, 1991 (UNSC 1990b, 1990c). Amidst calls to give sanctions more time to work and pursue further diplomatic options, Bush gained the support of Congress and the U.S. launched Operation Desert Storm with airstrikes on Iraqi targets on January 19 and a ground invasion that began on February 24 (Clymer 1991). By February 27, Bush declared the liberation of Kuwait and on February 28 Iraq formally accepted all UN resolutions, marking the end of major U.S. combat operations.

Justifications for Action and Rhetorical Themes

The Predominance of Security Justifications

By all accounts, the Bush administration had an "overabundance of acceptable rationales for using force" in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm (Teeter 1990a). In line with this assessment, an Office of Speechwriting memo on Bush's address to the VFW Convention in August 1990 described the:

> spectrum of justifications for our current military operation in the Middle East that ranges in persuasiveness from the most persuasive reason: that we are upholding world peace and the rule of law by standing up to naked aggression; to the less persuasive (though legitimate) argument that we are protecting America's vital interest in preserving the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf region to the rest of the world (J. Pinkerton 1990).

From the early stages of the conflict, security justifications provided the predominant rationale for military action and served as the core theme of the White House's communications strategy ("Guidance, Gulf Policy Themes" 1990). In his first address to the nation following the deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia, Bush continued the administration's effort to frame U.S. involvement as vital to U.S. national security interests. The address explained that Bush "took this action to assist the Saudi Arabian Government in the defense of its homeland," which was vital to U.S. interests because "There is no justification whatsoever for this [Iraq's] outrageous and brutal act of aggression. A puppet regime imposed from the outside is unacceptable. The acquisition of territory by force is unacceptable. No one, friend or foe, should doubt our desire for peace; and no one should underestimate our determination to confront aggression" (G. H. W. Bush 1990b). Similar security justifications focused on defending U.S. interests in the region and rebuking Iraqi aggression provided the primary rationale for action throughout the conflict and were in line with the military objectives "to force Iraqi troops to leave Kuwait, to restore the legitimate government of Kuwait to its rightful place, and ensure

Iraqi compliance with all relevant UNSC resolutions" (Gear, n.d.). Discussions of national security also emphasized the strategic importance of Iraq and its threat to U.S. economic interests. For example, Bush explained, "An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors—neighbors who control the lion's share of the world's remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless" (G. H. W. Bush 1990e).

The Use of Humanitarian Claims

However, in addition to these security claims Bush's national addresses and White House communications guidance also couched the intervention in moral terms and used humanitarian appeals to draw attention to the suffering of innocent citizens in Kuwait and Iraq. For example, in the same VFW address where Bush outlined his security rationale, the President began by asking the public for "support in a decision I've made to stand up for what's right and condemn what's wrong" and referenced "the Iraqi government's history of aggression against its own citizens" (G. H. W. Bush 1990b). As Figure 6.1 shows, humanitarian claims remained secondary in emphasis when compared to security justifications; however, humanitarian explanations appeared in national addresses throughout the conflict.

Figure 6.1 Relative Emphasis of Humanitarian and Security Justifications



The most common humanitarian appeals centered around three alternative themes. First, they referenced Iraq's treatment of Kuwait and the plight of the Kuwaiti people, asserting "The talks of rape and assassination, of cold-blooded murder and rampant looting are almost beyond belief. The whole civilized world must unite and say: This kind of treatment of people must end. And those who violate the Kuwait people must be brought to justice" (G. H. W. Bush 1990h). Second, Bush highlighted Saddam's "history of aggression against its own citizens" (G. H. W. Bush 1990b) and noted that "We've seen him use chemical weapons on his own people" (G. H. W. Bush 1990h). Third, the national addresses drew attention to Saddam's treatment of U.S. and other foreign hostages, expressing concern about "innocent people held against their will in direct contravention of international law. Then there's this cynical and brutal policy of forcing people to beg for their release, parceling out human lives to families and traveling emissaries like so much chattel" (G. H. W. Bush 1990h). These themes contrasted Saddam's human rights violations and use of human shields with assertions that the U.S. was doing everything it could to

minimize civilian casualties and allowed Bush to claim, "We have no argument with the people of Iraq. Indeed, for the innocents caught in this conflict, I pray for their safety" (G. H. W. Bush 1991d).

Multilateralism and the New World Order

In addition to overarching security and humanitarian explanations, the multilateral nature of military action and the importance of protecting the nascent new world order dominated Bush's national addresses. First, statements of multilateralism emphasized both the support of the international community—especially other Arab states—and burden-sharing in terms of financial costs and military risks. For example, in his first public remarks on the conflict, Bush noted that "It is important that the international community act together to ensure that Iraqi forces depart Kuwait immediately" (G. H. W. Bush 1990a). As the international coalition came together, Bush lauded the support of other nations, explaining, "As the deployment of the forces of the many nations show and as the votes in the United Nations show, this is not a matter between Iraq and the United States of America; it is between Iraq and the entire world community, Arab and non-Arab alike. All the nations of the world lined up to oppose aggression" (G. H. W. Bush 1990d). This multilateral support demonstrated the legitimacy of military action and allowed Bush to announce that "We're more than willing to bear out [sic] fair share of the burden…But we also expect others to bear their fair share" and assert that "The United States will also seek burden-sharing for part of our own effort" (G. H. W. Bush 1990d).

Second, protecting the hard-won new world order in the aftermath of the Cold War provided a bridge between Bush's domestic theme of creating a "kinder, gentler nation" (Porter 1990a) and the administration's long-standing post-Cold War "vision thing" for U.S. foreign policy (Fitzwater 1989). To this end, Bush (1990d) explained that:

> The consequences of our not doing so [helping Kuwait] would be incalculable because Iraq's aggression is not just a challenge to the security of Kuwait and other Gulf nations but to the better world that we all have hoped to build in the wake of the Cold War. And therefore, we and our allies cannot and will not shirk our responsibilities. The state of Kuwait must be restored, or no nation will be safe and the promising future we anticipate will indeed be jeopardized.

This new world order marked a dramatic shift from the Cold War era and was characterized by international cooperation, as well as respect for the rule of law and human rights. In the President's words, "Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak" (G. H. W. Bush 1990e). The UN also played a central role in this new world and the Gulf War provided the first opportunity to show that "We're now in sight of a United Nations that performs as envisioned by its founders" (G. H. W. Bush 1990e).

Combined, Iraq's international aggression, brutal treatment of innocent civilians, the unity of the international coalition, and the threat to the new world order were the dominant and recurring themes in Bush's national addresses during the Gulf War. The repeated use of humanitarian justifications in a conflict with no shortage of legitimate security explanations is in line with the domestic coalition argument. However, whether these justifications are part of a coherent communication strategy, the extent to which different justifications target different audiences, and the confluence of justification and military strategy remain open questions. The remainder of the case study addresses each of these questions in turn.

Communication Strategies and the Importance of Public Opinion

A foundational assumption of domestic coalition argument is that justifications for military action are part of a coordinated and coherent communication strategy designed primarily

to influence domestic public opinion. This assumption stands in contrast to scholars who assert that the public inherently trusts the president on matters of foreign policy and expect the public to accept any justification as legitimate (Mearsheimer 2011). This section tests the assumption of a domestic focus and coherent strategy against the alternative by examining the Bush administration's public statements and internal discussions during the Gulf War. Documents reveal that developing a coherent communications strategy was a primary focus of the White House in the buildup to military action and this strategy was both primarily concerned about and responsive to domestic public opinion.

A Coherent, Consistent Communication Plan

First, official statements and addresses about the Gulf War show remarkable consistency over time and across sources. The coordination of language and themes is particularly clear in statements of military objectives. While National Security Council communications reveal that the administration considered multiple paths forward (National Security Council 1990b), the same objectives were presented in the same language and order across time and spokesperson. For example, "the unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait," "restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government," and "security and stability for the region" appear in the President's September 11, 1990 Address to Joint Session of Congress, Secretary of State James Baker's statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 5, 1990, Bush's Christmas Eve message to the troops on December 24, 1990, and press guidance for "January Themes and Messages" in 1991 ("Draft 1, Presidential Remarks: Address to Joint Session of Congress" 1990; Baker 1990a; "Draft, Christmas Eve Message to the Troops" 1990, "Guidance, Gulf Strategy January Themes and Messages" 1991).

This consistency reflects the administration's recognition that to be effective and avoid complications, domestic communication themes needed to be highly coordinated and widely dispersed. In the early stages of the conflict, a National Security Council memorandum recognized that in preparation for military options, "our first task is to match our rhetoric—both public and private—with the military reality" and that lines on military and diplomatic options "should be used consistently by spokesmen across the government" (National Security Council 1990a). The need for a consistent message across agencies is also noted in the Office of the Public Liaison's early notes on talking points and public diplomacy (Schaefer 1990) and a memorandum to cabinet and agency contacts warned that, "Although we are not trying to mint hundreds of foreign policy spokespersons, it is important that those who do speak on behalf of the Administration are apprised of recent developments and are able, for example, to articulate clearly the four objectives the international community is pursuing in the Gulf" (Jackson 1990).

To develop and manage a consistent message, the White House crafted a communications plan that focused primarily on shoring up support from the domestic audience. In the initial outline of its communication plan, the Office of Public Affairs emphasized the domestic audience in its claims that the primary objectives was to "strengthen public support for Operation Desert Shield. Ultimately, our goal is broad, grass-roots support for the President's initiative" (White House Office of Public Affairs 1990). To standardize this message and maximize domestic support, the White House disseminated general and monthly themes that aligned with the president's speech schedule and press plan (Fitzwater 1991d; "Guidance, Gulf Policy Themes" 1990, "Guidance, Gulf Strategy January Themes and Messages" 1991).

Concern with Public Opinion

Second, as the objectives of the communications plan indicate, the goal of official rhetoric reflected the administration's primary focus on building and managing domestic attitudes towards military action. The administration's concern with public opinion is evident in the extensive collection and review of both external and internal polling. These polls gauged public support over the course of the conflict, anticipated factors that would reduce public approval, and tested the relative salience of alternative justifications for military action, disaggregating responses by a variety of demographic and regional variables ("Collection of Documents, Polls/Persian Gulf" 1991; Fabrizio 1990; "Folder, Poll Data - [Gulf War]" 1991; Teeter 1990b, 1991). Reports on public opinion trends garnered a response not only from the communications and public affairs staff, but from the President himself, who sent a personal, handwritten note to Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, requesting that he check a Time Magazine story that reported a "Most Precipitous Drop in polls??" (G. H. W. Bush 1991a).[45] Similarly, following the release of a Wall Street Journal poll, the press asked Fitzwater, "Does the President take public opinion into account at all as he factors in his major decisions on going to war, not going to war?" Fitzwater assured reporters that the President was primarily guided by what was best for the country, but reiterated that "the President is interested in public opinion. And he certainly was interested in that same distinguished network's finding that some 53 percent would support military action if that's the choice he has to make" (Fitzwater 1990b).

Presidential Speeches as a Tool for Shaping Public Opinion

Finally, not only did the White House track public opinion during the Gulf War, it attempted to shape it through speeches and statements that directly targeted the domestic

[45] Style and punctuation from original text.

audience. From the early stages of the conflict, the White House Communications Office coordinated the communication activities of the President and key senior administration officials to strengthen public support for Operation Desert Shield and eventually Operation Desert Storm. This plan's explicit objective was to "reassure the American people as to the objectives and purpose of our deployment" (Demarest 1990a) and communicate the president's message to the U.S. audience along two dimensions. First, "Thematically, we need to tell people why we are there and what we mean to achieve. Specific information on details of our involvement, purpose, international and UN support, etc., should be updated regularly and as events dictate." Second, "As time passes, critics may become more vocal. The message that the President has gone to historic lengths to avoid war (economic embargo and ten UN resolutions) and garnered unprecedented international support should be a fundamental component of all outreach activity" (Demarest 1990b). These discussions indicate that the communications team was both primarily concerned with persuading the domestic audience and considered strategies for responding to and mitigating opposition in addition to building support.

The administration's concern with disseminating its message to the U.S. public is also reflected in the stated objectives of individual speeches. Speech drafts both reiterate the importance of maintaining public support and identify specific domestic constituencies to be targeted. These constituencies include both cooperative and militant internationalists. For example, drafts of the President's address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention outline remarks intended "To comment on and solidify support from the VFW and the American public for the current deployment of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia" (Metzger 1990a). Similarly, the foreign policy section of Bush's 1991 State of the Union address was identified as an opportunity to "convey a tone of prudent decisiveness" and distinguish the Gulf War from the Vietnam

experience, which "is still a vivid memory in the minds of most adult Americans. They remember the loss of life, the unsatisfactory resolution, and the lack of decisiveness in concluding the conflict" (Porter 1990b). Speeches by the President were thus considered an important component of the broader communication plan.

In addition to providing an effective tool for managing public opinion, there is also evidence that White House officials recognized official rhetoric carried political costs and had the potential to tie their hands in the future. For example, in a draft of presidential remarks to religious broadcasters, White House Counsel struck down the claim that U.S. forces would remain in the Gulf "not one day more than necessary" because "We cannot foresee the situation that will confront us upon the conclusion of the current conflict, and it is possible that an extended U.S. military presence will be required. Rhetoric such as this will only complicate the hard decisions that may have to be made at that point" (Rademaker 1991). The content of the president's speeches was thus considered both an important tool of persuasion and a potentially costly strategic choice.

Finally, the focus on managing public perceptions of the conflict was not limited to communications staff, but included senior officials and the President himself. In a letter explaining his assessment of the conflict to Former President Richard Nixon, Bush (n.d.) wrote:

> In any event, the combination of remarkably candid consultations and explanations [of military strategy] we have offered seems to have had a calming effect [on the public]. That said, we are under no illusions on this score; managing the congressional and domestic account will, as ever, prove one of our major challenges. I hope that the statement at my press conference of November 30, the Administration's testimony last week at Congressional hearings, and our stepped up public diplomacy efforts will shore up public support.

In sum, the Bush administration's communication plan for the Gulf War provides evidence that the White House developed speeches and communication plans that primarily

targeted the domestic audience. This evidence is consistent with the domestic coalition argument's expectation that speeches and justifications are developed strategically with a focus on creating a domestic coalition. However, what remains to be seen is whether these communication strategies target the aggregate public or reflect White House efforts to build a unifying coalition across recognized domestic divisions.

Acknowledging and Building the Domestic Coalition

In addition to its contention that leaders are concerned about public opinion, the domestic coalition argument also has three expectations for how presidents view and engage with the domestic audience. First, it expects the White House to consider heterogeneity in its attention to public opinion. Second, it asserts that leaders work to build domestic coalitions as a means of avoiding politically costly opposition and target key constituencies accordingly. Third, the communications plan is expected to use humanitarian justifications to appeal to a diverse audience, but should also caution against overstating the importance of these claims. Evidence from the Bush administration's communication plan for the Gulf War supports each of these three expectations, which this section outlines in turn.

Heterogeneity in the Domestic Audience

While the Bush administration did not explicitly discuss cooperative and militant internationalists, they did consistently disaggregate public opinion data and examine substantive shifts in the composition of public approval. Official polls—both on the president's general popularity and public perceptions of the Gulf conflict—consistently broke down public opinion by not only party identification, but also gender, region, age, race, and a hawk/dove scale (ABC News/Washingon Post 1991; CBS News Poll 1990; PA/Opinion Analysis 1991, 1990, Steeper 1990a, 1990b). As part of its larger political communications strategy, officials recognized that

"the time available for the President to cultivate, thank, listen to, highlight, garner support from, and reach out to outside groups will be in short supply" and identified key groups that "would be given the highest priority for time with POTUS" (Demarest 1990d). These groups included both the President's base and target constituencies and were further divided into political, ethnic/demographic, geographic, and issue-oriented categories. Table 6.2 summaries the groups identified in this memorandum, which was seen by Chief of Staff John Sununu who noted the proposal "seems reasonable" (Demarest 1990d).

Table 6.2 Presidential Participation with Outside Groups (Demarest 1990d)

	Base Groups	Target Groups
Political	• Republicans • Conservatives • Republican Office Holders • Bush Supporters	• Conservative Democrats
Ethnic/ Demographic	• Asians • European 1st-4th Generation • Northern Catholics • Younger Voters	• Blacks • Hispanics • Seniors
Geographic	• California, Texas, Southern States • Rocky Mountain States • New England (sans R.I.)	• Industrial Midwest
Issue-Oriented	• Law Enforcement/Drugs/Crime Groups • Veterans, National Defense Groups • Teamsters, Conservative Union Members • Social Value Groups, i.e. MADD, Right-to-Life, etc. • Small Business, Entrepreneurs • Corporate and Trade Association CEO's • Conservationists • Evangelicals • Anti-Tax Organizations	• Parents/Students/Teachers/ Education Reformers • Service Organizations/Points of Light Groups/Celebrities • Disability Community • Farm Organizations • Sports/Fitness/Health Groups

Because this framework was developed in the context of election campaigns rather than support for the Gulf War, the administration's base groups include constituencies generally

unassociated with foreign policy beliefs. However, both the target and base columns include demographics known to correlate with militant or cooperative internationalist values. Law enforcement, veterans, national defense groups, and conservatives likely include significant numbers of militant internationalists. Additionally, to the extent that the administration was concerned with appealing to young voters, non-southerners, and education reformers its message needed to resonate with cooperative internationalist values.

In addition to being concerned about general presidential approval, the administration was also attentive to the potential for politically costly opposition to the Gulf War. Communications staff tracked antiwar protests and demonstrations of support, identified potential opposition groups, and collected and responded to statements of opposition (American Arab Scientific Society 1991; Battaglia, n.d.; Browning 1991). White House staff also perceived and sought to counteract growing isolationist sentiment among conservatives—which both the domestic coalition argument and official documents predict would weaken the base of support for military action. As more individuals drift into the isolationist category, the potential magnitude of support for intervention shrinks. Efforts to persuade and counteract what opinion leader Paul Weyrich referred to as "those in the conservative camp who argue that we have no vital interests overseas and should retreat into isolationism" appear in notes from initial meetings that developed the themes of military action, as well as in speech drafts that caution against including quotes from isolationist thinkers (Metzger 1990b; J. P. Pinkerton 1990; Weyrich 1990). Notably, these efforts focused on preventing individuals from becoming isolationists rather than convincing self-proclaimed isolationists to support military action—an effort the domestic coalition argument expects to be futile. Taken as a whole, this evidence indicates the Bush administration recognized that not all public support was created equal. Acknowledging

diversity in the domestic audiences, the White House used its communication plan to avoid opposition and target the constituencies that were most important for its continued political success.

Key Constituencies in the Gulf War

Combining their acknowledgement of a diverse domestic audience and concern with the potential for politically costly opposition, White House communications staff focused significant attention on three groups: religious leaders, college students, and veterans.[46] Religious leaders and communities were targeted as critical constituencies because they were part of Bush's base and were divided in their support for military action. On the one hand, religious groups with pacifist traditions were unlikely to be convinced to support military action—at best humanitarian claims could limit vocal dissent from these constituencies. For example, a statement by the American Friends Service Committee outlined their belief that "war could have been averted, and we believe now that it must be stopped now, before more blood is shed. It must be ended before the imperatives of warfare become fully entrenched" (American Friends Service Committee 1991).

Individuals associated with such pacifist and religious organizations could not be convinced to support military action and were not an efficient target audience for White House communications. However, leaders from other groups such as Roman Catholic Archbishop Roger Mahony "offered qualified support to U.S. action in the Gulf but urged the U.S. to consider the moral ramifications" ("White House News Summary" 1990). In a memorandum to

[46] This list is not exclusive. The official communication plans also referenced business leaders, Arab Americans, and minority groups, but these constituencies appear less frequently in the discussions surrounding presidential speeches. Examples focus on these three groups because: 1) each was the sole and explicitly identified target of at least one official communication, and 2) the development of this communication was well documented. Additionally, the three groups cover the range of potential target audiences—college students were assumed to be a hard sell, religious leaders were split in their opinion of the war, and veterans groups were targeted as a base of support.

speechwriters and researchers the Office of Public Liaison noted the distinction between religious groups, explaining, "We can write off any support from left-of-center religious institutions such as Pax Christi USA and the National Council of Churches, but we really do need an ongoing and friendly dialogue with conservative and main stream churches" (Fitch 1990). The former hold a position equivalent to isolationists—they were unwilling to endorse military action under any circumstances—while the latter espouse values associated with cooperative internationalism, namely a preference for cooperative foreign policies and concern with the effect of the conflict on foreign civilians. For example, in his letter to the President following a personal meeting, the Bishop of the Episcopal Church expressed his willingness to consider support for intervention, saying, "Morally, we must respond to such an outrage, both as a member nation of the community of nations and as individuals who seek to respect and uphold the human rights of others" (Browning 1991). However, he followed this statement of action with hesitancy to support the use of military force, "War for me can never be a moral option unless all attempts at a solution short of war are exhausted" and caution against overusing humanitarian appeals "While I share your outrage over the atrocities reported from Kuwait, such atrocities should not be used as the necessary or sufficient basis for our actions against Iraq when we have not acted in a similar fashion towards other nations commiting [sic] abuses of human rights" (Browning 1991). These statements reflect the cooperative internationalist concern with the wellbeing of foreign civilians, skepticism of the utility of military action as all but a last resort, and sensitivity to the overuse of humanitarian appeals.

In line with the domestic coalition expectation that presidents use humanitarian claims to persuade individuals with cooperative internationalist values, the White House relied on humanitarian justifications in it communications with religious groups. The same memo from the

Office of Public Liaison that distinguished between religious groups noted that to persuade the individuals that could be moved "religious leaders feel the President's language justifying our deployment needs to remain consistent, and needs to relate to moral objectives and goals" (Fitch 1990). In addition to sending personal responses to letters and inviting groups to the White House, Bush targeted the religious community's concerns in an address to religious broadcasters that intended to highlight the morality of U.S. action and outline "principles which illustrate why it is indeed a 'just war'(Demarest 1990c; Fitch 1991; Smith 1991).

Additionally, the administration focused on college students—whose youth and level of education make them more likely to hold cooperative internationalist beliefs—because campuses were viewed as likely sites for antiwar mobilization. These concerns were based on comparisons with the anti-Vietnam movement and efforts by opposition leaders to spark student dissent. While noting that, unlike the anti-war protests of the 1960s, "today's larger anti-war demonstrations (such as one held October 20, 1990 in New York with 20,000 people) have been off the campuses," the Office of Public Liaison warned that "dissent among student bodies across the nation is growing and beginning to question the U.S.'s role in the Gulf" (Battaglia, n.d.). To persuade students to support the Gulf War, the administration briefed interns to carry the White House message back to their campuses and issued an open letter to college students to "reach the students of our nation and directly communicate to them the President's views of the situation in the Gulf" ("Guidance, Presidential Letter to the College Students" 1991; Metzger 1990c). As in the case of the religious community, the White House perceived students to be skeptical of military action and concerned with humanitarian objectives such as the suffering of civilians—a perspective reflective of cooperative internationalist values.

Finally, in addition to minimizing domestic opposition, the administration also appealed to veterans' groups—more likely to include significant numbers of militant internationalists—to activate existing domestic support. These efforts included collecting quotes and letters from current soldiers, seeking the endorsement of veterans' organizations, and an address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention. Rather than convincing veterans that military action was necessary, communication was intended to "thank these leaders for their continuing support" and "solidify support" (Metzger 1990a, 1991). In this case, the target constituency group was perceived to have values consistent with militant internationalism—including a belief in the efficacy of military force and preference for security objectives—and, as expected, the White House identified speeches to veterans as an opportunity to solidify the base of support for military action.

The Utility of Humanitarian Claims

Not only did the Bush administration identify key constituencies among the domestic audience, it also used humanitarian claims to persuade these groups. To maintain support from conservative and mainstream churches, staff reported that "religious leaders feel the President's language justifying our deployment needs to remain consistent, and needs to related to moral objectives and goals" (Fitch 1990). To this end, the President's address to religious broadcasters was developed to "illustrate why it [Operation Desert Storm] is indeed a 'just war'" and drew on examples of harm done to Kuwaiti citizens to make this point:

> Every war—every war—is fought for a reason. But a just war is fought for the right reasons, for moral not selfish reasons. Let me take a moment to tell you a story, a tragic story, about a family whose two sons, 18 and 19, reportedly refused to lower the Kuwaiti flag in front of their home. For this crime, they were executed by the Iraqis. Then, unbelievably, their parents were asked to pay the price of the bullets used to kill them. Some ask whether it's moral to use force to stop the rape, the pillage, the plunder of Kuwait. And my answer: Extraordinary diplomatic efforts

> having been exhausted to resolve the matter peacefully, then the use of force is moral (G. H. W. Bush 1991e).[47]

Humanitarian claims also played a central role in the administration's response to other moral opinion leaders. For example, in a letter to Coretta Scott King, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Jack Kemp wrote that he was "deeply troubled by your public comments on President Bush's agonizing decision to implement the United Nations resolutions authorizing the liberation of Kuwait" and implored Mrs. King to recognize that, "The Kuwaiti people has been visited with untold suffering. Yet it is far too weak to come to its own defense. Is the world condemned to stand idly by?" (Kemp 1991). Humanitarian appeals that focused on harm done to the Kuwaiti people thus played an important role in the administration's efforts to persuade the religious community that war was moral and just.

This humanitarian language was also not limited to religious and moral opinion leaders. Instead, the administration also drew on humanitarian claims in its appeals to college students, among whom cooperative internationalist values are likely to be prominent. For example, the President's open letter to college students, distributed to college newspapers around the country, opened with a graphic and detailed description of Saddam Hussein's abuse of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti people:

> The terror Saddam Hussein has imposed upon Kuwait violates every principle of human decency. Listen to what Amnesty International has documented. "Widespread abuses of human rights have been perpetrated by Iraqi forces…arbitrary arrest and detention without trial of thousands…widespread torture…imposition of the death penalty and the extrajudicial execution of hundreds of unarmed civilians, including children. Including children. There's no horror that could make this a more obvious conflict of good vs. evil (G. H. W. Bush 1991c).

[47] Earlier drafts were even more direct: "Some ask whether it is moral to use force to stop the rape, pillage, and plunder of Kuwait. My answer: It should be immoral not to use force" (Smith 1991).

The humanitarian claims Bush used to appeal to the religious community and college students were both more prominent and graphic than the rhetoric used in national addresses. The emphasis placed on humanitarian explanations in these cases indicates that—without explicitly classifying religious groups and college students as cooperative internationalists—the White House recognized that humanitarian justifications could help persuade skeptical audiences focused on the human costs of war.

While useful in foreclosing likely channels of opposition, humanitarian claims were notably absent in the President's primary public communication to veterans' groups—his address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) Annual Conference on August 20, 1990. This change in justifications across audiences indicates that the White House recognizes the utility of humanitarian claims depends on the target audience. Reflecting the interests of the audience, these remarks were primarily designed to emphasize the President's "commitment to a strong national defense" and highlight both "the necessity of standing up to those dictators who attempt to deny freedom to others around the world" and "the importance of a national defense policy that responds to the security demands of a complex and still precarious world" (Smith 1990).

Consistent with addresses to other groups, Bush's speech to the VFW Convention asserted, "I acted knowing that our cause would not be easy but that our cause is right" (G. H. W. Bush 1990c). However, in contrast to his addresses to religious leaders and college students, Bush made the case that action was right with exclusively security justifications, explaining, "while one should not underestimate those who endanger peace, an even greater mistake would be to underestimate America's commitment to our friends when our friends are imperiled or our commitment to international order when that, too, is imperiled" (G. H. W. Bush 1990c). The speech continued to highlight the innocent foreign civilians trapped in Kuwait, but did not

reference Saddam's history of human rights abuses or mistreatment of Iraqi and Kuwait citizens. These appeals are in line with the militant internationalist view that maintaining U.S. national security through military strength is the best way to ensure international peace and stability.

Backlash and Limits to Humanitarian Claims

While humanitarian claims had a broad strategic appeal in the Gulf War, there is also evidence that the Bush administration recognized and was constrained by the risk of overusing humanitarian explanations. Drafts of the president's open letter to college students provide the clearest example of a case in which the administration limited its humanitarian appeals to avoid backlash. Early drafts of the letter emphasized exclusively humanitarian concerns, focusing on Saddam Hussein's long and documented history of abusing his own citizens and targeting of innocent children in Kuwait (Jackson 1991). However, in their review of the drafts, officials warned that the intended audience needed "an appeal to the intellect in addition to the emotional appeal" and cautioned that "The almost exclusive focus on human rights arguments is not an accurate reflection of what lies behind our involvement. The letter does not adequately treat our goals, why we feel a sense of urgency, and why the United States is assuming so much of the responsibility of the international response" (Jackson 1991; Sittmann 1990). Ultimately, the letter was revised to include counterbalancing references to Iraq's international aggression, attempts at nuclear proliferation, and connections to terrorism (G. H. W. Bush 1991c). This revision process suggests that White House officials recognized the risk associated with overstating humanitarian claims and aimed to strike the rhetorical balance that Chapter 3 finds in post-Cold War justifications—the consistent use and limited emphasis of humanitarian claims in security interventions.

In sum, the communications strategy for the Gulf War demonstrates that the Bush administration recognized and tracked sources of heterogeneity in public opinion, used this heterogeneity to identify key constituencies, and developed speeches and official communications to appeal to these groups and minimize the risk of politically costly domestic opposition. Of the target groups, those perceived to be on the fence about military action held values consistent with cooperative internationalism—a preference for diplomatic engagement and a focus on humanitarian objectives. Humanitarian claims were used to persuade these key groups and make the case that military action was moral, just, and could not wait any longer. However, officials also recognized that there were limits to the utility of humanitarian appeals and expressed concern that over emphasizing these claims was counterproductive. Combined, this evidence provides support for each of the domestic coalition argument's theoretical expectations, as outlined in Table 6.1 above.

Appeasing the International Audience

In the Gulf War, humanitarian justifications appear in the Bush administration's appeals to target constituencies and responses to domestic dissent. However, the concern about the international audience presents an alternative explanation for the presence of humanitarian claims. Specifically, the effect of humanitarian claims on the domestic audience could be a positive side effect of strategies designed to build and manage international support. To evaluate primary target of communication strategies and rule out this alternative, the question then becomes: how does the White House's concern with the domestic audience compare to its concern with the international audience? Evidence from the Gulf War reveals that the international audience received significant attention in official communication strategies and was the focus of public diplomacy efforts. However, these efforts did not primarily manifest in the

form of humanitarian claims. Additionally, rather than detracting from the importance of the domestic coalition, the White House aimed to create a symbiotic relationship between domestic and international statements and used international approval to bolster domestic public opinion. Therefore, maintaining a stable multilateral coalition and support from the international audience influenced official statements during the Gulf War, but efforts to gain international approval do not undermine the evidence for the domestic coalition argument.

The Importance of the International Audience

The international audience loomed large in the Gulf War for three reasons. First, it heralded in the new world order by providing the foremost example of cooperation with the Soviet Union and emphasized the success of U.S. diplomatic efforts following the end of the Cold War. Second, the intervention was carried out by a large and united multilateral coalition that provided both international legitimacy and opportunities for burden-sharing. Third, the support of the international community and other Arab states helped counter anti-American sentiment and debunk the claims of Saddam Hussein's disinformation campaign.

Throughout the conflict, the Bush administration sought and highlighted the support of the international community as evidence of a new world order that was free from the tension of the Cold War and governed by U.S. leadership, international cooperation, and commitment to the rule of law. Guidance from a press conference following Iraq's invasion reveals the administration's early desire to emphasize Soviet participation in the trade embargo: "TASS has announced that the Soviets intend to stop supplying Iraq. Richard Haass recommends that we react very positively and urge other countries to follow the Soviet lead" ("Guidance, Additional Notes" 1990). Similarly, drafts of Bush's September 11, 1990 Address to the Joint Session of Congress asked listeners to "Just imagine how different this crisis would be if, as in decades past,

a dictator like Saddam has [sic] been able to count upon the Soviet Union and East-West confrontation to inhibit an international response to his aggression" ("Draft 1, Presidential Remarks: Address to Joint Session of Congress" 1990). Margin comments from this same draft encouraged speechwriters to use this section to "Dramatize signal to Hussein/Give Gorb some credit" ("Draft 1, Presidential Remarks: Address to Joint Session of Congress" 1990). Similarly, comments on speech drafts from advisor Ed Rogers highlighted the broader international theme of which Soviet cooperation was only one example: "In every set of remarks re Persian Gulf we should include ref. to the Rule of law and/or Iraq violations of International law. This is important" (Rogers 1990).[48]

The emphasis on international cooperation and the rule of law was reinforced by the multilateral nature of the military action and involvement of the United Nations. By its end, the intervention was carried out with the support of a coalition of 28 states and was enabled by twelve UN resolutions. U.S. officials worked to build and maintain this coalition, but these efforts primarily involved "a quiet diplomatic effort to develop support for the use of force" rather than official statements (National Security Council 1990a). For example, in conversations with Republican congressional leadership the President urged members that "quick approval of the Desert Shield supplemental [funding] is a must," alongside forgiving Egypt's FMS debt and approving Saudi arms sales, "if we are to keep this coalition intact" (G. H. W. Bush 1990f). The administration's strategy also worked through international organizations and included both efforts to "pursue additional non-forceful resolutions at the United Nations—at a pace of roughly one a week" and a plan to "focus on the Security Council, in stages" by gaining the support of one member at a time (National Security Council 1990a).

[48] Punctuation, capitalization, and emphasis from original.

Exceptions to this quiet diplomacy included a "Video Address to the Community of Nations United Against Iraqi Aggression," which highlighted the importance of the January 15 deadline for Iraq's withdraw (Mcgroarty 1991). Bush also gave an address to the United Nations General Assembly to "reflect on the efficacy of UN action on Iraq" (Roy 1990). As a result of continued diplomatic efforts, the coalition remained stable and there is no evidence that the broader White House communications strategy was primarily driven by the need for coalition maintenance.

Public Opinion in Arab States

An exception to the overall stability of the international coalition was the administration's concern with anti-American sentiment in Arab states. Diplomatic communications from the day after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait found that the leaders of Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia "felt this was an Arab matter, and that they asked for time to resolve the issue themselves" (Fitzwater 1990a). In January 1990, as the diplomatic efforts of Arab states and the international community increasingly appeared unsuccessful, Secretary of State James Baker warned the President that Iraq's foreign minister "wants to make it Iraq vs. U.S" (Fitzwater 1991b). The following day, Bush spoke with UN Secretary General De Cuellar, emphasizing the multilateral nature of the intervention and opportunities to demonstrate that military action was driven by the UN rather than the U.S. alone (Fitzwater 1991c). From this point forward, the assertion that "This is not, as Saddam Hussein would have it, the United States against Iraq. It is Iraq against the world" became a common feature in presidential speeches and official statements (G. H. W. Bush 1990e).

The administration was also careful to separate Saddam Hussein's government from the Iraqi people, claiming that "It is truly Iraq against the world. But I want to make this point clear:

We have no argument with the people of Iraq" (G. H. W. Bush 1990d). In addition to making this point to the U.S. and international community writ large, the administration also made its case directly to the Iraqi people in an address prior to the beginning of the hostilities, which explained, "You have been told that this crisis is a struggle between Iraq and America. In fact, it is Iraq against the world. / Never before has world opinion been so united against an act of aggression" ("Draft Comments, McGroarty/Dooley, Presidential Remarks: Video Address to the Iraqi People" 1990). These addresses reflected a major goal of public diplomacy and communication strategies towards the international audiences: to dispel criticism that the U.S. was an imperial power engaged in a war against the Arab world.

Managing international opinion in Arab states became even more important after the war began and Saddam launched a disinformation campaign. This propaganda accused the United States of targeting religious sites, while Iraq's use of human shields drew attention to civilian casualties (Rugh 1991a). When polls indicated that these accusations were shifting international opinion, the U.S.'s public diplomacy campaign coordinated an effort to contradict disinformation as it arose (Rugh 1991b). The themes for this response avoided praising Saddam's military sagacity, emphasized coalition unity, and were promoted by officials from the Department of Defense and the USIA rather than the White House ("Memorandum, Summary of Iraq Public Diplomacy Meeting" 1991; Rugh 1991b).

As part of this plan, humanitarian justifications were used to juxtapose Saddam's history of brutality in the region with U.S. concern about protecting civilians: "We deeply regret any loss of life, military and civilian, on all sides, and will do everything possible to minimize civilian casualties. For much of his career, Saddam Hussein has brutalized his own people" ("Cable, Gulf Public Diplomacy During Hostilities," n.d.). However, humanitarian concerns

primarily asserted the coalition's attempts to avoid hitting civilians and holy sites and were designed to lay the groundwork for post-war stability (Dyke 1991a, 1991c). Additionally, while U.S. officials noted that a drawn-out war could spark anti-American resentment in allied Arab countries, they ultimately concluded that "whether even a relatively long war will or will not generate sufficient public pressure to overturn the basic policies or political control of friendly Arab governments remains uncertain at this point" (Helman 1991). Given the expeditious end of the Gulf War, these concerns did not come to fruition and the coalition remained stable throughout the combat operation. Together, these factors indicate that humanitarian claims were helpful to, but not primarily an outgrowth of, international public diplomacy campaigns.

International Support and the Domestic Audience

Finally, rather than prioritizing the international audience, the administration also used international support to bolster domestic public opinion.[49] For example, even the communication plan for international public diplomacy aimed to "Look for spinoffs that positively affect American public opinion; do not negatively affect American opinion" (Dyke 1990). In this regard, the multilateral coalition was particularly helpful in addressing domestic concerns about the cost of the war, where internal polling indicated, "The public does believe that the U.S. is carrying more than its fair share of the financial costs of the war. This could be a problem for the Administration in the aftermath of the War" (Steeper 1991). The public's perception that allies were not paying their fair share was particularly troubling because of its effect on the domestic coalition: "People who do not think that the allies are paying enough include some constituencies that are very important to the Bush coalition, such as middle class voters (56%), high income voters (51%), Republicans (50%), and Southern whites (49%)" (Steeper and Sarvello Jamett

[49] This evidence is consistent with the finding that international support and the approval of international organizations increase public support through a variety of mechanisms (Grieco et al. 2011; Thompson 2006).

1991). In addition to emphasizing the magnitude of allies' contributions in official statements, the White House went as far as to deploy foreign leaders like the United Kingdom's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to make the case for military action to key U.S. foreign policy forums (Demarest 1990c). Therefore, while the Bush administration was attentive to international support and implemented a public diplomacy campaign to manage public opinion in Arab states, concern for the international audience neither superseded concern with domestic politics nor solely accounts for the presence of humanitarian justifications.

Settling Elite Debates

The Bush administration's international public diplomacy efforts suggest that as long as the multilateral coalition remained stable—as was the case for the duration of Operation Desert Storm—the White House prioritized domestic politics. However, the elite debate alternative implies that the administration's focus on domestic politics was driven by concern with political elites rather than public opinion and that humanitarian justifications were used to settle internal debates. As before, evidence that communication strategies responded to political elites only undermines the domestic coalition argument if these internal debates appear to be the primary driver of humanitarian claims. To evaluate the elite debate alternative, I investigate discussions between agencies and with Congress, outline the justifications used in these debates, and demonstrate that much of the administration's concern with Congressional approval stemmed from efforts to manage public opinion.

Sources of Elite Dissent

Within the administration and across agencies, early communication efforts reveal broad agreement on the themes that should be used to present Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm to the public. Where disagreements arose, they were more often over whether

humanitarian claims had been overstated than over a desire to place humanitarian objectives front and center. For example, in the second draft of the President's speech at Hickam Airfield on October 28, 1990, official comments reflect a back and forth on whether to mention that Iraq "gassed its own people," with a critic noting "The use of CW [chemical weapons] was years ago. It has nothing to do with this crisis and we were mum about it at the time" (McNally and Simon 1990). Despite these early discussions, the relative consensus on public themes during the conflict stands in stark contrast to debates over whether and how to carry out humanitarian objectives in war's aftermath, which created rifts both within the State Department and between the State Department and the National Security Council (Dyke 1991e). The discussion of humanitarian concerns was thus not without contention within the administration, but the addition of humanitarian justifications would have fueled rather than settled these internal debates.

Instead, the elite dimension of the White House's communication strategy predominantly focused on securing a congressional resolution in support of military action. To build support in the House and Senate, the President spoke at congressional meetings, sent letters to congressional leadership, and had officials testify before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Baker 1990a, 1990b; G. H. W. Bush 1991b; McClure 1991; "Meeting with Bipartisan Congressional Leadership" 1991, "Speech Cards, Republican Congressional Leadership" 1990). Communication with Congress primarily emphasized the U.S. national interest and the need to send a strong signal against Iraqi aggression. In his letter to Congressional leadership, Bush (1991b) explained:

> The current situation in the Persian Gulf brought about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait, threatens vital U.S. interests. The situation also threatens the peace. It would, however, greatly enhance the chances for peace if Congress were now to go on record supporting the position

> adopted by the UN Security Council on twelve separate occasions. Such an action would underline that the United States stands with the international community and on the side of law and decency; it also would help dispel any belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's leaders that the United States lacks the necessary unity to act decisively in response to Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait.

Humanitarian claims appeared in Bush's meetings with Congressional leadership after Operation Desert Storm began—for example, talking points for Republican Congressional Leadership on January 24 stated "I will say though that I am outraged by what Saddam is doing by targeting innocents with scuds and by his exploitation of POWs. He will be held accountable for any and all war crimes committed—but are absent from appeals prior to the passage of House and Senate resolutions ("Talking Points, Points to Be Made for Meeting with Republican Congressional Leadership" 1991). The White House's efforts to appease political elites, both within the administration and in Congress, thus do not exclusively account for the presence of humanitarian claims in official statements over the course of the conflict.

Congress and the Domestic Audience

Additionally, the administration's efforts to gain congressional approval were driven by concern about what support or opposition from Congress would mean for public opinion. White House officials were divided over whether to seek a congressional vote authorizing the President to enforce UN resolutions. Bush recognized that his "opposition to the war powers resolution is well known" (G. H. W. Bush, n.d.) and White House Counsel advised that "there are few legal advantages to a declaration of war," informing the President that he could proceed "without any formal congressional approval at all" (Gray 1990). In particular, opponents of a resolution argued that "It would be a mistake to ask for a Cong. Vote if they won't give overwhelming support" and the President believed there would be "Nothing worse than hung jury or negative vote" (Fitzwater 1991a). From this view, Congress' failure to unite behind military action would

undermine U.S. resolve and send a negative signal to Saddam Hussein. Despite these risks, the White House ultimately pursued a resolution to convince Saddam of their commitment (Fitzwater 1991a). Internal evaluations of the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief outlined the benefits of Congressional approval with reference to public opinion:

> "We believe it is legally sufficient to proceed with no formal congressional authorization at all. However, if U.S. forces will be involved in hostilities or situations where involvement in hostilities is imminent and you wish to avoid a dispute over the War Powers Resolution, or if a congressional endorsement would useful [sic] in gaining public support for your action, you should consider seeking a joint resolution approving your action" (Gray 1990).

In line with this advice, polling confirmed that a majority of the public thought the President should obtain congressional approval before taking military action in Iraq (Morin 1991; Office of Communications 1991). Combined, these discussions indicate that while the White House actively sought congressional approval, elite pressure did not primarily drive either the broader communications strategy or the use of humanitarian justifications. Instead, concern about the public's reaction contributed to the President's decision to pursue a congressional resolution of support.

Humanitarian Objectives

Finally, while appealing to multiple audiences, the emphasis the Bush administration placed on humanitarian claims could simply reflect a military strategy focused on humanitarian objectives. Instead, discussions of strategy and humanitarian conditions reveal that while the administration had sufficient information to make a humanitarian case for action, humanitarian objectives did not become a significant part of U.S. strategy until the post-war period.

Throughout the conflict, U.S. officials monitored reports of Saddam Hussein's past human rights abuses, atrocities and potential war crimes committed in Iraq and Kuwait, the status of refugees in neighboring states, and the effect of sanctions on Iraq's food and medical supplies

(Alexander et al. 1991; Crowder 1990; "Guidance, Iraq and War Crimes" 1991, "Report, Iraq: Impact of the Sanctions" 1990; Rosenblast 1991). To this end, the Office of Speechwriting collected a report from Amnesty International that provided detailed evidence, including photographs and witness testimony, of the human rights violations committed by Iraq since its invasion of Kuwait on August 2. The report concluded:

> Widespread abuses of human rights have been perpetrated by Iraqi forces following the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August. These include the arbitrary arrest and detention without trial of thousands of civilians and military personnel; the widespread torture of such persons in custody; the imposition of the death penalty and the extrajudicial execution of hundreds of unarmed civilians, including children (Amnesty International 1990).

Similarly, testimony from former U.S. hostages noted that "we have collectively borne witness to the full range of human rights violations" and aimed to "describe incidents and situations that are representative of these violations. These events are emblematic of the human dimension of this terrible and complex crisis" (Alexander et al. 1991). Evidence that Iraq was responsible for systematic human rights violations increased over the course of the intervention. By February 1991, press guidance reported that "We have anecdotal evidence that morale among Iraqi troops in Kuwait is declining and that their behavior toward Kuwaiti citizens is increasingly brutal" ("Guidance, Kuwait: Iraqi Atrocities" 1991). This brutality included not only looting and torture, but "many reports of executions of innocent Kuwaiti citizens" ("Guidance, Kuwait: Iraqi Atrocities" 1991).

Despite widespread evidence of Iraq's human rights violations, military strategy did not focus on preventing or ending the suffering of Kuwaiti civilians. Discussions of U.S. military options reveal that the White House considered making the case for military action by arguing that giving sanctions more time to work "comes into potential conflict with the need to act to stop Iraq atrocities and the destruction of Kuwait" (National Security Council 1990b). However,

officials' concern with the stability of Kuwait was connected to its status as a "vital country" rather than a response to human rights violations. Instead, the administration pursued the option to move from a "Cold Start" on the grounds that "At some point, it could become clear that sanctions were simply not working, that we could not conclude with any confidence that at some visible point in the future that Iraq would have no choice but to comply with the call to withdrawal unconditionally" (National Security Council 1990b). Additionally, throughout the intervention, the Department of Defense did not conduct operations to achieve humanitarian objectives (Brewington 1991) and the President's stated goals remained consistent and did not mention the welfare of Kuwaiti civilians ("Guidance, Gulf Policy Themes" 1990).[50] Humanitarian objectives were thus not an explicit part of U.S. military strategy during Operation Desert Storm.

Rather than pursing humanitarian objectives as part of the military intervention, humanitarian efforts were instead viewed as a tool to promote stability and avoid anti-American sentiment in the post-war environment. A memorandum from the National Security Council in the final weeks of war noted that, "It is very much in our interest now and after the war to demonstrate our humanitarian principles, which have guided us in the past. We are on a good track now, which should be continued, in cooperating with international humanitarian organizations and in our public sentiments" (Dyke 1991d). These post-war humanitarian efforts were developed during the conflict to reverse pro-Saddam Hussein and anti-American sentiment, allowing officials to defer immediate humanitarian action and rely on the help of international organizations. For example, following accusations by Iraq's foreign minister that the U.S. was

[50] Throughout the war, these goals included: "First, the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. Second, restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. Third, release of all hostages. Fourth, a commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf" ("Guidance, Gulf Policy Themes" 1990).

responsible for civilian casualties, officials responded, "This is unfortunate [anti-American sentiment], but I believe that in the aftermath of the conflict, the UN can do much to regain ground through its humanitarian relief to war victims, continued assistance to the countries whose economies are suffering as a result of this war, and other possible conflict resolution roles after hostilities end" (Dyke 1991b). In line with this approach, when the end of the war became imminent, focus shifted to preparing to work with international organizations to achieve humanitarian objectives and staff noted that, "We really need to push on UN and ICRC so they are in a position to take this problem [humanitarian assistance in Safwan and Southern Iraq] on when we pull out" (Wolfowitz 1991).

In sum, because the administration's focus on humanitarian objectives intensified in final days of the conflict when the need for public statements explaining intervention ended, it does not appear that the presence of humanitarian justifications in the President's national addresses reflected the content of U.S. military strategy. Instead, humanitarian objectives were largely confined to the post-war effort, including Operation Provide Comfort in which the U.S. used military force with the explicit aim of protecting Kurds in northern Iraq.

Conclusion

Humanitarian justifications played a common but secondary role in the Bush administration's communication strategy for the 1991 Gulf War. In line with the expectations of the domestic coalition argument, archival materials demonstrate that the administration was concerned about and made a concerted effort to build domestic support for the use of force. These efforts included disaggregating the public into key target groups and using humanitarian claims to appeal to skeptics and block potential channels of dissent. In this case, the religious community and college students acted as critical constituencies for the Bush coalition, espoused

values consistent with cooperative internationalists beliefs, and were the target audiences for many of the administrations' humanitarian appeals. Additionally, the evidence suggests that the White House recognized both the utility and limits of humanitarian claims and cautioned against their overuse. Combined, the Bush administration's communication strategy demonstrates that the President both knew about the diversity of the domestic audience and developed justifications with a broad coalition in mind.

The administration's communication with international and elite audiences demonstrates that while these audiences were considered in the development of official statements, they did not supersede concerns about domestic public opinion. Internationally, humanitarian claims helped counter Saddam Hussein's disinformation campaign, which accused the U.S. of targeting civilians and being at war with the Arab world. However, the international coalition remained stable throughout the conflict and the administration sought international support in part to emphasize burden-sharing and bolster domestic public opinion. Similarly, the administration worked to gain congressional approval, but relied primarily on security justifications to persuade political elites. As before, the decision to pursue a congressional resolution was partially motivated by its influence on public support for military action. Additionally, humanitarian claims did not directly reflect the U.S.'s focus on humanitarian objectives, as humanitarian efforts were largely confined to the post-war period. This evidence indicates that White House communication strategies balanced efforts to persuade multiple audiences, but the domestic audience was the primary concern and a significant driver of humanitarian justifications.

Taken as a whole, the evidence from the Gulf War demonstrates that the White House is concerned about the domestic coalition and recognizes the utility of humanitarian justifications, establishing the external validity of the domestic coalition argument. While this case

demonstrates that the domestic coalition logic operates in security interventions, it cannot determine whether this same logic drives the use of humanitarian justifications in potential humanitarian interventions. To better understand how and why presidents use humanitarian claims in the context of humanitarian crises, the following chapter traces the Clinton administration's approach to humanitarian justifications in the 1993-1995 Bosnia conflict, covering periods of both non-intervention and the escalation of military action.

CHAPTER SEVEN

MANAGING DOMESTIC PRESSSURE, MOBILIZING DOMESTIC SUPPORT: U.S. POLICY TOWARDS BOSNIA, 1993-1995

The preceding chapter examined the George H.W. Bush administration's communication strategy during the Gulf War to demonstrate that the White House recognizes the importance of building a domestic coalition and that humanitarian justifications are used to create a broad base of support. In security interventions, humanitarian claims help persuade skeptical cooperative internationalists who could otherwise form a politically costly source of domestic opposition. However, security interventions are only a portion of the potential interventions that presidents address in their public statements. Chapter 3 indicates that humanitarian claims are used in a distinct pattern—widespread use, discriminate emphasis—across potential interventions, including those that focus on humanitarian goals or do not end with the use of military force. Contrary to security interventions, potential humanitarian interventions have the primary objective of protecting or promoting the welfare of foreign civilians threatened by violence and often respond to egregious human rights abuses such as genocide. In this case, humanitarian justifications provide the primary rationale for military action and their presence could simply reflect the severity of the ongoing humanitarian crisis rather than a communication strategy designed to build a domestic coalition. Similarly, when presidents respond to humanitarian crises with policies short of intervention, the burden of justification may be lower and the public is unlikely to push the president to take military risks when there is not an imminent threat to the U.S.

Given these differences, this chapter examines the Clinton administration's communication strategy for the Bosnian conflict from 1993 to 1995 to consider the question:

Does the domestic coalition logic extend to communication strategies for humanitarian interventions and for U.S. involvement short of military action? The Bosnian conflict represents one of the worst humanitarian crises of the post-Cold War period, making it a key case for understanding how the White House develops communication strategies and considers humanitarian justifications in the face of overwhelming harm to civilians. Additionally, the conflict contains within-case variation in U.S. strategy, from an emphasis on reaching a negotiated solution to the threat and eventual implementation of airstrikes to the deployment of U.S. troops to enforce the Dayton Accords. Here, I leverage this variation to evaluate when establishing a stable domestic coalition becomes a relevant concern and to demonstrate that cooperative internationalists remain the target audience for the president's communications during periods of non-intervention.

This chapter traces shifts in the Clinton administration's policy towards Bosnia, communication strategy, and concern with the domestic coalition from Clinton's inauguration in 1993 to the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995. It first outlines the domestic coalition expectations for periods of non-intervention and introduces the structured questions used to evaluate this argument. Guided by these questions, the analysis shows that even during periods of non-intervention the Clinton administration's communication strategy consistently attempted to manage pressure and support from a coalition of internationalists. When the administration pursued a policy of non-intervention, communication plans emphasized humanitarian accomplishments alongside the human costs of military action to appeal to cooperative internationalist concerns. As the U.S. military strategy escalated to include airstrikes and the deployment of U.S. troops, the administration again targeted cooperative internationalists in an effort to assemble a domestic coalition of support. Taken as a whole, the Bosnian case

demonstrates that cooperative internationalists are a critical source of support and the drivers of justification strategies regardless of the type of intervention or the content of U.S. policy.

Domestic Coalitions for Non-Interventions

The domestic coalition argument expects humanitarian justifications to appeal to both cooperative and militant internationalists—an expectation borne out in the experimental tests conducted in Chapter 4. For individuals with cooperative internationalist values, humanitarian justifications increase their belief that intervention is necessary to achieve to humanitarian objectives, which helps override their skepticism towards the use of military force. Alternatively, individuals with militant internationalist beliefs support the use of force to achieve both military and humanitarian objectives because of their view that demonstrating military strength is the best way to maintain peace and security. Militant internationalists are thus comparably persuaded by both humanitarian and security justifications. In the buildup to security interventions, Chapter 6 shows that presidents employ humanitarian claims to communicate with groups with cooperative internationalist values, convince them that military action will achieve humanitarian objectives, and avoid domestic dissent. In this context, humanitarian claims are a key part of domestic mobilization for military action.

However, when mobilization for military action is not the White House's short-term goal, the content and objectives of humanitarian justifications shift while the importance of cooperative internationalists remains consistent. Absent an attack on or direct threat against the United States, the domestic audience is unlikely to pressure the president to take military action if the White House argues that the conflict can be resolved with a less risky strategy. In this case, building on the preferences of different groups established in Chapter 4, cooperative internationalists' skepticism towards the use of force and preference for non-aggressive

approaches combines with isolationists' disapproval of foreign engagement to create a majority that supports non-intervention. Militant internationalists, by contrast, are unlikely to be satisfied with the non-aggressive policy but should be less likely to become a vocal opposition if the crisis is cast as a non-vital U.S. interest. Given these dynamics among the domestic audience, if the humanitarian crisis is short-lived—either because of changing conditions on the ground or because peace and aid efforts resolve the problem—presidents can pursue a policy of non-intervention with little need for public explanation and few political consequences. With a ready-made coalition of support for non-intervention and in the absence of domestic pressure, the White House has an incentive to avoid drawing attention to the crisis. Support from cooperative internationalists can be taken for granted at this stage because the policy exactly aligns with their preferences—non-aggressive means used to achieve humanitarian ends. Avoiding public emphasis of the crisis is also consistent with the contention that the U.S. does not have a vital national interest at stake and avoids stoking the active opposition of militant internationalists. Reduced public attention also minimizes any concern from isolationists regarding the ways in which the U.S. is engaged in the crisis. As a result, I expect the Clinton administration to offer few public statements on the Bosnia conflict in the early stages of its involvement with the crisis.

However, if the humanitarian crisis continues and worsens—as it did in the Bosnian case—over time humanitarian justifications for military intervention will begin to appear in elite and media discourse, regardless of the White House's communication plan. Exposure to evidence that the humanitarian toll of the crisis is rising and to arguments that the use of force is the only way to end the suffering creates domestic pressure for action. As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, humanitarian explanations for military action elicit support from both militant and cooperative internationalists. In particular, when faced with evidence of egregious human

suffering such as genocide, cooperative internationalists' concern with ending a humanitarian nightmare is likely to outweigh their preference for non-combative means. Left unchecked, mounting evidence that grave human rights abuses are being allowed to continue creates pressure from both militant and cooperative internationalists to escalate U.S. involvement to end the crisis. Growing domestic discontent with the administration's foreign policy decisions is problematic both for its short-term effect on the president's approval ratings and ability to pursue other items on his political agenda and for its potential long-term consequences on the president's prospects for reelection. When the White House does not intend to escalate its military involvement—as was the case for U.S. policy towards Bosnia until 1995—the president will need to offset this pressure by offering humanitarian justifications for non-intervention.

The objective of the presidents' justifications for non-intervention is to manage domestic pressure by dismantling the coalition in favor of increased military engagement. Cooperative internationalists remain the most efficient target for this strategy because, unlike militant internationalists, they can be convinced that military force is not the best way to resolve the conflict. To maintain the support of cooperative internationalists in light of ongoing mass atrocities—such as the Serb army's campaign of ethnic cleansing—presidents will need to make the case that involvement short of intervention is the best way to achieve humanitarian objectives. To this end, speeches are expected to emphasize humanitarian accomplishments and focus on military action as risky and inefficient. Additionally, the president is expected to have an incentive to avoid drawing attention to the crisis or escalating human rights violations that would contradict the message that non-confrontational means are working. As long as cooperative approaches such as diplomacy or aid appear capable of achieving the humanitarian objectives, cooperative internationalists are expected to be an easy sell. Their patience with non-

military options will prevent the formation of a unified coalition of opposition to the president's foreign policy.

However, opposition from militant internationalists carries political costs even if these individuals are neither a majority of the public nor easily persuaded to support non-intervention. Active opposition casts doubt on the prudence of the president's foreign policy and complicates efforts to persuade cooperative internationalists, but the president is unlikely to be able to convince militant internationalists that a stronger military response is not necessary. Instead, the White House can mitigate dissent and pressure from militant internationalists by arguing that the crisis does not affect U.S. national security—their core concern. Combined, the policy preferences of cooperative and militant internationalists and the importance of managing domestic pressure for escalation suggest that justifications for inaction should highlight humanitarian achievements and downplay the importance of the crisis for U.S. national interests.

Alternatively, if White House policy changes to include military action, the communication strategy is expected to capitalize on this pressure to further mobilize cooperative internationalists in support of intervention. As in the Gulf War case, humanitarian justifications will be used to persuade any cooperative internationalists who remain skeptical of the utility of military action. Militant internationalists, who have pushed for military action all along, will be easily convinced to support this policy change. However, the president is expected to abandon his previous efforts to convince this group that the crisis is not a vital U.S. interest and to instead argue that the intervention supports U.S. strategic and security goals. Table 7.1 summarizes the theoretical expectation and observable implications of this argument in the context of the Bosnian conflict.

Table 7.1 Theoretical Expectations and Observable Implications

Expectation	Observable Implications
During the early periods of non-intervention, little public attention is given to the crisis.	• Limited public acknowledgement of the crisis during the early stages. • Little domestic pressure for action. • Any speeches that are given emphasize the success of diplomacy and aid in accomplishing humanitarian goals.
As the crisis continues, domestic pressure builds and justifications are needed to prevent the formation of a coalition in favor of escalation.	• Officials become concerned with domestic pressure for action. • Speeches emphasize humanitarian accomplishments. • Communications target groups espousing cooperative internationalist values. • Crisis is presented as non-vital to the U.S. national interest and security.
When strategy changes to include military action, humanitarian justifications targeting cooperative internationalists remain, but their content shifts.	• Speeches emphasize that military means are now necessary to meet humanitarian ends. • Administration remains concerned with constituencies with cooperative internationalist values. • Action is presented as important to U.S. national interests and security.

Case Selection and Methodology

Case Selection

This chapter uses a case study of U.S. policy towards the Bosnian conflict from 1993 to 1995 to evaluate these expectations and demonstrate that the cooperative internationalist logic extends both to humanitarian interventions and periods of non-intervention. The analysis begins with Bill Clinton's inauguration in 1993 and ends with the announcement that the U.S. would send troops to implement the Dayton Accords in December 1995. While the early stages of the conflict took place during the George H.W. Bush administration, the analysis focuses on the Clinton administration to hold constant both the president—accounting for differences in rhetorical style—and the key decisionmakers and speechwriters—accounting for both personal and personnel differences in the White House's approach to foreign policy. Additionally, while

the violence in Bosnia included conflicts between the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and Bosnia Croats, the analysis primarily focuses on the war between the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. This dimension of the conflict captures the most grievous and consistent violations of international humanitarian law, including ethnic cleansing, the siege of Sarajevo, and attacks on UN peacekeepers.

Structured Questions

As in the previous chapter, I rely on a set questions to structure the analysis of the conflict and evaluate the theoretical expectations outlined in Table 7.1. This case is structured around eight sets of questions. To gauge the gravity assigned to the humanitarian crisis and strategy in the early months of the Clinton administration, I ask: 1) To what extent did the president emphasize humanitarian concerns and seek to draw attention to the humanitarian crisis? 2) To what extent did the White House express concern about domestic pressure for action? 3) To what extent did the White House connect the conflict to vital national and security interests?

To evaluate the extent to which the White House aimed to manage domestic pressure for escalation when it arose, I consider: 4) Was the White House concerned about opposition and public pressure for action? If so, from which actors? 5) Did discussions of humanitarian efforts emphasize accomplishments or the need for continued action? 6) In discussions of military action, did the White House primarily focus on the benefits or the risks of the use of force?

Finally, to determine the extent to which the White House communication strategy focused on the domestic coalition across different stages of the conflict, I ask: 7) Who was the target audience of the communication strategy? Did this target change over time? 8) Did the

content of justifications shift when U.S. strategy changed to include military action? Table 7.2 summarizes these questions alongside the expectations they are designed to evaluate.

Table 7.2 Structured Questions to Evaluate Theoretical Expectations

Expectation	Structured Questions
Early Stages: Acknowledgement of Humanitarian Crisis	1) To what extent did the president emphasize humanitarian concerns and seek to draw attention to the humanitarian crisis? 2) To what extent did the White House express concern about domestic pressure for action? 3) To what extent did the White House connect the conflict to vital national and security interests?
Prolonged Non-Intervention: Utility of Diplomacy	4) Was the White House concerned about opposition and public pressure for action? If so, from which actors? 5) Did discussions of humanitarian efforts emphasize accomplishments or the need for continued action? 6) In discussions of military action, did the White House primarily focus on the benefits or the risks of the use of force?
Mobilizing for Military Action	7) Who was the target audience for the communication strategy? How did this target change over time? 8) Did the content of justifications shift when U.S. strategy changed to include military action?

Answers to these questions are based on archival materials collected from the William J. Clinton Presidential Library as well as the text of official statements and presidential speeches collected from the Public Papers of the Presidents database. My data collection efforts focused on files from: 1) the communications staff, including drafts of national addresses, press guidance, and internal memos and meeting agendas, 2) domestic political advisors, including memos and meetings involving the Chief of Staff, election campaign staff, reports from and communications with polling firms, and communications with Congress, and 3) diplomatic and military advisors, including memos and meetings with the State Department, National Security Council, and Joint Chiefs. Documents from diplomatic and military advisors are used to track how U.S. strategy

and objectives for the Bosnian conflict changed over time. I use documents from communications staff and domestic political advisors, as well as texts from the Public Papers of the Presidents, to evaluate how and why the communication strategy shifted over time. Documents from these sources also shed light on the White House's concern with and attempts to manage domestic pressure for military action.

Foreign Policy Beliefs in Context

As outlined in Chapter 6, White House discussions of foreign policy beliefs are unlikely to rely on the foreign policy belief terminology to reference divisions in the domestic audience. However, as evidence from the Bosnian case presented below suggests, the Clinton administration was attentive to internationalist and isolationist sentiment writ large, in addition to hawk and dove measures. Together, these concepts and the demographics and interest groups correlated with cooperative internationalist values, described in Chapter 6, provide proxies for foreign policy beliefs in the context of the Bosnian conflict.

Conflict Overview

The Bosnian conflict had its origins in the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Slovenia was the first to declare its independence, followed by Croatia—whose declaration led to seven months of war with the Yugoslav National Army and the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to keep the peace in February 1992—and Macedonia (Albright 2003, 178). In the midst of this violence, the United Nations Security Council imposed an embargo on weapons deliveries to the region, including Bosnia, which froze in place an uneven balance of forces (Power 2002, 249). Madeleine Albright, Clinton's Ambassador to the UN, outlined this uneven impact, writing, "The Serbs in Bosnia had ample arms and could be

resupplied when necessary from Belgrade. The Croats had help from Zagreb in circumventing the embargo. The Muslims were relatively defenseless" (Albright 2003, 179).

Bosnia held its independence referendum in March 1992 against the vocal opposition of its Serb population which preferred to unite with the Republic of Serbia and boycotted the vote (Daalder 1998). The U.S. and the European Community recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as Croatia and Slovenia, as sovereign independent states in April 1992, asserting that, "The United States views the demonstrated commitment of the emerging states to respect borders and to protect all Yugoslav nationalities as an essential element in establishing full diplomatic relations" (G. H. W. Bush 1992). At independence, Bosnia was a multiethnic state made up of three main ethnic groups: Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. Following the independence vote, war broke out as Bosnian Serbs, opposed to the separation and aided by Yugoslav national forces under the direction of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, began a campaign of ethnic cleansing that drove Bosnian Muslims and Croats from their homes (Christopher 2001, 253). As part of this campaign, Serbian forces laid siege to the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo, systematically destroyed Muslim cultural and religious sites, and began targeting civilians in a campaign of ethnic cleansing that included murder and rape as well as the imprisonment of Bosnian Muslims in concentration camps.

In July 1992, the UN, with the help of the U.S., United Kingdom, and other member states, began airlifts of humanitarian aid to the besieged Sarajevo in an operation that would become the longest running airlift in history (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 1996). As Serb forces continued to attack and block humanitarian convoys, the United Nations Security Council expanded its mandate to include the use of "all necessary measures" to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. While the George H.W. Bush administration consistently stated

its unwillingness to involve the American military in the conflict, by the time Clinton took office in January 1993 NATO had agreed to enforce a no-fly zone and peace efforts, focused on the Vance-Owen Plan, were stalled. The Clinton administration rejected the Vance-Owen Plan and in May 1993 attempted to convince allies to lift the UN arms embargo and use air strikes to help protect Bosnian Muslims as they rearmed (Albright 2003, 180; Daalder 1998). Allies rejected this proposal because of concerns that their peacekeeping forces on the ground could become targets and the White House was unwilling to expend the political capital necessary to force an agreement. Albright (2003, 181), perhaps the strongest proponent of U.S. military involvement within the administration, outlines her view of the administration's policy moving forward:

> At this stage, with a new President, a wary Secretary of State, a negative Pentagon, nervous allies, and crises in Somalia, then Rwanda and Haiti blowing up, we weren't prepared to run the risks of leadership in Bosnia…Throughout the next two years our goal was a negotiated solution, but we never applied the credible threat of force necessary to achieve it. Instead we employed a combination of half-measures and bluster that didn't work. We brokered cease-fire agreements that were violated within days. We proposed a resolution in the Security Council to lift the arms embargo but were blocked when nine members, including Britain, France, and Russia, abstained. We vowed to strengthen six Muslim "safe areas," but reinforcement couldn't travel to those areas without Bosnian Serb consent. We vowed to cut off arms shipments to the Bosnians Serbs from Belgrade, but Milosevic refused to allow UN border monitors on Yugoslav territory. We voted to enforce no-fly zones, but the Serbs violated them hundreds of times without paying a significant price.

As a result of perceived international and domestic political constraints, throughout 1993 and 1994 the Clinton administration pursued a policy of non-intervention and remained committed to achieving a negotiated solution to the conflict. By 1995, both the conflict and the United States' willingness to use military force began to shift. The year began with a winter truce negotiated by former President Jimmy Carter, which lasted four months. However, the Serbs responded to the end of the cease-fire by shelling Sarajevo and in the summer of 1995 attacked the UN-declared safe areas in Zepa and Srebrenica. Secretary of State Warren Christopher (2001,

254) describes these attacks and the evidence of the systematic and mass killing of men and boys as a turning point for the Clinton administration's policy towards Bosnia:

> The slaughter of thousands of Muslim residents of these towns, widely covered by the press, galvanized world opinion and convinced the key NATO allies that the time had come to do whatever was necessary to halt the slaughter before it reached the next apparent target of the Bosnian Serbs, the safe area of Gorazde. President Clinton, deeply engaged and strongly spurred on by the vice president, insisted that we find a way to stop the killing.

In a meeting with allies in London in July 1995, the U.S. and NATO committed to respond to future attacks on safe areas with airstrikes and relaxed the requirements for dual key authorization from the UN. When Bosnian Serbs shelled a Sarajevo marketplace on August 28, NATO, including U.S. forces, put the London agreement into action with intensive strikes on Serb targets that continued until September 14 (Christopher 2001, 257). U.S. participation in these strikes coincided with pressure for increased action from the House and Senate, most notably in the form of legislation in favor of unilaterally lifting the arms embargo. This vote forced Clinton to use his veto power to block the legislation and prevent the implementation of unilateral lift, which he believed would create conflict with allies within both the UN and NATO (Purdum 1995).

With the increased and credible threat of external intervention, on November 21, 1995 Bosnian and Serbian leaders signed the Dayton Accords, agreeing to maintain the sovereignty of the Bosnian state at the cost of partitioning the territory into three ethnically-defined areas for Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. To implement the peace agreement, Clinton promised the deployment of 20,000 U.S. troops (Power 2002, 440). These forces served as part of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) which completed its one-year mandate in 1996 and handed over responsibilities to the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which remained in place until 2004.

In sum, U.S. policy towards Bosnia was characterized by non-intervention and a focus on achieving a negotiated solution during 1993 and 1994. U.S. military involvement began to escalate in 1995 as NATO launched sustained airstrikes against Serbian targets and culminated in the commitment of U.S. troops to enforce the Dayton Accords. Examining the Clinton administration's communication strategy during the first half of 1993 thus addresses the early stages expectations. I then evaluate the prolonged non-intervention expectations in late 1993 and 1994, and 1995 allows me to consider changes in communications as the president mobilizes for military action.

Justifying Humanitarian Non-Intervention

The domestic coalition argument expects appeals to cooperative internationalists to remain central to the White House communication strategy, even as the content and frequency of public statements change to reflect policy shifts. Reports of a humanitarian crisis—readily available and graphic during the Bosnian conflict—create the potential for widespread opposition if the president fails to effectively justify his decision to pursue a strategy of non-intervention. This opposition is costly for the president's domestic political agenda in the short term and for his reelection prospects in the long term. To avoid incurring political punishment, when the White House is committed to action short of intervention, the communication strategy will focus on maintaining the support and patience of cooperative internationalists to prevent them from joining a coalition in favor of escalation. To achieve this goal in the early stages of the Clinton administration's involvement, presidential statements should be low in number to avoid adding to the perceived urgency of the crisis. As the conflict wears on and humanitarian justifications for increased military involvement appear in elite and media discourse, the president will need to offset this domestic pressure for action by highlighting humanitarian

achievements while downplaying connections to the U.S. national interest. Clinton's speeches and White House documents from this period reveal three patterns consistent with the domestic coalition expectations: 1) in the first months of the Clinton administration's involvement with conflict, references to Bosnia in addresses to the nation were few and far between and placed relatively low emphasis on humanitarian explanations, 2) when domestic pressure increased and public statements became more common, speeches emphasized humanitarian achievements and the success of diplomatic efforts, even in the midst of ongoing atrocities, and 3) speeches presented the conflict as a European issue and asserted that U.S. interests in the region were non-vital.

Attention to the Crisis

In the early stages of its Bosnia policy, the Clinton administration had an incentive to downplay the ongoing humanitarian crisis to avoid mobilizing opposition among militant internationalists. As Figure 7.1 illustrates, for the first year of his administration Clinton gave few national addresses that referenced the Bosnian crisis. By 1994, however, the administration began to face political costs for its relative silence. A National Security Council memo outlined the problem:

> With the exception of a few soundbites from the President, the Administration has offered little in the way of public explanation or defense of our position. A strategy which appears defensive, or even worse, a strategy of silence will not quell public uproar; it will make it worse. We need to lay out our policy but with care not to promise more or less than we may intend to do in the long-run (Sonenshine, n.d.).

Following this change in communication strategy, the number of addresses increased in 1994, but they remained few and far between. However, by mid-July 1995 when the U.S. strategy shifted to include participation in intensified NATO airstrikes and the possibility of deploying troops to implement a peace agreement loomed, Clinton gave multiple speeches addressing

Bosnia each month. This pattern is consistent with the expectation that Clinton would avoid attracting additional attention to the Bosnian crisis in the early stages of its policy, intensify its efforts to frame non-intervention favorably as domestic pressure mounted, and use public statements to mobilize domestic support as military involvement increased.

Figure 7.1 Number of Speeches to the National Audience by Month of Conflict



When Clinton did give national addresses that discussed Bosnia, examining the distribution of justifications reveals few clear patterns. As Figure 7.2 shows, in the first year of the conflict, speeches given by George H.W. Bush placed high levels of emphasis on humanitarian claims—employing them as the primary justification in the majority of the addresses. During the Clinton administration the relative emphasis placed on humanitarian claims became more scattered, with a roughly equal number of speeches that focused primarily on humanitarian concerns or used humanitarian justifications as the secondary explanation or not at all. The pattern of security justifications during this same period is comparable to the emphasis placed on humanitarian claims, suggesting that Clinton often mixed humanitarian and security explanations for both action and inaction. The variation in the emphasis of humanitarian claims

and the presence of security justifications suggests that humanitarian justifications are not the only explanations available nor are they the primary justification in every speech. Instead, this pattern is consistent with the argument that Clinton used humanitarian actions in periods of inaction and action to appeal to cooperative internationalists while security explanations attempted to mitigate opposition from military internationalists.

Figure 7.2 Relative Emphasis of Humanitarian and Security Justifications



Domestic Pressure for Escalation

The increase in Clinton's speeches on Bosnia beginning in late 1993 coincided with rising pressure from opponents lobbying for increased military involvement. In particular, the administration faced consistent pressure from members of Congress and opinion leaders ("Bosnia Hill Strategy" 1994). In late 1993, Representative Susan Molinari summarized growing dissent in Congress in her letter to the President, "Many of my colleagues here in Congress, including myself, have been questioning the 'hands off' policy by your Administration towards the ongoing crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Thus far, the idle threats made by our world leaders followed by inaction only increases the number of dead, wounded and homeless" (Molinari

1993). This pressure increased over time and became more politically problematic as it was led by Senator Bob Dole, Clinton's opponent-to-be in the 1996 presidential election. In particular, Dole spearheaded efforts to pass legislation that called for the U.S. to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. Following the February 1994 attack on a busy Sarajevo marketplace, he and Senator Joseph Lieberman coordinated a letter signed by 51 other Senators that asserted the attack "emphasized, once again, the imperative of taking immediate and effective action to provide the Bosnian government with the means to defend its citizens. The people of Sarajevo are not being strangled; they are being slaughtered. As allied and U.N. floundering over these past twenty-two months has demonstrated, strong measures cannot be taken without decisive U.S. leadership" (Dole and Lieberman 1994). Notably, the call for unilateral lift had bipartisan support, including the signatures of Democrats such as Joe Biden and Paul Wellstone alongside well-known Republicans such as Jesse Helms, Richard Lugar, and Strom Thurmond.

In addition to statements from Congress, consistent media coverage communicated arguments for escalation to the public as evidence of atrocities continued to mount. In its public affairs strategy for April 1994, the White House acknowledged that coverage of attacks on civilians and the resulting calls for escalation could not be avoided—"This story is not going to fade away although the initial press hysteria will subside"—in part because "Media interest is great and the number of outlets is equally great" (Ross/Sonenshine 1994). To offset this pressure the White House focused its attention on providing compelling justifications for its policy of non-intervention in Bosnia, based on the strong belief that "it is possible to alter the tone and tenor of the press coverage of Bosnia, and to contribute to public understanding of our interests in the Bosnian conflict" (Ross/Sonenshine 1994).

Domestic pressure was also expressed by interest groups and core constituencies. The leaders of the American Jewish Congress—a non-pacifist religious group likely to espouse cooperative internationalist values—criticized the White House, writing "The cold indifference to the massive human catastrophe in Bosnia expressed by your Administration's policy constitutes a betrayal of fundamental American values no less than of America's national interest" (Lifton and Siegman 1993) They then called on the President to "take immediate steps to assert U.S. leadership in mobilizing international action to stop the carnage in Bosnia and to prevent the catastrophe that the fall of Sarajevo would represent" (Lifton and Siegman 1993). Similarly, George Soros, whose foundation provided millions of dollars in relief assistance, pressured the White House to increase its protection of civilians, noting "We find it unacceptable that ordinary citizens should still be under attack and that others are still being forced from their homes. At a minimum, the U.S. should take the lead to ensure that the proposed safe-havens really protect civilians" (Soros Humanitarian Fund 1993). These statements demonstrate growing domestic discontent with the Clinton administration's policy towards Bosnia, including among non-pacifist religious groups and humanitarian organizations likely to espouse cooperative internationalist values.

However, in line with the domestic coalition expectations, statements from these and similar groups also indicate that they could be convinced to accept a non-aggressive policy if it was sufficient to end the human suffering. For example, when a group of churches, synagogues, and civic groups organized "A Day for Bosnia" in Dallas, TX, the event aimed to "speak out for peace and the defense of human rights in Bosnia-Hercegovina and to help provide aid to those who have suffered as a result of the tragedy there" (Saperstein 1993). To this end, the group coordinated the signing of the "world's largest postcard" to be delivered to the White House. The

postcard urged Clinton to "Please utilize our country's global leadership and give voice to our great nation's moral force. If we do not act now, how shall we one day tell our children that we did nothing," but organizers emphasized that "the inscription is in no way critical of the President's efforts, and calls only for increased exertion on present White House policy. Neither United States military intervention nor a repeal of the arms embargo are included among the demands" (Saperstein 1993).

As these examples illustrate, domestic pressure for increased U.S. action came from Congress and domestic groups, including members of the President's own party and organizations that favored non-aggressive solutions to the conflict. However, in line with the domestic coalition expectations, the groups most likely to hold cooperative internationalist values also demonstrated a willingness to accept non-intervention if the White House's policy was successful in easing the humanitarian crisis. As long as the White House was committed to finding a negotiated solution rather than military action, these groups represent the target audience for the administration's communication strategy because they were both politically engaged and willing to support continued non-intervention.

Negotiated Settlement and Humanitarian Achievements

The non-intervention stages of the Bosnian conflict presented a challenge for official communications because the strategy in need of justification occupied a complicated middle ground between action and inaction. A National Security Council memo from 1994 outlined this problem: "The reality is that we have carefully and consciously crafted a policy position that rests somewhere between 'idling and overdrive.' This policy centers on a careful balanced between the use of power and diplomacy" (Sonenshine 1994). This balanced approached posed an "inherent contradiction between short-term imperatives ('do something') and longer-term

goals (negotiated peace)" which threatened to "trap the US in a quagmire of our own making" (Kass 1993a). In an effort to avoid this quagmire the White House needed to convince the domestic audience that its moderate position was the right way to bring an end to the Bosnian people's suffering. To this end, the communication strategy emphasized the importance of diplomacy, highlighted humanitarian accomplishments, and created visible evidence of humanitarian successes, no matter how small, whenever possible.

From the beginning, the Clinton White House made it clear that it had "decided to give top priority to helping negotiating succeed and want to do nothing that could detract from that goal" ("Draft, Letter to Rudy Perpich from the President" 1993). In his statements to the domestic audience, Clinton reiterated the United States' focus on achieving a negotiated solution and made the case that "A workable, enforceable solution acceptable to all parties is the only way to ensure a lasting solution for Sarajevo and for all of Bosnia" (Clinton 1994c). Achieving a negotiated settlement remained the stated purpose of U.S. efforts throughout 1994, even as its participation in NATO's enforcement of a no-fly zone and provision of close air support increased. In a news conference outlining these efforts, Clinton (1994d) presented them as limited and necessary to achieve a negotiated peace:

> Let me be clear about our objective. Working with our allies, the Russians, and others, we must help the warring parties in Bosnia to reach a negotiated settlement. To do that, we must make the Serbs pay a higher price for continued violence so it will be in their own interests, more clearly, to return to the negotiating table. That is, after all, why we pushed for NATO's efforts to enforce a no-fly zone and the Sarajevo ultimatum and to provide close air support for U.N. forces who come under attack.

While the White House consistently presented a negotiated settlement as its main objective, a consistent message alone is insufficient to manage public pressure for action. To maintain the support and patience of cooperative internationalists, the White House also needed

to make the case that its policy of non-intervention was working. As evidence that current efforts were sufficient to address the crisis, Clinton's addresses also highlighted humanitarian and diplomatic accomplishments. This choice is particularly notable because the lauded accomplishments took place against the backdrop of ongoing ethnic cleansing—they were thus a strategic rhetorical choice rather than evidence of improving conditions on the ground.

To implement this approach, public affairs talking points on Bosnia advised officials asked about the conflict that their "Strategy should be to return to positive things we have done, and not let incidents portray our policy as a failed policy" (Kerrick, n.d.). Future guidance pursued this strategy by noting that the U.S. had given "the largest quantity of humanitarian assistance to the region of any nation" and was the "major single-nation food donor, has performed over three-quarters of all airdrops, and has transported over 10,000 metric tons of aid by airlift to Sarajevo" ("Talking Points, Bosnia-Herzegovina" 1994). In line with these efforts, Clinton's public statements often included long lists of accomplishments, noting that "We have participated in the enforcement of economic sanctions against Serbia. We have initiated airdrops of food and medicine and participated in the Sarajevo airlift, a massive effort, running longer than the Berlin airlift, which has relieved starvation and suffering for tens of thousands of Bosnians" (Clinton 1994b). Speeches also cast temporary calm as a success, mentioning the relative quiet in Sarajevo and evidence that the Serbs had stopped shelling specific safe areas even as reports of widespread ethnic cleansing continued (Clinton 1994e).

In addition to highlighting accomplishments as they occurred, the White House also sought out opportunities to achieve and publicly demonstrate humanitarian successes. To this end, references to the public profile of U.S. efforts factored into discussions about the trade-offs of different humanitarian objectives. For example, information papers on the pros and cons of

humanitarian airdrops noted both their ability to relieve suffering and their visibility. Airdrops were both the safest form of participation and could provide a "Very visible, high profile demonstration of US concern/activism" ("Information Paper, Increasing Humanitarian Aid--Airdrops" 1993). Similarly, expanding the U.S. medical mission to include more children offered a "High visibility US humanitarian assistance contribution without commitment of additional ground troops" and "Appeals to American sentiment" ("Information Paper, Expansion of Mission--US Hospital Zagreb" 1993).

The U.S. role in collecting evidence to be used by the War Crimes Tribunal was particularly helpful in this respect because, "Establishing individual accountability for war crimes is 'law and order' on an international scale that the public quickly and favorably grasps ("Talking Points, Political Rationale for a Special Coordinator for War Crimes" 1995). To maximize the political gain from these efforts, some officials recommended the appointment of a high profile Special Coordinator for War Crimes (Walker 1993). Taken as a whole, these efforts to highlight humanitarian accomplishments helped make the case that the policy of non-intervention was working and military escalation was not necessary.

A Non-Vital European Problem

The domestic coalition argument does not expect the president to be able to persuade militant internationalists that non-intervention is the best way to resolve the crisis. However, it does anticipate that the White House will attempt to counter militant internationalists' arguments in favor of escalation by suggesting the crisis does not sufficiently threaten U.S. interests or security to warrant putting troops in harm's way. By countering these claims the White House limits the rhetorical space available for dissent (Krebs and Jackson 2007) and the risk that opposition will spread to other groups. In the Bosnian case, the Clinton administration responded

to pressure for increased military engagement by framing the crisis as a primarily European problem that did not affect vital U.S. interests (Albright 2003, 179; Christopher 2001, 252).

First, Clinton's statements from 1994 promoted the narrative that responsibility for ending the humanitarian crisis was shared and not primarily American. In response to the first Sarajevo market attack Clinton condemned the violence and asserted that "America's interest and the responsibilities of America's leadership demand our active involvement in the search for a solution" (Clinton 1994b). However, the limits of U.S. responsibility were carefully qualified:

> Europe must bear most of the responsibility for solving the problem and, indeed, it has. The United Nations has forces on the ground in Bosnia to protect the humanitarian efforts and to limit the carnage. And the vast majority of them are European, from all countries in Europe who have worked along with brave Canadians and soldiers from other countries. I have not sent American ground units into Bosnia. And I will not send American ground forces to impose a settlement that the parties to that conflict do not accept (Clinton 1994b).

Clinton's speeches during this period were consistent with other White House efforts to avoid creating the perception that the U.S. was leading the international response. For example, when the administration considered appointing a prominent coordinator for the U.S. humanitarian assistance efforts in Bosnia, officials from the National Security Council cautioned that "naming a prominent official to coordinate with other countries could imply that we were taking the lead responsibility for organizing the international relief effort, letting the Europeans and/or UN off the hook" (Walker 1993). Similarly, talking points in opposition to the Dole Amendment—which would have required the U.S. to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on Bosnia—noted that "Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility" ("Talking Points, Points on the Dole Amendment" 1995). Instead, the administration's public and political communications emphasized multilateral cooperation with allies and the United

Nations to promote the narrative that "The United States is willing to lead. But others must join us" ("Draft, Letter from the President to Congressman John Kasich" 1993).

Second, in addition to allocating responsibility to European allies and the UN, the Clinton administration also worked to limit domestic pressure by classifying Bosnia as non-vital to the U.S. national interest. For example, announcing NATO's decision to threaten airstrikes in 1994, Clinton explained that the U.S. interests at stake fell short of creating an impetus for direct U.S. action: "…we clearly have a humanitarian interest in helping to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo and the continuing slaughter of innocents in Bosnia. These interests do not justify unilateral American intervention in the crisis" (Clinton 1994a). Clinton went on to make a direct link between the absence of vital U.S. interests and his policy towards the conflict, explaining, "our contribution to resolving the Bosnian conflict will be proportionate to our interests, no more and no less" (Clinton 1994a). This distinction appeared in equally strong language in briefing materials prepared for official statements in front of the House, which answered the question 'What are U.S. interests in Bosnia?" by stating first: "The conflict in Bosnia does not affect U.S. vital interests in a way that would warrant unilateral U.S. military intervention" (Kerrick 1994).[51]

Foreign Policy Beliefs and Support for Non-Intervention

To this point, Clinton's justifications are consistent with the types of appeals that Chapter 4 found to resonate with cooperative internationalists and counter the concerns shown to be salient among militant internationalists. But, did the administration's communication plan reflect concern with managing the support and opposition of these individuals? Internal discussions of White House policy and communications reveal that the administration actively worked to

[51] The guidance goes on to explain that "We do, however, have strong national interests at stake" and outlines the same strategic, humanitarian, and political interests Clinton enumerated in his announcement of threatened NATO airstrikes (Kerrick 1994).

counter domestic pressure, acknowledged the public held a spectrum of policy preferences, and recognized that the most effective target audience existed between the extremes of militant internationalism and isolationism. In 1993, officials noted domestic pressure for escalation and warned of the perils of "military operations born of frustration with diplomacy and a noble desire to 'do something'" which only "lead to more frustration and new appeals to 'try harder'" (Kass 1993b). To maintain public approval and avoid being pressured onto an unsuccessful path of military escalation, the press strategy recommended that:

> The best explanation is the truth. We have chosen not to pursue either of the extremist positions: the do-nothing approach nor the massive use of force approach. We strive to find a middle ground between full-fledged isolationism, and full scale war. The middle ground is a mixture of minimal force and maximum diplomacy. *It satisfies neither those who want us to stay out of internal conflicts, altogether, nor those who want us to bomb everything in sight. We will accept the fact that both ends of the spectrum are dissatisfied.* We will pursue what we believe is the best course. We will not be steam rolled by those at the extremes of the spectrum (Sonenshine, n.d.).[52]

The domestic audience's spectrum of beliefs continued to inform the administration's communication plan and reappeared in a 1994 memo that explained, "There are those who are trying to portray the US position as either totally passive/inactive. On the other end of the spectrum are those who are trying to portray this position as one of over-activity. They are both WRONG" (Sonenshine 1994).

In addition to outlining the administration's concern with being "steam rolled" by domestic pressure, this strategy also explicitly acknowledges that the domestic audience holds a spectrum of foreign policy preferences and that not all individuals can be persuaded. Support for the U.S. policy of non-intervention from either "those who want us to stay out, altogether" (i.e., isolationists) or "those who want us to bomb everything in sight" (i.e., militant internationalists)

[52] Emphasis added.

was considered unattainable and an ineffective target for official communications. Given this expected opposition, the White House could only afford to "accept the fact that both ends of the spectrum are dissatisfied" because individuals with cooperative internationalist values existed between the two extremes and could be convinced to support the "minimal force and maximum diplomacy" approach. Persuading these individuals minimized the risk of a broad coalition of dissent and allowed the administration to pursue its desired strategy.[53]

The 1993 press strategy is only one example of the Clinton administration's acknowledgement of internationalist and isolationist sentiment as part of its communication plan. In a memo summarizing public option, staff drew on the same questions from the Chicago Council on Global affairs presented in Chapter 2 to track internationalist attitudes in the context of the Bosnian conflict. The memo concluded that despite media coverage of isolationism, internationalist sentiment was "holding steady" and "About 60 percent of Americans now favor a generally active, cooperative U.S. role in world affairs, compared to about a fourth who oppose active involvement abroad" (Richman 1993). This confirmation that a majority of the U.S. public supported engagement in international affairs supported the White House's conclusion that "our own principles, as well as public and Congressional pressures, make it difficult to disengage and effectively abandon the Bosnians" ("Former Yugoslavia Policy Review" 1995). This understanding of public opinion was consistent with the conclusion drawn from earlier polls that the majority of the public supported threatening NATO airstrikes and "The strongest arguments in support of contributing US troops to a UN peacekeeping operation are based on humanitarian considerations" (Kull and Ramsay 1994). Together, these internal discussions and analyses

[53] As outlined in Chapters 2 and 4, a coalition of militant internationalists and isolationists does not carry the same political weight as a coalition of militant and cooperative internationalists because isolationists are less likely to take action to voice their dissent.

provide evidence that during periods of non-intervention, the Clinton administration's communication plan both recognized and responded to the diversity of the public's foreign policy preferences.

Mobilizing Support for Intervention

While the U.S. pursued a policy of non-intervention in Bosnia from 1993-1994, the communication strategy aimed to manage domestic pressure by convincing cooperative internationalists that this approach was the best and only way to resolve the conflict. In this context, justifications emphasized humanitarian accomplishments and cast the conflict as a non-vital U.S. interest. As U.S. policy shifted to include increased military involvement and the commitment of troops to enforce a peace agreement, the communication strategy remained focused on the domestic coalition. In this context, rather than managing domestic pressure, the White House had an incentive to mobilize domestic support for action. As before, cooperative internationalists remained the target audience of justifications, but these justifications now contended that U.S. military action was the only way to achieve the desired humanitarian objectives.

The Necessity of Military Action

As Figures 7.1 and 7.2 above show, Clinton's public statements regarding Bosnia became more common in the second half of 1995 as the prospect of sustained military action loomed and humanitarian justifications often provided the primary rationale for action. Communication staff prepared for this transition in strategy, recognizing that, "It is likely that U.S. military will soon be in harm's way, either as a part of UNPROFOR withdrawal or retaliatory strikes. It is not too soon to establish justifications for further U.S. intervention." (Lorin 1995). As it became clear that U.S. military action would take the form of participation in an implementation force for the

Dayton Accords, the discussion of military action in Clinton's speeches shifted. Rather than presenting military action as limited and unable to resolve the conflict, Clinton's statements now asserted that the use of force was critical to success. Instead of a policy flip-flop, Clinton also worked to frame the prospect of military action as consistent with his administration's long-term strategy, explaining that, "as I have said since early 1993, I believe American must be a part of helping implement that agreement." He went on to assure reporters that while he had "consistently opposed the involvement of our troops in any combat and in this United Nations mission," the implementation force would be "a very different thing, and I believe it's very, very important that we play a part of it" (Clinton 1995a).

From this point forward, Clinton's public statements consistently employed detailed humanitarian justifications for military action and presented the U.S. as the only actor with the power to prevent a return to violence and bloodshed. In his announcement of the peace agreement, Clinton (1995b) summarized this logic:

> The central fact for us as American is this: Our leadership made this peace agreement possible and helped to bring an end to the senseless slaughter of so many innocent people that our fellow citizens had to watch night after night after night for 4 long years on their television screens. Now American leadership, together with our allies, is needed to make this peace real and enduring.

While the implementation force would be multilateral and include significant burden-sharing, U.S. participation was critical because NATO was the only force capable of credibility implementing the agreement and "If we're not there, NATO will not be there; the peace will collapse; the war will reignite; the slaughter of innocents will begin again" (Clinton 1995c). Contrary to earlier assertions that diplomacy was the only way to peace, with a peace agreement in sight these justifications made the case that its implementation could only be achieved with military action.

As the administration made the case that U.S. military action was the only way to achieve an end to the humanitarian crisis its rhetoric also changed from countering concern with to emphasizing the U.S. national and security interests at stake. By the time Clinton announced that a peace agreement had been reached, he claimed "Our values, our interests, and our leadership all over the world are at stake" (Clinton 1995b) and presented the need for U.S. troops to protect "a region of the world that is vital to our national interests" (Clinton 1995c). This change is consistent with the argument that the White House now had an incentive to encourage rather than block the formation of a coalition of support for military escalation among militant and cooperative internationalists. Additionally, as before, evidence from White House memos and correspondence reveals that managing a domestic audience with diverse foreign policy preferences remained the goal of communication strategies during this stage of the conflict. This goal is noted in press guidance that outlined the administration's plan "to have broadest possible based [sic] of public support—in both parties—for U.S. role in implementation of settlement if we achieve one" (Bremner 1995; Feeley 1995).

Conclusion

The Clinton administration's communication strategy for Bosnia from 1993 to 1995 demonstrates that the White House remained concerned with the domestic coalition during periods of humanitarian non-intervention and intervention. Like the Bush administration, the Clinton administration also recognized the diversity of public opinion and explicitly considered a spectrum of isolationist and internationalist preferences. Acknowledging that neither isolationists or militant internationalists could be persuaded to support Clinton's middle-ground policy towards Bosnia, the White House aimed to alleviate domestic pressure by preventing cooperative internationalists from joining a coalition in favor of escalation. However, when the White House

intended to deploy an implementation force, it targeted these same individuals to convince them of the necessity of military action and mobilize a coalition in favor of action. Combined with Chapter 4's finding that humanitarian justifications persuade cooperative internationalists and evidence from Chapter 6 that these individuals are a critical constituency in security interventions, the Bosnia case shows that in both security and humanitarian interventions, as well as during periods of non-intervention, the support of cooperative internationalists is critical and humanitarian justification are key to maintaining this support.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Humanitarian justifications build support for military action by emphasizing the suffering of foreign civilians and convincing the public that the U.S. has a moral responsibility to respond. The conventional wisdom has focused on the utility of these justifications in the context of humanitarian interventions where their primary consequence is to enable the use of force in response to humanitarian crises—when faced with a humanitarian crisis, presidents will use these justifications to make the case for military action, international and domestic audiences who have internalized humanitarian norms will endorse the need to respond, and intervention will take place. From this view, humanitarian justifications are an embodiment of humanitarian norms with the potential to overcome the "society-wide silence" that stands in the way of preventing genocide (Power 2002, xvii). However, when the U.S. faces a potential security intervention these appeals are expected to be less effective than security justifications which convince the public that there is an imminent threat to either its safety or U.S. national interests that can only be addressed through military action. While humanitarian claims are useful in mobilizing support for humanitarian intervention, security justifications that "demonstrate that the threats or costs of war are specific and proximate" should be the optimal explanation for military intervention to protect U.S. interests (Western 2005, 22). Why, then, do U.S. presidents consistently use humanitarian claims to justify interventions best explained in terms of national security? If humanitarian claims simply work better than the conventional wisdom recognizes, why do presidents limit their emphasis of these justifications?

By raising these questions, the pattern of humanitarian justifications in the post-Cold War period challenges conventional wisdom about what is required to mobilize the domestic audience

in support of intervention. This project has sought to provide a better understanding of the incentives behind presidents' explanations for military action by considering the composition of the audience these justifications are intended to persuade. To this end, it has clarified the pattern of humanitarian justifications in national addresses, highlighted the individuals most likely to respond to these claims, and investigated the process through which administrations develop communication strategies to build support for military action. I argue that the pattern of humanitarian justifications is explained by the incentives presidents face to build and maintain a stable coalition of support that includes individuals with diverse foreign policy preferences. Specifically, I contend that the underlying beliefs known to shape individuals' support for different policies also systematically influence how individuals respond to alternative justifications for military action. Disaggregating the domestic audience by foreign policy beliefs reveals that the same individuals—cooperative internationalists—who require humanitarian justifications also constrain their use. These individuals are key to maintaining both a domestic coalition of support and democratic accountability for the use of force because they are most likely to voice their dissent and impose political costs on the president. By applying existing evidence of heterogeneity in the domestic audience to presidents' attempts to positively frame military interventions, this project both accounts for the pattern of humanitarian justifications and clarifies the conditions under which presidents can successfully mobilize support for military action.

Summary of Findings

The empirical findings outline the pattern of humanitarian justifications in the post-Cold War period and demonstrate that this pattern is driven by the preferences of cooperative internationalists and their position in stable domestic coalitions. Content analysis of presidents'

national addresses on potential interventions highlights the amount of time and effort that leaders expend explaining military action to the public. Analysis of trends in justifications reveals that humanitarian justifications were used in significant numbers throughout the post-Cold War period. Additionally, contrary to the explanation that justifications reflect the nature of the crisis, the presence of these appeals is not limited to potential humanitarian interventions—humanitarian claims appeared at least once in the majority of national addresses, regardless of the nature of the underlying conflict. However, the pattern of humanitarian justifications is also inconsistent with accounts that expect presidents to use all possible justifications all the time to placate an emotional and impulsive public. Instead, the evidence suggests that presidents use humanitarian justifications widely across interventions types, but exercise discretion in their emphasis of these claims in potential security interventions. This pattern is in line with the domestic coalition expectation that presidents employ humanitarian claims to persuade cooperative internationalists but must be careful not to overstate these claims to avoid backlash from the same group.

Having illustrated the pattern of justifications in national addresses, the analysis then turns to the micro-level to investigate whether and how foreign policy beliefs influence individuals' responses to humanitarian claims. Survey experiments vary both the type and sincerity of justifications to evaluate these hypotheses. The findings confirm that cooperative internationalists possess a unique combination of traits that makes them a key target audience for justifications—they are skeptical of military force, willing to take action to express their opposition, and sufficiently attentive to politics to react quickly to interventions and threaten leaders' prospects for reelection. The results also show that cooperative internationalists were the only group whose support changed significantly based on the type of justifications used—

militant internationalists are supportive and isolationists are opposed to interventions regardless how the president justified military action, but the majority of cooperative internationalists only offered their support when the president included humanitarian justifications. These findings indicate that humanitarian justifications are useful in security interventions because they are uniquely capable of bolstering support among the group otherwise most likely to form a politically costly opposition.

Because humanitarian claims generate support from both cooperative and militant internationalists, presidents should have an incentive to use these appeals as often as possible. Why, then, does the pattern of justifications show that presidents consistently limit their emphasis of humanitarian explanations for security interventions? I argue that cooperative internationalists both create the need for humanitarian justifications and constrain their use. Leveraging the survey experiment's variation in the sincerity of justifications, I show that all respondents offered significantly lower support when the president used humanitarian claims as a cover for his own political agenda. However, only cooperative internationalists were significantly affected by evidence the president used insincere humanitarian justifications to make the case for an intervention motivated primarily by security concerns. These individuals offered lower support for the intervention as a whole, but also reported a reduced likelihood of voting for the president's reelection. Based on these results, if presidents need to maintain the support of cooperative internationalists they have an incentive not to overstate or misuse humanitarian claims.

On the surface, this finding appears to be good news for the strength of democratic accountability. The core constituency will impose political costs when the president is caught using insincere justifications, reducing the benefits of and opportunities for deception. The

negative consequences of deception are not limited to humanitarian justifications—leaders face comparable political costs for the use of deceptive security claims—but different segments of the public impose these costs for different justifications. Findings from the survey experiment show that individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs punish leaders for the misuse of humanitarian justifications, while individuals with militant internationalist beliefs hold leaders accountable for deceptive security justifications. However, the experimental results also show that presidents can mitigate these political costs, even among cooperative internationalists, by employing half-truths that combine insincere humanitarian justifications with sincere security claims. If leaders use humanitarian claims as a secondary explanation for security interventions—as the pattern of justifications in Chapter 3 indicates they often do—the costs of deception and risk of backlash may be insufficient to prevent presidents from misleading their publics.

The experimental approach employed in these chapters directly varies the type and sincerity of the president's justifications to provide micro-level data on how communications influence individuals' support for military action. It ensures that all respondents receive the same information about the intervention, allows me to directly probe foreign policy beliefs and separate the effect of the justification from support for the president, and, through randomization, controls for the effects of potentially confounding pre-treatment covariates. The benefits of this approach are two-fold. First, it establishes a clear link between the justifications used and respondents' support for military intervention, assuaging concerns about whether all individuals heard the same speech or explanations for action. Second, it enables me to directly measure foreign policy beliefs, support for intervention, views of the president, and support for future interventions for the same group of individuals at the same point in time. This data collection

facilitates the evaluation of multiple micro-level implications for the domestic coalition argument in one place.

Despite these benefits, the experimental approach also has significant limitations, most notably in terms of its external validity. While the experiments reveal how individuals responded when presented with information about the president's justifications for action, they do not demonstrate the effect of these justifications on public opinion in actual cases of intervention. Future research employing public opinion data is needed to determine whether the combination of humanitarian and security justifications Bush and Clinton used in the case studies influenced public opinion as the experimental findings suggest. However, as Druckman and Jacobs (2015, 116) note, "The study of presidents teaches a healthy appreciation for the distinction between presidential strategic intent to move public opinion and the actual effect of the White House on Americans." The domestic coalition argument contends that presidents always attempt to shape public attitudes towards military action by appealing to a diversity of foreign policy beliefs and that humanitarian justifications are well suited to persuading cooperative internationalists, but the effectiveness of this strategy in any given case is likely to be subject to the same four conditions that Druckman and Jacobs (2015, 15) find to "modify or obstruct elite efforts to move citizen attitudes" more broadly:

> First, when the public holds strong opinions about an issue, it will be difficult to change basic preferences or the importance attached to the policy. This creates incentives for presidents to use their private polling to focus on weakly held attitudes or gaps in public knowledge. Second, competing messages from other elites and/or the media can neutralize presidential efforts to influence the public's opinions. Research shows that counterframes often offset each other by motivating individuals to resist any one perspective. Third, the president's own history sets parameters on what can be done. Presidents with checkered histories on an issue or low credibility may find individuals more inclined to resist or question their messages. Conversely, public approval of a president's performance increases his influence in moving opinion. Fourth, efforts by elites to direct public opinion are

colored by real-world events, especially if circumstances and communications clash.

Given these conditions, presidents' attempts to persuade cooperative internationalists by providing humanitarian justifications for action are more likely to be successful when their information advantages are strong, general approval is stable, and—consistent with the results of deception presented in Chapter 5—claims do not diverge wildly from reports of conditions on the ground.

While the experimental findings indicate that presidents should use humanitarian claims if they want to persuade cooperative internationalists, this analysis also cannot determine whether administrations have these incentives in mind when developing communication strategies. To evaluate whether presidents recognize and respond to these incentives, the case studies of the 1991 Gulf War and U.S. policy towards Bosnia 1993-95 consider whether the pattern of humanitarian claims reflects an intentional White House communication plan. Archival materials from the Gulf War show that the George H.W. Bush administration was concerned about public opinion, recognized sources of heterogeneity in the public's approach to foreign policy, and developed a communication strategy that included humanitarian claims in an effort to build the broadest possible domestic coalition. In particular, the Bush administration used humanitarian claims to target religious communities and college students who expressed concern about the human costs of war. Additionally, officials outlined the risk of backlash and cautioned against the overuse of humanitarian appeals.

The Bosnia case then demonstrates that the same domestic coalition logic at play in security interventions also drives communication strategies in potential humanitarian interventions and during periods of action short of intervention. Speeches and documents from this conflict show that the Clinton administration explicitly considered sources of internationalist

and isolationist sentiment and consistently targeted cooperative internationalists. During periods of non-intervention, official statements used humanitarian claims to manage domestic pressure and prevent cooperative internationalists from joining a coalition in support of military escalation. When the administration's policy shifted to include increased participation in NATO airstrikes and the commitment of U.S. troops to help enforce the Dayton Accords, humanitarian claims were repurposed to mobilize a coalition in support of intervention. Combined, evidence from the case studies demonstrates that while U.S. policy and the objectives of interventions change over time, the target audience and the justifications used to bring this audience into the domestic coalition remain the same. Taken as a whole, the multi-method approach provides evidence in support of the domestic coalition argument at multiple levels of analysis.

The Domestic Coalition in a Changing Political Context

To this point, the analysis has provided evidence that the central role of cooperative internationalists in domestic coalitions accounts for the pattern of humanitarian justifications in post-Cold War interventions. Specifically, the project systematically analyzed national addresses from the past 25 years to show that presidents from both political parties have talked about foreign policy decisions in comparable language and employed consistent communication strategies to build broad coalitions of support for military action. However, the first months of the Trump administration indicate this White House may take a dramatically different approach to both foreign policy and communication. This potential shift in the U.S. approach to foreign policy coincides with evidence of dramatic polarization on a wide range of political issues to suggest that both Americans' policy attitudes and the political context are in a state of flux. These shifts raise the question: How stable are White House concerns about the domestic coalition and individuals' foreign policy preferences during periods of dramatic political change?

Change and Consistency in Foreign Policy

Public opinion polls following the 2016 presidential election reveal significant, polarizing shifts in the public's attitudes towards foreign policy and trust in the actors involved in communicating the White House's message to the domestic audience. In terms of foreign policy, Pew polls show that Democrats and Republicans now diverge significantly in their perceptions of the greatest threats facing the United States (Pew Research Center 2017a). The three most polarizing threats were: 1) refugees from Iraq and Syria, whom 70 percent of Republicans viewed as a major threat compared to only 19 percent of Democrats, 2) global climate change, which 88 percent of Democrats and only 18 percent of Republicans saw as a major threat, and 3) Russia's power and influence, which posed a major threat to 70 percent of Democrats but only 39 percent of Republicans (Pew Research Center 2017a). Perceptions of Russia have undergone the most dramatic change, with Republicans and Democrats changing places in their views of Russia as an adversary in 2017. At the beginning of 2016, 20 percent of Democrats and 25 percent of Republicans thought of Russia as an adversary, but by 2017 the percentage of Democrats with this view increased to 38 percent while the percentage of Republicans dropped to 20 percent (Kiley 2017). This change marked the first time in the last decade that Democrats have viewed Russia more critically than Republicans. It corresponded with an increase in the percentage of Democrats who hold a negative view of Vladimir Putin, as well as partisan differences in respondents' beliefs that Russia was behind the hacking of the Democratic National Committee (48 percent of Republicans and 93 percent of Democrats) and that U.S. sanctions against Russia were the correct response to hacking accusations (39 percent of Republicans compared to 51 percent of Democrats) (Kiley 2017).

In addition to influencing the public's views of the most pressing foreign policy issues, polls conducted in early 2017 also reveal that Republicans' trust in the government increased by 17 percent compared to 2015 (11 to 28 percent) while trust among Democrats declined from 26 percent to 15 percent (Pew Research Center 2017c). Similarly, stark partisan divides now appear in opinions about the role of the media in democracies and perceptions that news organizations favor one side of the political debate over the other (Bump 2017). Therefore, the public's view of different foreign policy issues changed at the same time that the power of the president to frame these issues to his benefit and ability of the media to provide a platform for experts to agree with or dispute official claims appeared to be weakened.

However, despite departures on other policy dimensions, one early source of consistency with previous administrations was Trump's use of humanitarian justifications in the context of military interventions. In his first address to a joint session of Congress, Trump explained that his administration would develop a new plan to defeat ISIS and in so doing stop a group that has "slaughtered Muslims and Christians, and men and women and children of all faiths and beliefs" (Trump 2017a). Similarly, Trump justified U.S. airstrikes against Syria as a response to the regime's "horrible chemical weapons attack on innocent civilians. Using a deadly nerve agent, Assad choked out the lives of helpless men, women, and children. It was a slow and brutal death for so many" (Trump 2017b). Surprisingly, these justifications closely reflect Obama's call for action in response to the Syria's use of chemical weapons in 2013: "Assad's government gassed to death over a thousand people, including hundreds of children. The images from this massacre are sickening: Men, women, children lying in rows, killed by poison gas. Others foaming at the mouth, gasping for breath" (Obama 2013).

In the early months of the Trump administration, while the military actions that the Trump White House would need to justify remained largely unknown, humanitarian justifications provided a rare example of consistency in the face of other changes. This persistence suggests that the basic relationship between the domestic coalition and communication strategies remained intact. In the context of increasing polarization, humanitarian justifications may prove particularly important to efforts to circumvent otherwise unprecedented levels of opposition.

Taken as a whole, these changes in the U.S. political climate raise two questions about the validity of the domestic coalition argument and the continued utility of humanitarian justifications: 1) Are the experimental results presented in Chapter 4 stable in the face of political changes? 2) Has the importance of foreign policy beliefs been overshadowed by partisanship in an increasingly polarized political environment? The following sub-sections address these questions in turn to establish the scope conditions of the domestic coalition argument and highlight areas for future research.

The Stability of Foreign Policy Beliefs

These dramatic changes in the political climate could limit the scope of the domestic coalition argument, either by changing individuals' willingness to support military intervention overall or by altering their perception of alternative justifications. Given the sensitivity of survey experiments to differences in wording, samples, and unobservable idiosyncrasies of the time period in which they are fielded, Druckman et al. (2011, 20) suggest that "Analytically, a single random assignment makes it difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the mediating pathways of numerous intervening variables. To clarify such effects, a researcher needs to design several experiments, all with different kinds of treatments." As a robustness check of the experimental

results presented in Chapters 4 and 5, I also conducted a series of experimental pre-tests and follow-up surveys, which help establish the stability of the relationship between justifications and foreign policy beliefs both across samples and over time. Examining trends in the results across this time period is particularly important because together the pre-tests and follow-ups can be used to evaluate the domestic coalition expectations prior to the 2016 election, in the heat of the election campaign, and during the transition to the Trump administration. While this period may be unique in the level of political turmoil, understanding how the election season and presidential transition did or did not influence the effects of foreign policy beliefs is critical for determining the conditions under which these beliefs will be relevant for understanding political attitudes in the future.

Figure 8.1 illustrates support over time for each type of justifications based on respondents' foreign policy beliefs. The trends in support are compiled from a total of nine survey experiments conducted between May 2016 and May 2017. The instruments for each survey are included in the appendix.

Figure 8.1 Changes in Support for Justifications Over Time



Note: Surveys were conducted during 2016 unless otherwise noted.

Comparing the trends for each type of justification demonstrates that, despite dramatic changes in the political environment, responses were relatively consistent over time within each foreign policy group. Isolationists (ISO) offered the lowest levels of support for all types of justifications and this support remained low across experiments. By contrast, a majority of cooperative (CI) and militant (MI) internationalists offered support for humanitarian and combined justifications with some variation in the relative magnitude of support. However, while consistently lower than militant internationalists, the trends in cooperative internationalists' support for terrorism and foreign policy restraint justifications—which explained action as a response to cross-border aggression in a foreign country—show an uptick in the percentage of individuals in favor of intervention beginning in October 2016 and continuing through December 2016. This trend indicates that cooperative internationalists' willingness to support security justifications increased during the height of the election campaign and immediate aftermath. This increase could be explained both by reports of terrorist attacks carried out by the Islamic State during this period and by efforts from candidates of both parties to appear strong on terror during the campaign.

While the general pattern of support for alternative justifications is stable over time, some variation in samples collected at different points during a particularly contentious period in U.S. politics is not surprising. Interpreting the substantive importance of this variation hinges on whether the changes undermine the significant differences in support based on individuals' foreign policy beliefs that are associated with the domestic coalition argument. Table 8.1 reports the levels of support across experiments, as illustrated in Figure 8.1, and highlights the samples in which the pattern of support is consistent with the domestic coalition expectations.

Table 8.1 Trends in Support for Justifications by Foreign Policy Beliefs

	Exp. 1: May 2016	Exp. 2: June 2016	Exp. 3: July 2016	Exp. 4: August 2016	Exp. 5: October 2016	Exp. 6: November 2016	Exp. 7: December 12, 2016	Exp. 8: December 19, 2016	Exp. 9: May 2017
Humanitarian	48	46	60	56	57	57	---	57	65
CI	52	53	61	59	71	63	---	68	70
MI	58	67	78	59	56	67	---	61	86
ISO	29	15	21	33	19	23	---	32	26
Terror	58	47	54	54	63	62	---	---	58
CI	43	49	48	51	60	58	---	---	57
MI	85	72	82	79	91	81	---	---	71
ISO	50	31	33	28	46	35	---	---	48
FPR	---	37	---	---	---	---	53	68	46
CI	---	38	---	---	---	---	59	71	38
MI	---	58	---	---	---	---	76	71	94
ISO	---	26	---	---	---	---	20	54	30
Combined (Terror)	68	---	62	63	63	59	---	---	62
CI	65	---	60	66	55	61	---	---	56
MI	92	---	83	79	84	89	---	---	87
ISO	45	---	31	30	42	17	---	---	46
Combined (FPR)	---	51	---	---	---	---	59	63	65
CI	---	53	---	---	---	---	71	71	68
MI	---	72	---	---	---	---	67	71	81
ISO	---	36	---	---	---	---	11	14	31

Shaded columns represent experiments in which findings are consistent with the domestic coalition hypotheses. Experiments 1, 2, and 4 did not include information about experts' account of the conflict. All samples are from MTurk with the exception of experiment 8, which is a national sample fielded through SSI.

In six of the nine experiments, including the most recent follow-up fielded in May 2017, participants responded to alternative justifications as expected by the domestic coalition argument, i.e., cooperative internationalists appear as the group whose support is significantly influenced by the addition of humanitarian justifications to security explanations. Cooperative internationalists' support for the combined justification scenarios was comparable across the nine experiments. Rather than variability in their response to combined justifications, the findings indicate that in the disconfirming samples cooperative internationalists offered higher than normal support for security justifications which muted the positive effect of adding a humanitarian claim. Notably, the October 2016 and November 2016 samples were collected around the height of the presidential election when all sides had an incentive to appear strong on terror. The gradual decline of support for security justifications among cooperative internationalists in the aftermath of the election suggests this increase is an artifact of an abnormal period in which military interventions are particularly unlikely to take place (Gaubatz 1999).[54]

Evaluating Inconsistencies

Alternatively, the pattern of results in experiment 8 present challenges that are not easily attributed to any single factor. In this case, the absence of a significant difference in cooperative internationalists' support for security justifications compared to the combined scenario is especially troubling because this survey was conducted on a national sample. The sample included 2,031 U.S. adults and was fielded through Survey Sampling International (SSI) from December 19-30, 2016. In this sample, cooperative internationalists offered high and comparable

[54] The lowering of support for terrorism justifications in the May 2017 sample is also noteworthy because this survey was fielded the same week as a terrorist attack at a concert in Manchester that received significant U.S. media coverage because it involved both young victims and a U.S. musician.

levels of support for humanitarian, security, and combined justifications and the addition of humanitarian claims did not significantly increase their support. Isolationists also responded to security justifications more strongly than in previous samples—54 percent offered their support, representing a 24 percent increase over the next highest level of support for the same justifications. As in the previous experiments, a majority of militant internationalists also supported all three categories of justifications. These changes among cooperative internationalists' and isolationists' support for security justifications raise the question: is support for the domestic coalition hypothesis limited to the sample characteristics associated with Amazon's Mechanical Turk?

There are two categories of potential explanations for the differences between experiment 8 and the other samples. First, differences in convenience samples and the national SSI sample that targets Census demographics could undermine the results. Second, unobserved factors, including potential changes in the political and media environment as the U.S. grappled with evidence of Russian hacking and prepared for the presidential transition, as well as the Christmas holiday, could influence participants' associations with different types of justifications and alter their responses to the treatment scenarios. Evidence in support of the first explanation would effectively falsify the micro-level expectations of the domestic coalition argument and undermine the results presented in Chapter 4. Alternatively, evidence in support of the second explanation would indicate that changes in the political climate may limit the scope of the domestic coalition argument and suggest that future research is needed to determine whether the argument holds among a national sample.

If the changes in support are a result of improved representativeness in the national sample, I expect to find: 1) differences in sample demographics, both overall and in the

composition of different foreign policy groups, 2) that the pattern found in previous experiments holds for individuals in the SSI sample who most closely resemble MTurk participants, and 3) differences in the behavior of foreign policy groups across justification categories. Alternatively, if the inconsistent SSI results are a product of noise—either random or related to the political climate and events of late December—that influenced the meaning and salience of security justifications, I expect that: 1) the demographic composition of the foreign policy groups remains stable, 2) subgroup analysis fails to produce results similar to the MTurk samples, and 3) support for the other justification categories is consistent with the results from previous experiments. I evaluate each of these expectations in turn.

Tables 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4, respectively, summarize the demographic composition of the MTurk sample reported in Chapter 4 which was conducted in July 2016, a follow-up MTurk sample conducted on December 12, 2016 that used a foreign policy restraint scenario as the security justification, and the national SSI sample fielded December 19-30, 2016 which also used a foreign policy restraint scenario.[55] As expected for convenience samples, comparing the MTurk demographics in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 reveals some differences—the July sample contained more female respondents, had a lower average level of education, and included fewer Democrats. Comparing these MTurk experiments to the SSI survey shows that in terms of gender and party identification the demographics of the national sample fall within the range of and are not substantively different from the convenience samples. However, the samples diverge significantly on education, measured here as the percentage of respondents with a college degree.[56] The SSI experiment matched Census education levels, which are lower than the

[55] Table 8.2 repeats the information previously reported in Chapter 4 as Table 4.3. It is duplicated here to facilitate comparisons.
[56] These differences remain when education is measured as the last grade/year of school completed and as whether the individual entered college.

average education level of MTurk respondents. If these differences in education drive the change in results, the connection between foreign policy beliefs and responses to justifications for military action may only hold among educated individuals.

Table 8.2 Demographics by Foreign Policy Beliefs (MTurk July 2016, as presented in Chapter 4)

	Cooperative	*Militant*	*Isolationist*	*All*
Gender *(0=Female; 1=Male)*	0.42	0.46	0.51	0.44
Education *(0=Less than College; 1=College)*	0.55	0.51	0.46	0.52
Party ID *(1=Republican; 7=Democrat)*	4.94	3.44	4.14	4.39
N	850	419	243	1510

Table 8.3 Demographics by Foreign Policy Beliefs (MTurk December 12, 2016)

	Cooperative	*Militant*	*Isolationist*	*All*
Gender *(0=Female; 1=Male)*	0.51	0.52	0.70	0.55
Education *(0=Less than College; 1=College)*	0.58	0.40	0.41	0.49
Party ID *(1=Republican; 7=Democrat)*	5.16	3.46	4.07	4.50
N	106	50	44	201

Table 8.4 Demographics by Foreign Policy Beliefs (SSI December 19-30, 2016)

	Cooperative	*Militant*	*Isolationist*	*All*
Gender *(0=Female; 1=Male)*	0.45	0.43	0.49	0.45
Education *(0=Less than College; 1=College)*	0.36	0.31	0.28	0.33
Party ID *(1=Republican; 7=Democrat)*	4.91	3.90	4.43	4.42
N	871	808	349	2031

I took two steps to evaluate the likelihood that differences in education are responsible for the inconsistencies in the SSI sample. First, tests of proportions demonstrate that there are no significant differences in the level of support for humanitarian, security, or combined justifications offered by individuals with different education backgrounds.[57] Nor did education make a significant difference in cooperative internationalists' support for security justifications ($p=0.8022$)—the factor responsible for inconsistencies with the domestic coalition expectations. Second, I replicated the analysis of support based on foreign policy beliefs using only the subset of SSI respondents with a college degree to determine whether the domestic coalition pattern reappeared among educated respondents in this sample. Rather than replicating the pattern of results presented in Chapter 4 and shown in the majority experiments outlined in Table 8.1 above, cooperative internationalists' heightened support for security justifications remained—73 percent compared to 71 percent in the full sample.[58] Taken as a whole, these diagnostics consistently fail to provide evidence that the difference in findings is driven by education levels or the increased representativeness of the SSI sample.

Finally, if the difference in results is a symptom of a more representative sample, I would also expect to find general differences in the way respondents thought about and supported multiple types of justifications for military action. Instead, the levels of support for humanitarian and combined justifications, as reported in Table 8.1, are consistent with MTurk responses to comparable treatment conditions across all subgroups.[59] Additionally, militant internationalists' support for security justifications remained consistent. The substantive differences between

[57] See appendix for full results.
[58] I also ran the analysis using only subsets of respondents who were Democrats or had entered college. Neither case returned results consistent with the MTurk findings.
[59] Responses to the December 12, 2016 MTurk survey are the most appropriate point of comparison for the security and combined justifications because this instrument included the same foreign policy restraint justifications that were used on the SSI sample. The wording of the humanitarian-only justification scenario is consistent and thus comparable across all samples.

samples are thus limited to cooperative internationalists' and isolationists' support for security justifications, which is consistent with the argument that factors in the political and media environment altered the meaning of these justifications among these subgroups.

In sum, evaluating the alternative explanations provides no evidence that the difference in results is driven by the improved representativeness of the SSI sample. Instead, the evidence is consistent with the noise explanation and the most recent survey results indicate that responses are returning to their previous patterns in the election's aftermath. Therefore, while additional research is needed, the bulk of the evidence indicates that the results presented in the previous chapters are valid and, combined with replication efforts from five additional samples, provide support for the domestic coalition claims.

The Effects of Political Polarization

The dramatic partisan differences in political attitudes outlined at the beginning of this chapter pose an additional question for the domestic coalition argument: To what extent do foreign policy beliefs remain relevant for understanding public opinion in increasingly polarized environments? Up to this point, the survey experiments used to evaluate the connection between individuals' foreign policy beliefs and support for alternative justifications primed respondents to set aside partisan considerations, telling them: "The situation reflects actions taken by presidents from both political parties. It is NOT about the current president and it is NOT about any specific country in the news today."[60] In reality, individuals' opinions of the current president influence their willingness to support his foreign policies and partisanship provides a heuristic for evaluating the merits of complex foreign policy plans. How the partisanship of the president and

[60] At different stages surrounding the 2016 election respondents were also told that the scenario was not about any of the current presidential candidates or the president-elect.

individuals' foreign policy beliefs interact to shape attitudes towards military action is thus an important and open question.

To investigate the relevance of foreign policy beliefs in a polarized environment, I conducted an additional survey experiment that randomized the president's partisan identity.[61] I fielded this experiment to 1,171 U.S. adults via MTurk on June 3-6, 2017. Within each category of justifications—humanitarian, security (FPR), and combined—participants were randomly assigned to read justifications for military action from either a Democratic or Republican president. Combining information about respondent's assigned treatment condition with their self-reported party identity allows me to measure whether individuals respond differently to Democratic or Republican presidents or to co-partisans. Table 8.5 presents the results of this analysis.

Table 8.5 Support for Justifications by Partisanship of the President

	Overall Support	Co-partisan President	Republican President	Democratic President
Humanitarian	58	61	55	61
CI	67	69	66	68
MI	74	76	75	72
ISO	9	8	5	14
Security (FPR)	59	62	54	65
CI	63	60	63	62
MI	74	70	57	86
ISO	26	55	25	29
Combo	50	59	49	50
CI	52	59	48	56
MI	65	80	62	67
ISO	13	13	30	0

Table reports the percentage of respondents in each category who supported intervention.

[61] Survey instrument included in appendix.

The results outlined in Table 8.5 indicate that among each group of foreign policy beliefs, support for humanitarian and security justifications remains stable regardless of the partisanship of the president. The exception is isolationists, who were more than twice as likely to support security interventions proposed by a president from the same political party. However, given isolationists' opposition to prolonged involvement in international affairs, even their support for co-partisan presidents is unlikely to be sufficient to sustain interventions in the long-term. There is also a modest partisan pattern in support for combined justifications where both cooperative and militant internationalists offered the highest support for justifications from presidents who shared their party identity.

While suggestive, the summary statistics presented in Table 8.5 are not a direct test of the interaction between partisanship and the effect of foreign policy beliefs on support for intervention. To examine whether these trends meet the standards of statistical significance, I also used logistic regression models with interactions for the binary co-partisan and foreign policy belief variables to evaluate the extent to which the president's party identity moderates the effect of foreign policy beliefs on support (Baron and Kenny 1986). The results, presented in full in the appendix, confirm that the only significant moderation occurs for isolationists in the security condition. In this case, a positive and significant interaction term ($p=0.015$) indicates that individuals with isolationist values are significantly more likely to support security justifications offered by a president from their own political party. Otherwise, the moderation analysis provides no evidence that the effects of foreign policy beliefs on support are significantly altered by partisanship. Thus, while the U.S. political climate is rapidly changing, to date foreign policy beliefs appear to remain relevant for understanding support for military interventions.

Contributions and Implications

This research makes three main contributions. First, it highlights the role that moral appeals play in mediating the relationship between the president and public support for the use of force. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the findings imply that national security justifications are neither the most effective nor the only way to bolster public support for military action. In addition to threats to their own self-interest, individuals also respond to moral appeals for military action, even outside of cases of humanitarian intervention. By demonstrating how humanitarian appeals contribute to domestic support for intervention the findings help explain why these justifications have historical precedents long before the evolution of humanitarian intervention norms (Bass 2008; Bogen 1966; Rodogno 2012).

Second, the project speaks to the broader questions of how much public support is necessary to facilitate intervention and the conditions under which presidents are able to generate this support. Studies of public attitudes towards military action implicitly assume that more support is better without considering the threshold at which support is sufficient to initiate intervention. Disaggregating public opinion based on individuals' foreign policy beliefs reveals that all support is not created equal and that the content of support matters as much as the magnitude. Regardless of the overall magnitude of support, if the domestic coalition does not include cooperative internationalists, it will be difficult to sustain and subject to active opposition. Presidents are able to build this necessary coalition of support by employing humanitarian justifications that appeal to both cooperative and militant internationalists. However, if presidents attempt to use insincere humanitarian claims as the sole pretext for security interventions or as a cover for their own political agenda, humanitarian justifications will not generate sufficient public support. Selecting the right combination of justifications thus

gives presidents leeway to pursue military action, but there are limits to the power of humanitarian rhetoric.

Finally, the analysis highlights the importance of connecting findings from scholarship on representation and political psychology that highlight heterogeneity in public opinion to the study of attitudes towards military action. In particular, the U.S. public is a diverse audience with systematically different foreign policy beliefs that influence its response to military action. While the corresponding percentage of the population varies, cooperative internationalist, militant internationalist, and isolationist beliefs have persisted for more than 30 years and are likely here to stay. Disregarding this source of heterogeneity in individuals' approaches to foreign policy risks overstating the stability of support and overlooking likely sources of domestic opposition.

Implications for the Presidency

Through these theoretical and empirical contributions, the project also has implications for the presidency, humanitarian and anti-war advocates, and U.S. foreign policy. First, for presidential administrations, the project highlights the leeway presidents have to frame military interventions to their benefit and build public support for action. Even among cooperative internationalists, the group most likely to impose political costs for unpopular interventions, presidents are viewed as the authority on foreign policy decisions and can easily prime these individuals' other-regarding concerns by alluding to humanitarian objectives. Notably, these allusions require minimal time and are in fact more effective when they are used as supplements to security claims in security-driven interventions. Humanitarian justifications are thus a key part of effective presidential appeals, but more is not always better. In security-driven interventions, the president's persuasive power will be maximized if he or she employs humanitarian claims sparingly and avoids attracting scrutiny of their validity.

The findings also provide guidance for how the White House should interpret public opinion polls regarding attitudes towards military action. Aggregate numbers alone are insufficient to separate the base of supporters—militant internationalists—from potential swing supporters—cooperative internationalists—and isolationists who will not be persuaded by any justification strategy short of a direct and immediate attack on the U.S. Because presidents should be concerned both with maintaining a majority of support and preventing the formation of politically costly dissent, understanding who makes up the domestic coalition is key to evaluating the threat of domestic opposition. If the coalition does not contain a significant number of cooperative internationalists, the White House will likely face vocal and politically problematic opposition. Presidential administrations thus have an incentive to poll foreign policy orientations more directly and apply the logic of electoral coalition building to support for military action. Additionally, communication strategies will benefit from acknowledging the central role played by individuals with cooperative internationalist values, recognizing that these individuals exist across party lines, and monitoring changes in their support over the course of interventions.

Humanitarian and Anti-War Advocates

Second, the project has implications for the strategies used by humanitarian advocates and anti-war activists. On the one hand, the experimental results appear to mitigate the gravest concerns about the misuse of humanitarian appeals—i.e., that presidents' overreliance on humanitarian claims in non-humanitarian interventions could justify otherwise illegitimate interventions and weaken the international community's willingness to respond to mass atrocities in the future. When humanitarian claims were perceived as insincere or illegitimate, they no longer bolstered support among cooperative internationalists and the perceived misuse of these

claims reduced respondents' willingness to vote for the president's reelection. However, even illegitimate humanitarian justifications did not undermine respondents' future support for U.S. action to end an ongoing genocide. Therefore, the widespread use of humanitarian justifications outlined in Chapter 3 does not appear to pose a direct threat to the future development of humanitarian norms. Instead, because humanitarian claims increase public expectations that the intervention will create humanitarian outcomes, savvy advocates can use the president's rhetoric to pressure the White House to pursue humanitarian objectives.

However, organizations opposed to war, as well as those concerned about the treatment of foreign civilians, should be concerned by the ease with which the White House is able to co-opt the humanitarian narrative. Krebs (2015) has demonstrated that anti-terror narratives allow the president to block channels for dissent and reduce the political costs of foreign policy decisions.[62] The experimental results in Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that humanitarian justifications, when used correctly, have a similar effect on opportunities for domestic opposition to take hold. To increase their chances of effectively countering the president's rhetoric, anti-war movements should shine light on and directly counter the validity of the president's humanitarian justifications, focusing their messaging on cooperative internationalists. If movements can convince cooperative internationalists that the president's humanitarian explanations are insincere or illegitimate, they both weaken the president's domestic coalition and attract the individuals most likely to become engaged in the opposition. Because of the president's first-mover and information advantages, efforts to directly counter the White House's claims are likely to be more effective that attempts to reframe the conflict as a whole.

[62] See also Krebs and Lobasz's (2007) account of the effect of the war on terror narrative on opposition to the George W. Bush administration's justifications for the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.

U.S. Foreign Policy

Finally, the project has two sets of implications for the practice of U.S. foreign policy, including the influence of humanitarian norms in contemporary interventions and the status of democratic accountability for the use of force. Following debates over the prudence of using force to end humanitarian crises and the responsibilities of U.S. leadership (Mandelbaum 1996; Power 2002), with the exception of short-lived involvement in Libya in 2011, U.S.-led humanitarian interventions increasingly appeared to be a relic of the 1990s. This project shows that while the practice of humanitarian intervention may be in decline, humanitarian rhetoric remains a central part of contemporary U.S. military action. Presidents have incentives to use these justifications in security-driven interventions to persuade cooperative internationalists, but doing so also increases the public's expectation that intervention will lead to humanitarian outcomes. Thus, presidents' use of humanitarian appeals may tie their hands in the practice of intervention, increasing attention to the safety of civilians and the success of post-conflict reconstruction.

Additionally, democratic institutions that incentivize presidents to obtain and sustain public support are known to shape when and how the U.S. pursues military interventions (Maoz and Russett 1993; Reiter and Stam 2002; Russett 1993; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2010). The domestic coalition argument implies that this burden of democratic accountability is not evenly distributed across the American public. Instead, it is individuals with cooperative internationalist values who hold the key to domestic consent for action and impose political costs on leaders who act without sufficient public support. The prevalence of individuals with these views and their perception of the president's credibility are central determinants of the conditions under which the White House is able to generate the support necessary to ease public constraints on the use of

force. While grounded in moral foundations, foreign policy beliefs can shift in response to major geopolitical or economic changes (Chanley 1999; Kertzer 2013). If militant internationalist sentiments become more prevalent, presidents will have an easier time mobilizing the domestic audience to support military action. Alternatively, if growing isolationist sentiment pulls individuals from the cooperative internationalist category, the president will have fewer options for building a sustainable domestic coalition. If this shift marks a decline in cooperative internationalists' engagement with politics, it may also lower the risks of costly domestic dissent; however, if former cooperative internationalists remain engaged they may instead become a powerful and consistent source of opposition to humanitarian and security interventions. Similarly, if polarization undermines the credibility of the president among individuals who are not co-partisans, Republican presidents will face tighter domestic constraints on the use of force than Democratic presidents, whose electoral coalition makes their message more likely to resonate with a significant number of cooperative internationalists.

Limitations and Areas for Future Research

This project takes a first step towards understanding how the public's foreign policy preferences shape White House communication strategies and influence the president's ability to mobilize domestic support for action. However, the findings raise a number of questions beyond the scope of this dissertation that create avenues for future research. First, while the project relies on survey experiments to evaluate the relationship between foreign policy beliefs and responses to justifications for military action, future research is needed to validate these findings with a national sample. Additionally, the argument carries implications for aggregate public opinion and the analysis of public opinion data from recent conflicts can further clarify how foreign

policy beliefs interact with other factors to shape attitudes in the context of ongoing military interventions.

Second, here I focus primarily on how presidents employ justifications to mobilize the domestic audience at the moment when their information and first-mover advantages are greatest: the build-up to military action. The case studies provide an initial overview of how justification strategies change over time, but future work should consider whether individuals' foreign policy beliefs also influence the durability of their support over the course of an intervention and whether the justifications they find most persuasive remain consistent. In particular, I would expect the support of isolationists to decline most rapidly, the support of cooperative internationalists to be particularly sensitive to changes in the relative success and human costs of intervention, and militant internationalists to offer the most steadfast support.

Finally, here I focused on how presidents use humanitarian justifications to bolster the support of cooperative internationalists, the group that is both skeptical of military action and the most likely source of costly political opposition. In addition to increasing the level of support, humanitarian claims are also expected to reduce the risks of dissent—even cooperative internationalists who do not offer explicit support for military action justified in humanitarian terms should be less likely to take direct action to oppose the intervention. This expectation is in line with Krebs' (2015) argument that by establishing the dominant narrative of the intervention the president can block the available channels for dissent. Directly examining the effect of official humanitarian justifications on both the content and magnitude of domestic dissent is a central task for future work.

CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX

Chicago Council Survey Measures of Foreign Policy Beliefs, "Very Important" Foreign Policy Goals for Cooperative and Militant Internationalists

These policies are taken from Mandelbaum and Schneider (1979, 41-42). Reponses were collected from 13 waves of the Chicago Council Survey.

Table A2.1: Foreign Policy Goals Associated with Cooperative and Militant Internationalists

Foreign Policy Beliefs	*Associated Foreign Policy Goals*
Cooperative (Liberal) Internationalism	Keeping peace in the world.
	Securing adequate supplies of energy.
	Fostering international cooperation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation, and energy.
	Worldwide arms control.
	Helping solve world inflation.
	Combating world hunger.
	Maintaining a balance of power.
	Strengthening the United Nations.
	Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries.
Militant (Conservative) Internationalism	Containing Communism
	Protecting the interests of American business abroad.
	Strengthening countries who are friendly toward us.
	Defending our allies' security.
	Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression.
	Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations.
	Promoting the development of capitalism abroad.

Table A2.2: Importance of Cooperative Internationalist Goals

	1974	1979	1982	1987	1995	1998	2001	2002	2008	2010	2012	2014	2015
Keeping peace in the world.	85	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Securing adequate supplies of energy.	76	78	70	69	62	64	69	75	80	68	--	66	61
Fostering international cooperation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation, and energy.	66	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Worldwide arms control.	66	64	64	69	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Helping solve world inflation.	64	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Combating world hunger	60	59	58	63	56	62	34	61	46	42	42	42	42
Maintaining a balance of power.	48	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Strengthening the United Nations.	46	47	48	46	51	45	46	57	39	37	35	37	--
Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries.	39	35	35	37	22	29	20	30	--	--	--	--	--
Average	**61**	**57**	**55**	**57**	**48**	**50**	**43**	**56**	**55**	**49**	**37**	**48**	**52**

Table A2.3: Importance of Militant Internationalist Goals

	1974	1979	1982	1987	1995	1998	2001	2002	2008	2010	2012	2014	2015
Containing Communism.	55	60	59	57	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Protecting the interests of American business abroad.	39	45	44	43	52	--	30	49	--	--	--	44	--
Strengthening countries who are friendly toward us.	38	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Defending our allies' security.	33	50	50	56	41	44	--	57	--	--	--	38	38
Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression.	28	34	--	32	24	32	--	41	24	24	--	25	--
Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations.	28	26	29	30	25	29	24	34	17	--	14	17	--
Promoting the development of capitalism abroad.	17	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	19	--	--	--
Average	**34**	**43**	**46**	**44**	**36**	**35**	**27**	**45**	**21**	**22**	**14**	**31**	**38**

Table A2.4 Cross Tabulation of Foreign Policy Beliefs and Ideology

	Liberal	*Conservative*	*Moderate*	*Total*
Cooperative Internationalist	62% (526)	17% (142)	21% (180)	100% (848)
Militant Internationalist	23% (96)	58% (243)	19% (79)	100% (418)
Isolationist	38% (92)	32% (77)	30% (74)	100% (243)
N	715	462	333	

Percentages are calculated across rows to report the percentage of individuals with each category of foreign policy beliefs that identify with the given political ideology. Counts reported in parentheses.

Table A2.5: Cross Tabulation of Foreign Policy Beliefs by Partisan ID, Leaners Coded as Independents

	Democrat No Lean	*Republican No Lean*	*Independent with Leaners*	*Total*
Cooperative Internationalist	40% (342)	10% (83)	50% (423)	100% (848)
Militant Internationalist	20% (82)	40% (166)	41% (170)	100% (418)
Isolationist	33% (56)	18% (43)	59% (144)	100% (243)
N	480	292	738	

Percentages are calculated across rows to report the percentage of individuals with each category of foreign policy beliefs that identify with the given party. Counts reported in parentheses.

Table A2.6: Distribution of Strong Partisans by Foreign Policy Beliefs

	Strong Democrat	*Strong Republican*	*Total*
Cooperative Internationalist	16% (138)	1% (11)	17% (149)
Militant Internationalist	5% (19)	12% (50)	17% (69)
Isolationist	6% (14)	5% (11)	11% (25)
N	171	72	

Percentages are calculated across rows to report the percentage of individuals with each category of foreign policy beliefs that identify as strong partisans. Counts reported in parentheses.

A2.7 Results of Logistic Regressions Predicting Cooperative Internationalism by Party ID



Figure illustrates the marginal effect of party identification on the predicted probability an individual is a cooperative internationalist. Results are shown clockwise for the party identification scale (1=Strong Democrat; 7=Strong Republican) and binary variables (0=did not identify as; 1=identified as) for Democrats, Republicans, and independents.

A2.8 Results of Logistic Regressions Predicting Militant Internationalism by Party ID



Figure illustrates the marginal effect of party identification on the predicted probability an individual is a militant internationalist. Results are shown clockwise for the party identification scale (1=Strong Democrat; 7=Strong Republican) and binary variables (0=did not identify as; 1=identified as) for Democrats, Republicans, and independents.

A2.9 Results of Logistic Regressions Predicting Isolationism by Party ID



Figure illustrates the marginal effect of party identification on the predicted probability an individual is an isolationist. Results are shown clockwise for the party identification scale (1=Strong Democrat; 7=Strong Republican) and binary variables (0=did not identify as; 1=identified as) for Democrats, Republicans, and independents.

CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX

Table A3.1: Included Categories of Presidential Speeches

Type of Speech	Description	Number of Speeches	Percentage of Total Documents
Remarks	Includes "remarks" in the title, most often commemorating a holiday or anniversary, announcing a new initiative, or before departing on a planned trip.	158	19.7%
Statement	Includes "statement" in the title, most often on a pressing event, emergency, or (in)action by Congress.	277	34.6%
News/Press Conference	Includes the prepared portion of presidents' news and press conferences. Excludes news conferences given with other leaders or immediately following events, in addition to non-prepared, off-the-cuff remarks and responses to reporters' questions.	58	7.2%
Radio	Includes all weekly addresses broadcast over the radio.	225	28.1%
State of the Union	Yearly addresses before a joint session of Congress on the State of the Union.	16	2.0%
Address	All other labeled addresses, excluding the State of the Union, most often announcing a new initiative, in response to an attack, or to update the nation on the progress of ongoing military action.	42	5.2%
Message	Includes "message" in the title, most often on the observance of a holiday.	13	1.6%
Other	All other speeches that address the nation as the primary audience. Includes untitled speeches and prepared exchanges with reporters outside of news or press conferences.	12	1.5%

Table A3.2: Dictionary of Humanitarian Justifications

Humanitarian Phrases	Percentage Correct	Humanitarian Phrases	Percentage Correct
abhorrent	100%	savage	100%
appalled	100%	shelling	100%
atrocit*	100%	siege	100%
barbarism	100%	slaughter	100%
bodies	100%	snipers	100%
cleansing	100%	starvation	100%
concentration	100%	starving	100%
conscripting	100%	refuge*	90%
convoy	100%	population	90%
defenseless	100%	brutal*	89%
detained	100%	humanitarian	87%
dying	100%	displac*	83%
egregious	100%	civilians	82%
exhausted	100%	suffering	80%
flee	100%	surviv*	80%
genocid*	100%	airdrops	80%
heinous	100%	suffer	77%
huddle	100%	tortur*	75%
immoral	100%	hospitals	71%
inhumane	100%	ethnic*	71%
Kosovars	100%	universal	70%
malnourished	100%	innocent	69%
massacre	100%	supplies	67%
mutilation	100%	rations	67%
norms	100%	delivery	66%
oppression	100%	horrif*	66%
palaces	100%	nightmare	66%
reconstruction	100%	rape	66%
revulsion	100%		

Table A3.3: Dictionary of Security Justifications

Security Phrases	Percentage Correct	Security Phrases	Percentage Correct
arming	100%	comply	83%
autonomy	100%	mass	81%
axis	100%	invade	80%
battalions	100%	stability	80%
bunker	100%	inspect*	76%
centrifuge	100%	occup*	75%
defiance	100%	territor*	75%
degrade	100%	resort	75%
destabiliz*	100%	chaos	75%
disarm*	100%	destroy	73%
equipping	100%	withdraw	73%
exercises	100%	extremist	73%
germ	100%	offensive	73%
harbor	100%	defeat	72%
hijacker	100%	victory	72%
hostility	100%	enrichment	71%
IEDs	100%	biological	70%
jets	100%	weapons	68%
provocation	100%	strike	68%
scud	100%	raids	67%
spillover	100%	fronts	67%
strongholds	100%	isolat*	67%
uranium	100%	neighboring	67%
sovereign*	95%	ballistic	67%
aggression	95%	defy	67%
killers	88%	outlaw	67%
destruction	87%	aerial	67%
missiles	86%	dismantle	63%
plot	85%	surge	63%
deter	83%	warfare	60%
unarmed	83%	invasion	60%
militia	83%		

Table A3.4: Dictionary of Ideological Justifications

Ideological Phrases	Percentage Correct	Ideological Phrases	Percentage Correct
Ballots	100%	Suppress	100%
Democratization	100%	Transformation	100%
Electoral	100%	Turnout	100%
Enfranchised	100%	Unelected	100%
Ink	100%	Representative	80%
Interim	100%	Corrupt	75%
Judiciary	100%	Transitional	75%
Misrule	100%	Self-government	71%
Nondemocratic	100%	Opposition	66%
Parliamentary	100%	Aspirations	66%
Pluralistic	100%	Dialog	66%
Polls	100%	Democratically	63%
Prodemocracy	100%		

Table A3.5: Intervention Type by Conflict-Year

Target State	Year	Intervention Type
Afghanistan	1992	Humanitarian
Afghanistan	1998	Security
Afghanistan	1999	Security
Afghanistan	2001	Security
Afghanistan	2002	Security
Afghanistan	2003	Security
Afghanistan	2004	Security
Afghanistan	2005	Security
Afghanistan	2006	Security
Afghanistan	2007	Security
Afghanistan	2008	Security
Afghanistan	2009	Security
Afghanistan	2010	Security
Afghanistan	2011	Security
Afghanistan	2012	Security
Afghanistan	2013	Security
Angola	1990	Security
Angola	1992	Security
Angola	1993	Security
Azerbaijan	1992	Humanitarian
Bosnia	1992	Humanitarian
Bosnia	1993	Humanitarian
Bosnia	1994	Humanitarian
Bosnia	1995	Humanitarian
Burma	1991	Humanitarian
Burma	1993	Humanitarian
Burma	1994	Humanitarian
Burma	1996	Humanitarian
Burma	1997	Humanitarian
Burma	2003	Humanitarian
Burma	2007	Humanitarian
Burma	2008	Humanitarian
Burma	2010	Humanitarian
Cambodia	1990	Humanitarian
Cambodia	1992	Humanitarian
Chad	2008	Humanitarian
Cote d'Ivoire	2002	Humanitarian
Cote d'Ivoire	2011	Humanitarian
Croatia	1992	Humanitarian
Croatia	1993	Humanitarian
Croatia	1995	Humanitarian
Cuba	1996	Security
DRC	1996	Humanitarian
DRC	1997	Humanitarian
DRC	2006	Humanitarian
El Salvador	1990	Humanitarian
El Salvador	1991	Humanitarian
Eritrea	1999	Humanitarian
Ethiopia	1990	Humanitarian
Ethiopia	1999	Humanitarian
Guatemala	1993	Humanitarian
Guinea-Bissau	1998	Humanitarian
Haiti	1991	Humanitarian
Haiti	1993	Humanitarian
Haiti	2004	Humanitarian
Indonesia	1998	Humanitarian
Indonesia	1999	Humanitarian
Iran	1993	Security
Iran	1996	Security
Iran	1997	Security
Iran	2003	Security
Iran	2004	Security
Iran	2005	Security
Iran	2006	Security
Iran	2007	Security
Iran	2008	Security
Iran	2009	Security
Iran	2010	Security
Iran	2011	Security
Iraq	1990	Security
Iraq	1991	Security
Iraq	1992	Security
Iraq	1993	Security
Iraq	1994	Security
Iraq	1995	Security
Iraq	1996	Security
Iraq	1997	Security
Iraq	2002	Security
Iraq	2003	Security
Iraq	2004	Security
Iraq	2005	Security
Iraq	2006	Security

Target State	Year	Intervention Type
Iraq	2007	Security
Iraq	2008	Security
Iraq	2009	Security
Iraq	2010	Security
Kosovo/Serbia	1998	Humanitarian
Kosovo/Serbia	1999	Humanitarian
Lebanon	1990	Security
Liberia	1990	Humanitarian
Liberia	1998	Humanitarian
Liberia	2000	Humanitarian
Liberia	2003	Humanitarian
Libya	2011	Humanitarian
Macedonia	2001	Humanitarian
Mali	2013	Security
North Korea	1993	Security
North Korea	1994	Security
North Korea	2002	Security
North Korea	2003	Security
North Korea	2004	Security
North Korea	2010	Security
Pakistan	1994	Security
Peru	1992	Humanitarian
Rwanda	1994	Humanitarian
Rwanda	1996	Humanitarian
Sierra Leone	1997	Humanitarian
Sierra Leone	1998	Humanitarian
Sierra Leone	2000	Humanitarian
Sierra Leone	2001	Humanitarian
Somalia	1992	Humanitarian
Somalia	1993	Humanitarian
Somalia	1995	Humanitarian
Somalia	2006	Security
Somalia	2007	Security
Somalia	2008	Security
Somalia	2009	Security
Somalia	2010	Security
Somalia	2012	Security
Somalia	2013	Security
South Sudan	2013	Humanitarian
Sri Lanka	2009	Humanitarian
Sudan	1994	Humanitarian
Sudan	1996	Security
Sudan	1997	Security

Target State	Year	Intervention Type
Sudan	1998	Security
Sudan	2000	Humanitarian
Sudan	2001	Humanitarian
Sudan	2004	Humanitarian
Sudan	2005	Humanitarian
Sudan	2006	Humanitarian
Sudan	2007	Humanitarian
Sudan	2008	Humanitarian
Sudan	2009	Humanitarian
Sudan	2010	Humanitarian
Sudan	2011	Humanitarian
Syria	2004	Security
Syria	2008	Security
Syria	2011	Humanitarian
Syria	2012	Humanitarian
Syria	2013	Humanitarian
Uganda	2010	Humanitarian
Yemen	2009	Security
Yemen	2011	Humanitarian
Yemen	2012	Humanitarian
Yugoslavia	1991	Humanitarian

CHAPTER 4 APPENDIX

A4.1: Main Survey Instrument

Fielded July 14-23 2016 to 1,512 U.S. adults through Amazon's Mechanical Turk

1. Treatment Conditions

Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. president said:

"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar—why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to [its own civilians, including innocent women and children/the security of the United States, including the American people/its own civilians and the security of the United States]. It has [killed thousands of its own people and directly targeted civilians/created a safe haven for terrorists and threatened the United States/created a safe haven for terrorists and killed thousands of its own people]."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of [Numar's civilians/the United States/Numar's civilians and the United States] is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly [agreed with/disputed] the President's reasons for intervention. [They, too/they] thought the U.S. action would [1-10 from table below].

Summary:

- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
- He said the U.S. must act to protect [Numar's civilians/U.S. security/Numar's civilians and U.S. security].
- Experts publicly [agreed with/disputed] the President's reasons for intervention.
- Experts said military action would mainly protect [Numar's civilians/U.S. security/the President's own political agenda].

<table>
<tr><th colspan="5">Experts thought the U.S. should…</th></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>Humanitarian</td><td>Security</td><td colspan="2">Combo</td></tr>
<tr><td>Agree</td><td>(1)…protect Numar's civilians.</td><td>(2)…protect U.S. security.</td><td colspan="2">(3)…protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Disagree, legitimate</td><td>(4)… instead of concern for civilians, the real motivation of the U.S. action was to protect U.S. security.</td><td>(5)… instead of concern for U.S. security the real motivation of the U.S. action was to protect Numar's civilians.</td><td>(6)… instead of concern for civilians the only motivation of the U.S. action was to protect U.S. security.</td><td>(7)... instead of concern for U.S. security the only motivation of the U.S. action was to protect Numar's civilians.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Disagree, illegitimate</td><td>(8)… protecting Numar's civilians was a story to cover up the President's own political agenda.</td><td>(9)… protecting U.S. security was a story to cover up the President's own political agenda.</td><td colspan="2">(10)… protecting Numar's civilians and U.S. security was a story to cover up the President's own political agenda.</td></tr>
</table>

2. Indicators of Foreign Policy Beliefs and Follow-Up Questions

Foreign Policy Beliefs
Which of the following best reflects the role you think the United States should play in the world:
(response options randomized)

- It is essential for the United States to work with other nations to solve problems such as overpopulation, hunger, and pollution.
- It is important for the United States to maintain a strong military to ensure world peace.
- It is best for the future of the United States if we stay out of world affairs.

Support and Opposition
Would you oppose or favor U.S. military action in this situation?

- Oppose strongly
- Oppose somewhat
- Neither oppose nor favor
- Favor somewhat
- Favor strongly

[Asked only of respondents who select: "Neither oppose nor favor."]
If you had to choose, would you lean towards opposing or favoring military action in this situation?

- Lean towards opposing
- Lean towards favoring

Which of the following actions would you be willing to take to show your support or opposition to this military action? Check all that apply.
(Response order randomized)

- Use social media to express my opinion about the military action.
- Sign a petition about the military action.
- Write a letter to the editor of my local newspaper expressing my opinion about the military action.
- Contact my Member of Congress to express my opinion about the military action.
- Participate in a protest about the military action.
- None of the above.

Intervention Outcomes
If the United States takes military action in this case, how likely do you think each of the following outcomes will be:

Civilians in Numar will be safe.
- Very unlikely
- Somewhat unlikely
- Somewhat likely
- Very likely

The United States will be more secure.
- Very unlikely
- Somewhat unlikely
- Somewhat likely
- Very likely

Attention to Politics
Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time. Others aren't that interested. How often would you say you get news about politics from TV, radio, newspaper, or online outlets?
- A couple of times a month or less
- Once a week
- 2-3 times a week
- Daily
- Several times a day

A4.2: Control Condition

Fielded May 6-22, 2016 to 147 U.S. adults through Amazon's Mechanical Turk

1. Control Condition
As part of an address to the nation, the President said:

"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kundu--why it matters, and where we go from here. This is not a world we should accept. For generations, the United States of America has been an advocate for peace. While we cannot be the world's police force, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

2. Support
Do you favor or oppose U.S. military action in this situation?

- Favor strongly (1)
- Favor somewhat (2)
- Neither favor nor oppose (3)
- Oppose somewhat (4)
- Oppose strongly (5)

If you had to choose, would you favor or oppose U.S. military action in this situation?
(Given only to respondents who selected "Neither favor nor oppose" in the previous question.)

- Favor strongly
- Favor somewhat
- Oppose somewhat
- Oppose strong

3. Assumed Motivations
Which of the following best explains why the U.S. is taking military action in this situation:

- To protect U.S. national security
- To protect the people of Kundu
- To protect US economic interests
- To promote democracy around the world

A4.3: Preliminary Experiment Survey Instrument

Fielded June 10, 2016 to 607 U.S. adults through Amazon's Mechanical Turk.

1. Demographics and Foreign Policy Beliefs

First, we are going to ask you a few background questions.

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female
- Other

Which of the following best reflects the role you think the United States should play in the world:
(response options randomized)

- It is essential for the United States to work with other nations to solve problems such as overpopulation, hunger, and pollution.
- The United States must demonstrate its resolve so that others do not take advantage of it.
- We should not think so much in international terms, but concentrate more on our own national problems.

Did you vote in the 2012 general election?

- No
- I usually vote, but did not in 2012.
- I am not sure.
- Yes. I definitely voted.

What is the last grade or class that you completed in school?

- None or grades 1-8
- High school incomplete (grades 9-11)
- High school graduate (grade 12 or GED certificate)
- Technical, trade, or vocational school after high school
- Some college, no 4-year degree (including 2 year Associate Degree)
- College graduate (BS, BA, or other 4-year degree)
- Post-graduate training or professional schooling after college

2. Treatment Conditions
Respondents were randomly assigned to read one of the following four scenarios.

Security – Terrorism

As part of an address to the nation, the President said:

"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kumar—why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kumar has created a safe haven for terrorists and its actions pose a threat to U.S. military security."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake. While we cannot be the world's police force, when the safety of the United States is at risk, we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action.

Security—FPR

As part of an address to the nation, the President said:

"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kumar—why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kumar has invaded its neighboring state and its actions pose a threat to U.S. military security."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake. While we cannot be the world's police force, when the safety of the United States is at risk, we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

Humanitarian

As part of an address to the nation, the President said:

"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kumar—why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kumar has killed thousands of its own people and poses a threat to its civilians."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of thousands of civilians is at stake. While we cannot be the world's police force, when the safety of thousands of civilians is at risk, we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

Combo—Humanitarian & FPR

As part of an address to the nation, the President said:

"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kumar—why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kumar has invaded its neighboring state and killed thousands of civilians."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake. While we cannot be the world's police force, when the safety of thousands of civilians is at risk, we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

3. Support

All respondents were then asked:

Do you oppose or favor U.S. military action in this situation?

- Oppose strongly (1)
- Oppose somewhat (2)
- Favor somewhat (3)
- Favor strongly (4)

Table A4.4: Support for Justifications by Party ID

	Security	*Combined*	*Difference*
Democrats	0.49	0.59	0.10
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Republicans	0.73	0.71	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Independents	0.39	0.50	0.11
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.14)
Democrats (no lean)	0.45	0.61	0.17
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Republicans (no lean)	0.85	0.75	0.10
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Independents (no lean)	0.50	0.56	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Strong Democrats	0.25	0.46	0.21
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Strong Republicans	1.00	0.71	0.29
	(0.00)	(0.17)	(0.17)
N	153	151	

Table reports results from two-tailed tests of proportions. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A4.5 Support for Humanitarian Justifications by Party ID

	Humanitarian	*Difference from Democrats*
Democrats	0.64	
	(0.05)	
Republicans	0.61	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.09)
Independents	0.41	0.23**
	(0.09)	(0.11)
Democrats (no lean)	0.63	
	(0.06)	
Republicans (no lean)	0.67	0.04
	(0.09)	(0.11)
Independents (no lean)	0.52	0.11
	(0.06)	(0.09)
Strong Democrats	0.60	
	(0.11)	
Strong Republicans	0.71	0.11
	(0.17)	(0.20)
N	153	

Table reports results from two-tailed tests of proportions. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

CHAPTER 5 APPENDIX

A5.1: Survey Instrument

1. Treatment Conditions

Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. president said:

"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar—why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to [its own civilians, including innocent women and children/the security of the United States, including the American people/its own civilians and the security of the United States]. It has [killed thousands of its own people and directly targeted civilians/created a safe haven for terrorists and threatened the United States/created a safe haven for terrorists and killed thousands of its own people]."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of [Numar's civilians/the United States/Numar's civilians and the United States] is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly [agreed with/disputed] the President's reasons for intervention. [They, too/they] thought the U.S. action would [1-10 from table below].

Summary:

- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
- He said the U.S. must act to protect [Numar's civilians/U.S. security/Numar's civilians and U.S. security].
- Experts publicly [agreed with/disputed] the President's reasons for intervention.
- Experts said military action would mainly protect [Numar's civilians/U.S. security/the President's own political agenda].

<table>
<tr><th colspan="5">Experts thought the U.S. should…</th></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>Humanitarian</td><td>Security</td><td colspan="2">Combo</td></tr>
<tr><td>Agree</td><td>(1)…protect Numar's civilians.</td><td>(2)…protect U.S. security.</td><td colspan="2">(3)…protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Disagree, legitimate</td><td>(4)… instead of concern for civilians, the real motivation of the U.S. action was to protect U.S. security.</td><td>(5)… instead of concern for U.S. security the real motivation of the U.S. action was to protect Numar's civilians.</td><td>(6)… instead of concern for civilians the only motivation of the U.S. action was to protect U.S. security.</td><td>(7)... instead of concern for U.S. security the only motivation of the U.S. action was to protect Numar's civilians.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Disagree, illegitimate</td><td>(8)… protecting Numar's civilians was a story to cover up the President's own political agenda.</td><td>(9)… protecting U.S. security was a story to cover up the President's own political agenda.</td><td colspan="2">(10)… protecting Numar's civilians and U.S. security was a story to cover up the President's own political agenda.</td></tr>
</table>

2. Indicators of Foreign Policy Beliefs and Follow-Up Questions

Foreign Policy Beliefs
Which of the following best reflects the role you think the United States should play in the world:
(response options randomized)

- It is essential for the United States to work with other nations to solve problems such as overpopulation, hunger, and pollution.
- It is important for the United States to maintain a strong military to ensure world peace.
- It is best for the future of the United States if we stay out of world affairs.

Support and Opposition
Would you oppose or favor U.S. military action in this situation?

- Oppose strongly
- Oppose somewhat
- Neither oppose nor favor
- Favor somewhat
- Favor strongly

[Asked only of respondents who select: "Neither oppose nor favor."]
If you had to choose, would you lean towards opposing or favoring military action in this situation?

- Lean towards opposing
- Lean towards favoring

Political Costs
To what extent do you disagree or agree with each of the following statements:

I approve of the way the president handled the situation in Numar.

- Disagree strongly
- Disagree somewhat
- Agree somewhat
- Agree strongly

The president described the situation in Numar accurately.

- Disagree strongly
- Disagree somewhat
- Agree somewhat
- Agree strongly

If the hypothetical president were running for reelection, how likely would you be to vote for him?

- Very unlikely
- Somewhat unlikely
- Somewhat likely
- Very likely

Future Intervention

Now we are going to describe another situation this hypothetical President faced about a year after taking military action in Numar. As before, the scenario reflects a situation the U.S. has faced many times in the past and will likely face again in the future, but it is not about any country in the news today.

In an address to the nation, the President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I have received gruesome evidence that genocide is taking place in Rundu. Innocent civilians, including women and children, are being massacred in their homes by neighbors who support Rundu's government. The United States cannot be the world's police force, but when we can stop children from being killed in their own homes, we have a responsibility to act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

Would you oppose or favor U.S. military action in this situation?

- Oppose strongly
- Oppose somewhat
- Favor somewhat
- Favor strongly

Based on your best guess and what you've read about the situation in Rundu, to what extent do you agree with the following statements:

I trust the president to handle the situation in Rundu.

- Disagree strongly
- Disagree somewhat
- Agree somewhat
- Agree strongly

The president described the situation in Rundu accurately.

- Disagree strongly
- Disagree somewhat
- Agree somewhat
- Agree strongly

Table A5.2 Approve of the Way the President Handled the Crisis

	Humanitarian	*Security*	*Combined*	
Sincere	0.63	0.63	0.67	
	(0.55, 0.70)	(0.55, 0.71)	(0.59, 0.74)	
Insincere	0.41	0.44	0.57[#]	0.59[##]
	(0.33, 0.49)	(0.36, 0.52)	(0.49, 0.65)	(0.51, 0.67)
Illegitimate	0.39	0.41	0.38	
	(0.31, 0.46)	(0.33, 0.49)	(0.30, 0.46)	
N	456	451	606	

Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals reported in parentheses. [#]Insincere humanitarian claim, sincere security claim. [##]Insincere security claim, sincere humanitarian claim.

Table A5.3 Belief in President's Accuracy by Foreign Policy Beliefs

	Cooperative Internationalists	*Militant Internationalists*	*Isolationists*
Sincere	0.81 (0.73, 0.89)	0.89 (0.80, 0.98)	0.75 (0.58, 0.92)
Insincere	0.51 (0.40, 0.62)	0.75 (0.62, 0.88)	0.50 (0.31, 0.69)
Illegitimate	0.57 (0.46, 0.67)	0.58 (0.42, 0.74)	0.45 (0.27, 0.63)
N	254	121	81

Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals reported in parentheses.

CHAPTER 8 APPENDIX

A8.1 Treatment Conditions for Survey Experiments Reported in Table 8.1

Experiment 1, May 2016, MTurk

Humanitarian
As part of an address to the nation, the President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kundu--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kundu poses a grave threat to its own civilians, including innocent women and children. It has killed, imprisoned, and tortured thousands of its own people."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of thousands of civilians is at stake. For generations, the United States of America has been an advocate for peace. While we cannot be the world's police force, when the safety of thousands of civilians is at risk, we have a responsibility to act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

Security
As part of an address to the nation, the President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kundu--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kundu poses a grave threat to the security of the United States, including the American people. It has created a safe haven for terrorists and its actions would weaken U.S. military security."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake. For generations, the United States of America has been an advocate for peace. While we cannot be the world's police force, when the safety of the United States is at risk, we have a responsibility to act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

Combined
As part of an address to the nation, the President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kundu--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kundu poses a grave threat to its own civilians and to the security of the United States. It has created a safe haven for terrorists and killed, imprisoned, and tortured thousands of its own people."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of thousands of civilians and the United States is at stake. For generations, the United States of America has been an advocate for peace. While we cannot be the world's police force, when our security is at risk and we can prevent civilians from being targeted, we have a responsibility to act. That is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

Experiment 2, June 2016, MTurk

Humanitarian
As part of an address to the nation, the President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kumar—why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kumar has killed thousands of its own people and poses a threat to its civilians."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of thousands of civilians is at stake. While we cannot be the world's police force, when the safety of thousands of civilians is at risk, we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

Terrorism
As part of an address to the nation, the President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kumar—why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kumar has created a safe haven for terrorists and its actions pose a threat to U.S. military security."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake. While we cannot be the world's police force, when the safety of the United States is at risk, we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action.

Foreign Policy Restraint
As part of an address to the nation, the President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kumar—why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kumar has invaded its neighboring state and its actions pose a threat to U.S. military security."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake. While we cannot be the world's police force, when the safety of the United States is at risk, we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

Combined (FPR+Humanitarian)
As part of an address to the nation, the President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kumar—why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kumar has invaded its neighboring state and killed thousands of civilians."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake. While we cannot be the world's police force, when the safety of thousands of civilians is at risk, we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

Experiment 3, July 2016, MTurk
Results from this survey are reported in Chapters 4 and 5. See appendix A4.1 for treatment wording.

Experiment 4, August 2016, MTurk

Humanitarian
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own civilians, including innocent women and children. It has killed thousands of its own people and directly targeted civilians."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

Security
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to the security of the United States, including the American people. It has created a safe haven for terrorists and threatened the United States."

"This is not a world we should accept. The United States' national security and the safety of the American people are at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

Combined
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own civilians and to the security of the United States. It has created a safe haven for terrorists and killed thousands of its own people."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians and of the United States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

Experiment 5, October 2016, MTurk

Humanitarian
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own civilians, including innocent women and children. It has killed thousands of its own people and directly targeted civilians."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians.

Summary:
- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
- He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians.
- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
- Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians.

Security
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to the security of the United States, including the American people. It has created a safe haven for terrorists and threatened the United States."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect U.S. security.

Summary:
- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
- He said the U.S. must act to protect U.S. security.
- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
- Experts said military action would mainly protect U.S. security.

Combined
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own civilians and to the security of the United States. It has created a safe haven for terrorists and killed thousands of its own people."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians and the United States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.

Summary:

- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
- He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.
- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
- Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.

Experiment 6, November 2016, MTurk

Humanitarian
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own civilians, including innocent women and children. It has killed thousands of its own people and directly targeted civilians."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians.

Summary:
- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
- He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians.
- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
- Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians.

Security
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to the security of the United States, including the American people. It has created a safe haven for terrorists and threatened the United States."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect U.S. security.

Summary:
- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
- He said the U.S. must act to protect U.S. security.
- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
- Experts said military action would mainly protect U.S. security.

Combined
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own civilians and to the security of the United States. It has created a safe haven for terrorists and killed thousands of its own people."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians and the United States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.

Summary:

- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
- He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.
- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
- Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.

Experiment 7, December 12, 2016, MTurk

Security
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to the security of the United States, including the American people. It has invaded its neighboring state and threatened the United States."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect U.S. security.

Summary:
- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
- He said the U.S. must act to protect U.S. security.
- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
- Experts said military action would mainly protect U.S. security.

Combined
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own civilians and to the security of the United States. It has invaded its neighboring state and killed thousands of its own people."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians and the United States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.

Summary:
- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
- He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.
- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
- Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.

Experiment 8, December 19-30, 2016, SSI

Humanitarian
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own civilians, including innocent women and children. It has killed thousands of its own people and directly targeted civilians."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians.

Summary:
- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
- He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians.
- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
- Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians.

Security
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to the security of the United States, including the American people. It has invaded its neighboring state and threatened the United States."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect U.S. security.

Summary:
- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
- He said the U.S. must act to protect U.S. security.
- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
- Experts said military action would mainly protect U.S. security.

Combined
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own civilians and to the security of the United States. It has invaded its neighboring state and killed thousands of its own people."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians and the United States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.

Summary:

- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
- He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.
- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
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Experiment 9, May 2017, MTurk

Humanitarian
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own civilians, including innocent women and children. It has killed thousands of its own people and directly targeted civilians."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians.

Summary:
- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
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- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
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Terrorism
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to the security of the United States, including the American people. It has created a safe haven for terrorists and threatened the United States."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect U.S. security.

Summary:
- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
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- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
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Foreign Policy Restraint
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to the security of the United States, including the American people. It has invaded its neighboring state and threatened the United States."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect U.S. security.

Summary:

- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
- He said the U.S. must act to protect U.S. security.
- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
- Experts said military action would mainly protect U.S. security.

Combined (Humanitarian + Terrorism)
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own civilians and to the security of the United States. It has created a safe haven for terrorists and killed thousands of its own people."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians and the United States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.

Summary:

- The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
- He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.
- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
- Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.

Combined (Humanitarian + FPR)
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own civilians and to the security of the United States. It has invaded its neighboring state and killed thousands of its own people."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians and the United States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

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- Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.

A8.2 Results from Moderation Analysis of Effects of Foreign Policy Beliefs and Partisanship on Support

	Humanitarian	*Security*	*Combined*
CI	1.08***	0.66*	0.42
	(0.41)	(0.38)	(0.39)
Co-Partisan	0.25	0.67	0.93*
	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.49)
CI*Co-Partisan	**-0.17**	**-0.83**	**-0.51**
	(0.62)	**(0.61)**	**(0.63)**
MI	0.78	1.21**	0.49
	(0.53)	(0.51)	(0.43)
Co-Partisan	0.14	0.33	0.39
	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.36)
MI*Co-Partisan	**0.13**	**-0.76**	**0.85**
	(0.82)	**(0.73)**	**(0.76)**
ISO	-2.99***	-2.64***	-1.91**
	(0.78)	(0.66)	(0.78)
Co-Partisan	0.12	-0.18	0.68**
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.33)
ISO*Co-Partisan	**-0.36**	**2.26****	**-0.68**
	(1.32)	**(0.93)**	**(1.35)**
N	195	196	189

Table reports coefficients from logistic regression models of binary foreign policy belief and co-partisan variables and interactions on a binary measure of support for each category of justification. Standard errors reported in parentheses.. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Note: Data for the analysis reported above were collected from a survey experiment conducted in June 2017. See A8.4 for complete instrument.

A8.3 Tests of Proportions for Support by Education Level (SSI Sample)

	Humanitarian	*Security*	*Combined*
No College Degree	0.59	0.67	0.67
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
College Degree	0.52	0.69	0.57
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Difference	0.07	0.01	0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
N	208	202	202

Table reports the results of tests of proportions using data from the SSI sample. No college degree=0, college degree=1. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

A8.4 Presidential Partisanship Survey Instrument

The following survey was conducted using Amazon's Mechanical Turk to a sample of 1,177 U.S. adults in June 2017. The partisanship of the president was randomized within each treatment condition.

Humanitarian
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President, a [**Republican/Democrat**], said:

"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own civilians, including innocent women and children. It has killed thousands of its own people and directly targeted civilians."

"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."

After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians.

Summary:

- The U.S. President, a [**Republican/Democrat**], has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.
- He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians.
- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
- Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians.

Would you oppose or favor U.S. military action in this situation?

- Oppose strongly
- Oppose somewhat
- Favor somewhat
- Favor strongly

Security
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President, a [**Republican/Democrat**], said:
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to the security of the United States, including the American people. It has invaded its neighboring state and threatened the United States."

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Summary:

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- Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.
- Experts said military action would mainly protect U.S. security.

Would you oppose or favor U.S. military action in this situation?

- Oppose strongly
- Oppose somewhat
- Favor somewhat
- Favor strongly

Combined
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President, a [**Republican/Democrat**], said:
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